T1609 Three Short Treatises by Vasubandhu, Sengzhao, and Zongmi

Part Four

Vasubandhu's Sautrāntika

Theory on the Nature

of Action

If you do not grant that the two acts of body and speech exist, do you not then contradict and slander the scripture on these two kinds of acts? We neither contradict nor slander it. We are able intelligently to interpret the scripture, so that we commit no error in its regard. How do you interpret this scripture without error?

We avoid the poison of your opinion. We will explain in detail why the scripture speaks about three acts, what is meant by an act of the body, what the terms "body" and "act" mean, and what the terms "bodily action" and "mental action" signify. These are our questions.

1. The Three Actions

in the Scripture

Why then does the scripture only speak of the three acts of body, [speech, and mind]and not about[acts of] sight, and so forth? The scripture talks about the three acts to show that these three actions comprehend the ten paths of action, because its intent is to encourage those who fear there are too many things to be implemented. In a similar fashion, [the Buddha] summarized the three trainings for Vṛjiputra. Some thought that all acts are exclusively acts performed by the body, not by either speech or mind. So the scripture speaks about the three acts to show that these latter two are also to be performed.

2. The Body and Action

The body denotes a special combination composed of all the basic great elements, [endowed with] sensation. Action denotes a special volition. 41

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A Mahayana Demonstration on the Theme of Action 3. The Meaning of the

Term "Body"

A body is that which is brought about by accumulation, since it is brought about by the accumulation of atoms composed of the great material elements. Some think that the body denotes the accumulation of the various kinds of filth, because it is supported on various impure things. If this were true, however, then there would be no bodies among the gods. 4. The Meaning of the

Term "Action"

An act signifies a deed performed with intention by an agent. 5. The Meaning of the Phrase

"Bodily Action"

Bodily action denotes the volition that moves a body [to perform a physical act]. There are three types of such volitions: the volition to deliberate, the volition to decide [about that deliberation], and the volition to put [that decision] into effect. The volition that moves the body is itself called a bodily action, because that volition can engender the wind element that projects the bodily continuity into a different place. To be exact, one would say "the act that moves the body,

" but here the term "move" has been omitted and the text only says "the act of the body,

" just as one might speak simply of "an

oil of strengthening" in place of "an oil that increases strength" or simply of a "dust wind" instead of "a wind that moves dust. "

You should admit that in the path of the ten acts [only]the first three acts are included in the acts of the body, i.e., taking life, taking what has not been given, and [engaging in] illicit sexual activity. How does the act of volition deserve the same name?

Because it is an act of volition that moves the body to commit murder, theft, or [engage in] illicit activity. That which is done through the power of volition to move the body is identified as an act of volition. We commonly say that violent rebels burned down a village or that the fuel cooks the rice, [while in fact it is fire that does both].

Why then is volition called a path of action? 42

Part Four

It is called an action because volition has activity. It is called a path of action because it brings about the paths leading to good and bad destinies and then engenders those [destinies]. Alternately, the body that has been moved is the path of the action of volition because the three kinds of acts of volition function in reliance on the [body].

Moreover, killing, stealing, and debauchery are supported on the body, because they arise from an act of volition. Thus they are called bodily actions in accord with convention. Yet, in fact, such actions are themselves neither good or bad; it is by convention that one provisionally establishes their [designations as "good" or "bad"] so that people in the world might cultivate positive volitions and avoid negative volitions through the teachings. They are labeled as good or bad only through provisional designation. If only acts of volition are good or bad, then why does the Scripture on the Path of Action say

"It is because of the threefold[acts] of the body,[i.e., killing, stealing, and committing debauchery,] that a volition initiates action, and then performs and increases it. Because it is bad, it engenders the result of suffering and the maturation of that suffering.

"

The meaning of this scriptural passage is that the act of volition, which moves the body, which employs the body as its means, which is supported on the body and which takes killing, stealing, or debauchery as its object, is the cause that influences the resultant maturation of suffering. While they are called three kinds of bodily acts they are brought about by volition. The other volitions, [i.e., deliberation and decision,] are distinct from [the volition that effects bodily communication] and thus are called acts of mind, because they are associated with mind and neither move the body nor emit speech. If this is true, why then does the scripture speak of two actions: the act of volition and the act that has been willed?

Among the three types of acts explained above, the first two kinds of volition, [deliberation and decision,] are called acts of volition; only the third volition [that effects bodily communication] is called an act that has been willed. There is no error of contradicting the scripture here. 6. The Meaning of the Phrase

"Verbal Action"

Speech denotes the enunciation of words. It is called speech because it manifests 43

786b

A Mahayana Demonstration on the Theme of Action

the meaning of what one wishes to express. The volition that enunciates speech is named a verbal action. Alternately, speech is the support of syllables, etc., and it is called "speech" because it elucidates meaning by maintaining the syllables, etc. To be exact, we would call it "an act that enunciates speech, "

but here the term "enunciates" has been omitted and [the scripture] simply calls it "an act of speech.

" The examples are as given above.

7. The Meaning of the Phrase

"Mental Action"

Mind signifies consciousness. It is called mind because it can deliberate and move toward the engendering of other [acts] and toward [other] objects. The volition that activates the will is called an act of willing, because it brings about the willfulness to create various affairs, either good or bad. To be exact, we should call it "an act that effects will,

" but [the scripture] omits the term

"effects" and simply talks about "an act of willing.

" The examples are as

explained above.

If the three kinds of acts denote only volition, then in a distracted mind, or in an unconscious state in which no mind occurs, how could there be discipline or laxity? Because the seeds permeated by virtue of that special volition are not lost, we speak about discipline or laxity [in these states]. There is no error here. We understand the special volition to communicate either the discipline or laxity that such a superior thought elicits, since this volition permeates these two kinds of superior seeds. As long as these two kinds of seeds have not been lost, we provisionally establish the noncommunicative [acts] of good and bad discipline.

What do you mean when you say that one loses the seeds implanted by this special volition?

We mean that these [seeds] are no longer active causes for engendering a volition either for renunciation or its opposite, as they previously have been. What can destroy these seeds?

We hold that a volition that engenders a communicative act causes the abandonment of either good or bad discipline, as well as other causes that also lead to their loss.

44

Part Four

8. The Principle of the

Classification of Actions

The reason [the scripture] does not talk about acts of sight, etc., is because it only treats the acts of effort of sentient beings, not the acts carried out by all the sense spheres.

What are these acts of effort of sentient beings? The activity brought about by the will of an agent. What are acts carried out by all the sense spheres? The separate abilities of the eye, ear, [and the other senses]. The Buddha explained the three actions, whose meaning is deep and subtle.

Relying on reason and doctrine, I have finished this wondrous discourse.

I vow to transfer this merit to save the host of beings, Influencing them to quickly realize pure enlightenment. [End of] A Mahayana Demonstration on the Theme of Action [in] One Fascicle

45

Notes

A Mahayana Demonstration on the Theme of Action

Notes

1 Lambert Schmithausen, in Ālayavijñāna: On the Origin and the Early Development of a Central Concept of Yogācāra Philosophy, Part I: Text, Part II: Notes, Bibliography, and Indices(Tokyo: The International Institute for Buddhist Studies, 1987), argues that the theory of the storehouse consciousness developed in direct response to such a problematic and identifies the probable textual origin in the "Basic Section" of the Yogācārabhūmi.

2 This becomes apparent from a comparison of the critical Tibetan text prepared by Gijun Muroji, Jōgōron: Chibetto yaku kōteihon. The Tibetan Text of the Karma-Siddhi-Prakaraṇa of Vasubandhu with Reference to the Abhidharma-Kośa-Bhāṣya and the Pratītya-Samutpāda-Vyākhyā. Critically edited from the Cone, Derge, Narthang and Peking Editions of the Tibetan Tanjur (Kyoto: Self-published, 1985). Muroji's translation includes brief introductory remarks in both Japanese and English, followed by a critically edited Tibetan text along with Xuanzang's Chinese translation. Following Sumatiśila's commentary, Muroji differentiates Vasubandhu's voice from that of his interlocutors, yet the grammar of Xuanzang's Chinese at times clearly differs. 3 Étienne Lamotte, in his translation of the text,

"Le Traite de l'Acte de Vasubandhu

(Karma-siddhi-prakaraṇa)" Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques 4 (1935-1936): 151-282; English translation by Leo M. Pruden, Karmasiddhi Prakaraṇa: The Treatise on Action by Vasubandhu(Berkeley: Asian Humanities Press, 1988), restricted his attention to the Tibetan text and to Xuanzang's Chinese, and did not make use either of Vimokṣaprajñā'sChinese translation or of Sumatiśila's commentary. He invariably follows Xuanzang in identifying the lines of argumentation. In contrast, Yamaguchi Susumu, in Seishin no Jōgōron: Zenkeikai no chūshaku ni yoru gententeki kaimei (Kyoto: Hōzōkan, 1951), has made use of all the relevant materials and this work remains the best source for a comparative study of the text. 4 Lamotte, trans. Pruden, Karmasiddhi Prakaraṇa: The Treatise on Action by Vasu bandhu,pp. 36-39. 5 Stefan Anacker,

"A Discussion for the Demonstration of Action (Karma-Siddhi-Prakaraṇa), " in Seven Works of Vasubandhu, the Buddhist Psychological Doctor (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1984), p. 85. This translation is from the Tibetan and is guided by Sumatiśila's commentary, the Karmasiddhiṭīkā.

46

ESSAYS OF SENGZHAO

Contents

Translator's Introduction 51 Essays of Sengzhao I. Main Doctrine 63 II. Things Do Not Shift III. Emptiness as Nonsubstantiality 71 IV. Prajñāwithout Knowing 77 V. Correspondence with Liu Yimin 65 87

VI. Nirvana is Unnameable 101 Notes 123

49

Translator’s Introduction

Translator's Introduction

Thematic Overview

The collection of texts translated here, four essays and an exchange of letters, plus an introductory chapter, attributed to the scholar-monk Sengzhao (374-414 C.E.) is perhaps best seen, in the most general terms, as an extended meditation on a perennial theme in Chinese religio-philosophical reflection, the theme of sagehood. As the Essays investigate the nature and attributes of the sage—the sage's cognition, his world, his activities, and his mode of being in time—they take up a broad range of religio-philosophical topics, from self-cultivation and charisma to ontology and language, action and power. While Sengzhao draws on Indian Buddhist religio-philosophical resources (mainly, the Madhyamaka critique of substantializing language and its distinction of two levels of truth), as well as on the native Chinese tradition of philosophical and aesthetic reflection (especially those associated with the "Daoist" classics, the Laoziand the Zhuangzi), the Essaysresist simple reduction to either, nor can they be explained as a straightforward case of influence or adaptation. Instead, these writings present an original response to a set of concerns unique to Sengzhao, his community, and his times, and as such are an important voice in the religious speculation of early medieval China. Among the issues explored in these Essaysare such questions as who is a sage? How is the "sagely mind" different from the mind of the ordinary person? What are the properties of the world that the sage inhabits? If that world is empty (i.e., empty of "substantial being"), what happens in it to the reality of individual things, and what does it mean to say (as is said in the Essays) that in it "the power of myriad things is greatly amplified"? If emptiness is not a simple eradication of being, what, then, is it exactly—a state prior to the beingness of beings? An inherent quality of linguistic expression that can never reach any transcendental signifier? Or a mental attitude of withdrawal from engagement with things? Who is capable of becoming a sage? Is this a universal capacity or is it limited to a select few? And how does one attain sagehood? Is this attainment akin to "worldly" attainments 51

Essays of Sengzhao

and thus it can be made into a human project? Is such attainment at all possible if all things are really empty, without anything to be attained? Assuming the possibility of sagehood, is it brought about by a process of practice and learning, or rather by letting go and unlearning? Or is it not a process at all but rather a sudden breakthrough? How does the extraordinary cognition of the sage, prajñā(transcendental wisdom), affect the functioning and applicability of language? Can the wisdom of prajñābe communicated in language or does it inevitably confound all attempts at linguistic expression, ultimately rendering one silent? On the emotive-active side, if for the sage individual desires have ceased, how is it that he or she is able to "respond to things and events with an inexhaustible acuity"? Finally, what about time: if in emptiness things do not display temporal extension (they neither pass away nor endure unchangingly but rather exist in an eternal "now"), does this not present the possibility of a unique type of immortality? Language and Form

The core texts of the collection translated here, aside from the epistolary exchange and the introductory overview, represent the genre of lun, "expository essay"

or "disquisition.

" This genre started to gain popularity from the late Han period (late second century C.E.) and subsequently emerged as a favorite form of expository writing on political, aesthetic, and religious topics among the literary elites of the Northern and Southern dynasties (late third to sixth centuries). The language of lunis highly stylized, rich in tersely structured aesthetic devices such as allusion, alliteration, and parallelisms. Lun are as much a demonstration of the author's literary skill as an expression of philosophical insight or moral integrity. Though often polemical, the rhetoric of lunis not primarily argumentative but rather persuasive: it does not rely on strict logical reasoning but instead on an aesthetic appeal designed to solicit the reader's intellectual and emotional assent. All these characteristics are on ample display in Sengzhao's Essays. Other noteworthy features of the text are frequent references to Buddhist (mainly "Mahayana") sutras and śāstras, which both structure the discussion and lend it an aura of antiquity and authority; the question-and-answer format (dialogue with a fictitious opponent); and the use of a highly structured pattern of exposition, referred to in scholarship as interlocking parallel structure, or chain-argument, in which two lines of argument are developed simultaneously and intertwined.

52

Translator's Introduction

Historical Context

Sengzhao lived in a time of turmoil and innovation, referred to by historians as the "Northern and Southern dynasties" era (220-589 C.E.). It began with the fall of the Han empire, a momentous event that ushered in four centuries of political, military, and social upheaval and led to the redefinition of China's geography, society, and power structures. After almost a century of civil war dominated by the Three Kingdoms (the Shu, Wu, and Wei), the Jin restored a short-lived period of peace (280-316). In 316 the ruling house collapsed, due to internal strife and "barbarian" revolt, and for the next three centuries the areas north of the Yangzi River came to be dominated by non-Han nomadic and seminomadic tribes (which established a rapid succession of polities known collectively as the Sixteen Kingdoms). War and catastrophic flooding forced Han populations out of their heartland in the Yellow River basin to the sparsely populated mountainous and forested areas south of the Yangzi.

This tumultuous era was also one of major cultural innovation. As the Han empire fell its imperial orthodoxy, the foundation of classics, historiography, and state-controlled ritual systems, were also brought down. When the dust settled a new open space of unprecedented autonomy in the realms of literature, cosmology, and religion was revealed. Already by the late second and early third centuries, thinkers such as Wang Chong, Wang Bi, and He Yan had launched innovative critiques of Confucian orthodoxy, which reevaluated the foundation of individual and social life by probing the relationships between being and nonbeing, language and reality, the one and the many, and active involvement and eremitic non-action. The intellectual tradition they initiated came to be known as xuanxue,

"dark learning" or "study of the dark. The word "dark" is an allusion to such Daoist classics as the Laozi, theZhuangzi,and the Yijing, in which the concept of darkness figures prominently, and which gained immense popularity in this time.

In the mid-third century, with the increasing alienation of intellectual elites from the structures of state power, a new form of eremitism emerged, epitomized by the so-called Seven Worthies of the Bamboo Grove, a semi-legendary group of poet-recluses. Their works profess a disdain for established mores, political careerism, and literary orthodoxy and celebrate individualism, music, wine, and nature. The elites no longer defined themselves exclusively by hereditary inclusion 53

Essays of Sengzhao

in the institutions of state power but through the autonomous cultivation of literary refinement. This is manifested in the emergence of new poetic genres (especially the lyric poem, which expresses individual feelings) and new collections of poetry, as well as in qingtan, "pure conversation,

" a refined style of

conversation rife with bon-mots, literary allusions, puns, and sharp repartée. In later centuries, especially in the south, the very meaning of textual authority came to be redefined in the composition of theoretical treatises on literature, often with strong xuanxueovertones, that departed from the traditional orthodox definition of the canon. All of these factors reverberate throughout the Essays, with its xuanxuevocabulary, its qingtanaesthetics, its appeal to the ideal of cultured withdrawal, and its novel approach to the literary canon. Buddhism and Daoism, the first large-scale institutionalized religions in Chinese history, also emerged in this period. In the last decades of Han rule, in what is now Shandong and Sichuan, mass millennarian religions (mainly the Heavenly Masters, or Tianshi, sect of Daoism) empowered popular rebellions that carved out new social spaces outside of established societal and state structures. After the fall of the Western Jin and the division of China in 316, the southern elites were drawn to literary forms of Daoism, which offered techniques for attaining immortality through bodily and alchemical practices (e.g., Ge Hong and his text, Master Who Embraces Simplicity), as well as promising access to the spirits of deceased kin through shamanic revelation (the Shangqing, or Highest Clarity, tradition). Also in the south, around the turn of the fifth century, a new institutional form of Daoism, the Lingbao sect, appropriated the Buddhist doctrine of karma to develop elaborate rituals for the salvation of the dead. This institution was modeled on the Buddhist religion, which by then had become established as a significant presence in China.

Buddhism had been making inroads into China's vast territory via the Silk Road routes since the turn of the eras. Its sophisticated analyses of the mind and meditation practices attracted members of the literary elite steeped in "dark learning" and"pure conversation.

" The social spheres of the monk and the literatus interpenetrated. After China's split into north and south, the two regions developed divergent models of state-Buddhism relations. In the south, state regulation of Buddhism was mild: rulers patronized the religion, building monasteries and stupas, sponsoring sutra recitation, and granting land for monastic institutions, 54

Translator's Introduction

in order to accrue spiritual merit and cultural capital, but the ruling powers generally refrained from challenging Buddhism's self-professed autonomy vis-àvis the state. A more assertive policy toward Buddhism developed in the northern kingdoms, whose nomadic and semi-nomadic non-Han rulers, while often genuinely devoted to the religion, also actively regulated it and used it for purposes of statecraft. For them, the charismatic monks, with their miracle-working powers, were a potent political asset, and Buddhist cosmology, with its ideal of the cakravartin("wheel-turning king"), a model of kingship that is both transcendent and worldly, offered a powerful symbol of political authority. One of the northern kingdoms, the Later Qin (384-417), fit this profile quite well. Its ruler, the Sinified proto-Tibetan Yao Xing (366-416, r. 393-416), established in his capital, Chang'an, what was to become one of the greatest centers of Buddhist translation and scholarship in history. He imported to Chang'an numerous Indian and Central Asian Buddhist masters and sponsored scripture translation projects on an unprecedented scale. In early 402 he brought to Chang'an the great Kuchean scholar Kumārajīva, lavishing great honors on him, and put him in charge of the translation academy with (according to some traditional accounts) some five hundred learned monks. One of Kumārajīva's chief disciples and colleagues was Sengzhao, then twenty-eight years old. Biography of Sengzhao

According to Sengzhao's traditional biography, he was born to an impoverished family in 374 in the vicinity of Chang'an. As a young man he earned his living as a copyist, which exposed him to the literary canon of the day. He was especially fond of the Laoziand the Zhuangzi,but ultimately found these texts unsatisfactory. An encounter with the Teaching of Vimalakīrti (in the old third-century translation by Zhi Qian of the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa) proved pivotal—he was captivated by the text and resolved to direct his efforts toward Buddhism. He studied various forms of Buddhist doctrine, including the Prajñāpāramitā literature and also Mainstream (non-Mahayana) texts. Word of his intellectual prowess and debating skills spread quickly throughout the Chang'an area. In 398 Sengzhao joined Kumārajīva in Guzang, far west of present-day Gansu province, and became his disciple. In early 402, when the king of the Later Qin, Yao Xing, brought Kumārajīva to his capital in Chang'an, Sengzhao accompanied the master to 55

Essays of Sengzhao

the city. Kumārajīva was put in charge of the translation academy and Sengzhao joined the team that included Sengrui, Daorong, Sengdao, Tanying, and others, in time becoming one of Kumārajīva's chief intellectual collaborators. The Text

Sengzhao composed his first essay, translated in the present volume as "Prajñā without Knowing,

" around 405, following on Kumārajīva's retranslation, in 403-404, of the the Larger Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra.In this essay Sengzhao attempts to distinguish from ordinary knowledge the special mode of cognition that is unique to the sage. In the introductory passage Sengzhao praises the king's patronage of Buddhism as well as the genius of Kumārajīva, and announces the essay's topic: wisdom (prajñā) that knows everything without being limited to the cognizance of individual things. A longer section follows in which this theme is developed over a series of nine objections from a fictitious opponent with nine responses by Sengzhao.

This essay was taken south to Huiyuan's community at Lushan by Daosheng (408), where it was read by many, including the literatus and lay devotee Liu Yimin, as well as the scholar-monk Huiyuan. In response Liu wrote a lengthy letter to Sengzhao; this letter, along with Sengzhao's subsequent reply (circa 410), forms the "Correspondence with Liu Yimin" translated in this volume. The polite greetings that open both letters contain valuable information about the history of this period. In the main part of the essay Liu expresses his own and Huiyuan's doubts about the coherence of Sengzhao's portrayal of the "sagely mind" as at once all-knowing yet being altogether without knowledge. Likely between 408 and 411, Sengzhao wrote "Emptiness as Nonsubstantiality. " In the first part of this essay Sengzhao attacks three competing theories of emptiness current in his day: emptiness defined as "no mentation, " as "original

nonbeing,

" and as "form.

" He denounces these positions as failing, in different

ways, to capture the truth that emptiness, properly understood, is the defining characteristic of form as such—form is inherently "insubstantial. " In order to

arrive at emptiness, therefore, one must not abandon form but, on the contrary, develop a unique intimacy with its essential nature. The remaining sections of the essay contain Sengzhao's elaboration of this view.

Sengzhao's next lun-essay,

"Things Do Not Shift,

" has a noticeably more

technical ring, perhaps a reflection of his exposure to the Zhonglun(Nāgārjuna's 56

Translator's Introduction

Madhyamaka-kārikā, T. 1564) translated by Kumārajīva in 408-409. In this essay Sengzhao attempts to argue against a "common person's perception" of time. Usually people perceive that things arise, endure for some time, and then gradually cease to exist, but in reality the arising and ceasing of things are both empty. This position, far from leading Sengzhao into nihilism, allows him to assert in the closing sections of the essay that the "actions of the Tathāgata, "

and perhaps by extension those of the sage, do not "wither away" but instead "abide forever, unmoving.

"

Sengzhao wrote his final and longest essay,

"Nirvana is Unnameable,

" after

Kumārajīva's death, around 413-414. According to his own "Memorial to the King" placed at the beginning of the text, this essay is Sengzhao's attempt to adjudicate on an exchange between King Yao Xing and his younger brother, Yao Song, regarding the nature of nirvana, and, in a related thread, on the character of sagehood, a topic important to the royal family for both religious and political reasons. Sengzhao sides with the Yao Xing but also offers important modifications to the king's positions. The essay contains crucial evidence regarding the earliest formulations of a Sinitic Buddhist doctrine of subitism, the idea that if awakening is possible at all it must be sudden and complete, and, in some formulations, not dependent on prior study or effort. Sengzhao argues against this idea. Some scholars have doubted the authenticity of at least parts of this essay. Initially the four essays and Sengzhao's letters circulated independently. They appeared together for the first time in a commentary, Zhaolun shu(X. 866), by the late sixth-century exegete Huida. However, the sequence in which they appear in Huida's commentary differs from that in the standard Taishō version, an arrangement first seen in the slightly later commentary, also titled Zhaolun shu(T. 1859) by Yuankang (fl. mid-seventh century). The introductory chapter of the Essays,

"Main Doctrine,

" is also first found in Yuankang's work, and may

have been authored by Yuankang himself. In this translation I make frequent use of Huida's and Yuankang's commentaries, as well as of a commentary by Wencai (1241-1302), the Zhaolun xinshu(T. 1860), for insight on particularly difficult passages, as well as for variant readings that I find preferable to those in T. 1858.

Other works authored by Sengzhao but not included in the present translation include Commentary to the Teaching of Vimalakīrti(written between 406-410); prefaces to the Bailun(Śata-śāstra,after 404), the Teaching of Vimalakīrti (406 57

Essays of Sengzhao

or after), and the Chang ahan jing(Dīrghāgama,412 or after); a postface to the Lotus Sutra(406 or after); and an obituary for Kumārajīva (some scholars question the authenticity of this text). Sengzhao died in Chang'an in 414. His death became the stuff of legend in the later Chan tradition, and stories circulated of the Qin ruling house having executed him for some unspecified transgression.

Sengzhao's Reputation

in Later Centuries

While it is common to see Sengzhao presented as one of the original "patriarchs" (zu) of the Sanlun ("Three Treatises") "lineage" (zong) of Chinese Buddhism, such portrayals are not accurate. Sengzhao himself never claimed any sectarian affiliation. Indeed, the tendency to compartmentalize Chinese Buddhism into "sects" or "lineages" postdates Sengzhao in the history of the tradition by many centuries, and reflects less the realities on the ground and more the historian's and bibliographer's need for systematization. Furthermore, even after the invention of the "Sanlun" lineage Sengzhao's name was not immediately included in it and was only added much later. On the other hand, already during the Sui and early Tang periods the great scholiast Jizang, in an attempt to secure his own position in a competitive doctrinal and institutional environment, presented himself as the heir to a hallowed exegetical tradition going back to Sengzhao, and further back to Kumārajīva and Nāgārjuna before him. Jizang's construction of Sengzhao as the forefather of Chinese Madhyamaka shows the significance that he, and his Essays,held in later centuries.

A noteworthy expression of the significance of the Essaysis the large number of commentaries written on the text in later eras. Between the Chen (557-589) and Ming (1368-1644) periods no fewer than ten large commentaries were composed. Remarkably, these texts come from representatives of various Buddhist schools of thought, attesting to the appeal of Sengzhao's work across a broad spectrum of doctrinal orientations and sectarian affiliations. An equally telling sign of the lasting impact of the Essays are the countless references to it that show up in later Chinese Buddhist, especially Chan, literature. A humorous example is a passage from Hanshan Deqing's (1546-1623) autobiography, which says that he first attained insight into the truth of emptiness when, during an 58

Translator's Introduction

urgent stop at the outhouse, he recalled Sengzhao's words from "Things Do Not Shift" about the rivers that remain still while gushing forth! Aside from references to Sengzhao, some authorial communities chose to present their own writings as Sengzhao's, appropriating some of his substantial cultural capital; for example, the important eighth-century text the Treasure Trove Treatise(Baozang lun,T. 1857), associated with the Ox-head lineage of Chan and with trends in Tang-era Daoist speculation. Finally, Sengzhao's essay translated here as "Things Do Not Shift" is at the heart of one of the main doctrinal debates in the Ming period, when a number of prominent intellectuals clashed over the essay's logical coherence and its doctrinal orthodoxy. This gives an indication of the enduring influence of Sengzhao's texts more than a millennium after their composition.

Note on the Translation

The present translation of Sengzhao's Essaysis based on the standard Taishō shinshū daizōkyō edition of the text (Ch. Zhaolun,Jp. Jōron, T. 1858). It includes the entire text as it appears in T. 1858, with the exception of the preface written by Huida, which is worthy of translation and study in its own right. In translating technical terms I tried to remain consistent throughout, although in many cases I failed to find glosses that would function well for every instance of the original term. Chinese phonetic transcriptions of Sanskrit proper names and technical terms are retranscribed into Sanskrit and given with diacritics. I have rendered in English those Sanskrit terms translated in the Essaysinto Chinese (this applies mainly to titles of sutras), with the exception of such terms/names that are now well established in English usage, for example Śāriputra, Subhūti, etc. The same applies to Chinese proper names, which have been translated into English (e.g., Dashi Si = Large Stone Temple), with the exception of proper names in the original Chinese that are widely accepted in English (so Laozi is not rendered as "Old Master" or Chang'an as "Eternal Peace"). Readers interested in learning more about Sengzhao and his Essaysare referred to the Bibliography, in which a few of the more important studies are listed.

59

Essays

by

Shi Sengzhao from Chang'an, Later Qin Kingdom

I. Main Doctrine

"Original nonbeing,

" "reality-mark,

" "Dharma-nature,

" "emptiness by nature,

"

"dependent origination": all these are one doctrine. How so? All dharmas arise through dependent origination: before they arise, they do not exist; when the conditions of their existence perish, they too cease to exist. Were they to exist substantially, then—once in existence— it would be impossible for them to perish. From this it follows that though they presently manifest as being, in nature they are always fundamentally empty. This is referred to as "emptiness by nature. " This empty nature is

called "Dharma-nature.

" Dharma-nature being thus, it is called "realitymark. " Reality-mark is a nonbeing by itself—it is not made a nonbeing merely through analysis. Thus it is called "original nonbeing. "

Negations of being and nonbeing are not expressions of a belief in a substantial, eternal being and in an annihilationist, nihilistic nonbeing. To take being as being leads one to take nonbeing as nonbeing. But to perceive dharmas without attachment to nonbeing is to discern the reality-mark of dharmas: in this manner, though one perceives being, one does so without grasping to marks. Since the dharma-marks thus perceived are markless marks, the mind of the sage is established in that which has no location. Beings in all three vehicles attain the Dao through insight into emptiness by nature. Emptiness by nature is called the reality-mark of dharmas. To see the reality-mark of dharmas is called correct contemplation; to see differently is called wrong contemplation. Whoever should think that beings of the two vehicles have no insight into this principle would be gravely mistaken. The Dharma perceived by all three is the same, what differs are merely the mental capacities of beings.

Upāyaand prajñāare called "great wisdom.

" To see the reality-mark of

dharmas is called prajñā; to then not claim final liberation is the work of upāya(skillful means). To adapt to beings and transform them is called upāya; to not be tainted by karmic afflictions is the power of prajñā.Thus, the gate of prajñāis the contemplation of emptiness, the gate of upāyais immersion in being. In the midst of being vacuity is never lost, therefore one can dwell 151a

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within being while not becoming polluted by it. Contemplation of emptiness does not reject being; thus while contemplating emptiness one can refrain from claiming final realization. In this way within one moment of thought both skillful means (upāya) and wisdom (prajñā)are fully activated. Reflect on this well, and you will understand fully. The truth of nirvana, of cessation: once afflictions are eradicated, life and death are forever extinguished—

"cessation" is only this, not some other place to be reached.

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Life and death alternate, seasons come and go, all things are in flux: this is the common view. I say it is erroneous. Here is why. It is said in the Radiance,

"Dharmas neither come nor go, they do not move in any way.

"1 Is their motionless activity to be sought by discarding motion and instead pursuing stillness? No, it is within all movements that stillness is to be sought. Since stillness is to be sought within all movements, though moving, dharmas are constantly still. Since stillness is to be sought without discarding motion, though still, their motion never ceases. Indeed, motion and stillness are in no way distinct. This unity eludes doubters, however. As a result, the true teaching becomes mired in disputations, and the road to understanding is distorted by their fixation on distinctions. Truly, this ultimate, wherein stillness and movement are one, is not easy to capture in words. Why? Talk of the ultimate contradicts conventional beliefs, while conformity with the conventional does injustice to the ultimate. Words that oppose the ultimate lose sight of Nature and are powerless to convert beings. Words that disregard the conventional are bland, flavorless: hearing them, people of average faculties cannot tell what is real and what is not, while inferior types clap their hands in amusement and turn away. 2

So close, yet unknowable—is this not the very nature of things? Yet I cannot remain silent. Once again I will vest my mind where motion and stillness meet and venture an imperfect intimation. It is said in the Dao Practice,

"Originally there is no 'where' from which dharmas come; when they go, there is no 'where' that they reach. "3And in

the Middle Way Treatise,

"Seeing the place [of departure] we see the going, but the goer does not reach a place.

"4 These passages assert that stillness is to be sought in identity with motion, from which it follows that things do not shift.

Now, that past things do not reach the present is what is commonly thought of as movement. People say,

"things move, they are not still.

" But the same

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fact that past things do not reach the present is what I call stillness. I say, "things are still, not in motion.

"

[Others claim that] since things do not come [from the past to the present], they move and are not still. [I claim that] since things do not depart [from the present to the past], they are still and do not move. What we speak of are not two realities but one, though we view it differently. Oppose this reality—you will be bogged down; align yourself with it—you will penetrate its depths. Once you understand, nothing will obstruct you. Alas, for so long people have been trapped in delusion. Even though they are face to face with the ultimate, they do not wake up to it. They know that past things do not come [from the past to the present], yet they insist that present things can pass away [from the present to the past]. But since past things do not come [to the present], how could present things pass away [to the past]?

Allow me to explain. For a past thing, do you search in the past? In the past [such a thing] does not not exist. Do you search for it in the present? In the present it does not exist. That past things do not exist in the present shows that they do not come [to it from the past]; that they do not not exist in the past shows that they do not depart [from it to the present]. Now, as for present things: when in the present, they do not pass away. Hence, past things are by nature in the past—they do not do not reach it from the present; and present things are by nature in the present—they do not reach it from the past. Confucius said,

"Behold, Yan Hui, how swiftly things become new; in

the twinkling of an eye they are no longer as before!"5 All this shows that things do not come or go [between moments in time]. Since there is not even the slightest trace of departing or returning, how could one assert "movement" of anything at all?

With this mind, why still doubt that while the whirlwind6uproots the mountains7it stays constantly still; while the great rivers roar crashing into the sea they do not flow; while the wild horses8flutter in the sky they remain unmoving; and while the sun and moon travel the skies they are never in rotation? But wait! The Sage said,

"The passage of life is swift, swifter than the

gushing torrents.

"9 Thus one might object that through insight into impermanence do śrāvakas realize the Dao, and on awakening to the state free of conditions do pratyekabuddhas join with the ultimate. If indeed, as you say, 66

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the movement of things does not involve real change, how could it be claimed that by responding to change these two groups attain progress on the Dao? Yet, on careful investigation, the words of the Sage prove exceedingly subtle, deep, difficult to fathom. He asserts both that things, while seemingly in motion, are still; and that while seeming to depart they remain unmoving. [This truth] can only be encountered with the spirit, it cannot be found amid ordinary affairs.

Allow me to explain. While things are said to "depart, " this is not to assert

that they literally depart but merely to dispel people's attachment to the idea of permanence. Though they are said to "remain,

" this is not to argue that

they literally remain but merely to counter people's clinging to "passing away.

" Surely,

"departing" does not mean that things actually evanesce, nor does "remaining" mean that they perdure through time.

Accordingly, it is said in the Complete Realization,

"The Bodhisattva

dwells among those attached to permanence and teaches them impermanence. "10And in the Mahayana Treatise,

"All dharmas are ultimately unmoving; in them there is no trace of coming or going. "11

Such teachings are devised to lead beings from all quarters to liberation. The words may be contradictory but the reality in which they converge is one. Surely variation among descriptions does not make incongruous their object. Thus, though things may be said to be "constant" they do not remain. Though described as "departing" they do not shift [in time]. As things do not shift, while passing away they are constantly still; as things do not remain, while still they constantly pass away. In stillness things constantly pass away; thus, while passing away they never shift. In passing away things are constantly still; thus, while still, they never stay. Zhuangzi speaks of hiding a mountain in a marsh and Confucius stands at the bank of the river [gazing at its gushing torrent]: both reflect on the inability to make passing things stay in the present. Surely they do not mean that things push away the present and pass away [into the past]. 12

Indeed, if one carefully examines the mind of the sage, one will understand that what the sage perceives differs from what the common person perceives. How so? People claim that, young or old, a human being is of one constant body and its substance perdures throughout a lifetime of a hundred years. They only know that the years pass, but do not realize that the body follows 67

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suit. Take the story of the brahmacārinwho left the householder's life [as a young man] and only returned home as a white-haired old man. When his former neighbors saw him, they said,

"Could this be our former neighbor?"

The brahmacārinsaid,

"I may seem to be my former self but I am certainly

not him.

" The neighbors were startled. It is just like in the allegory of the strong man [who sneaks up under cover of night] and carries away [the boat] on his shoulders, [while the owner,] fast asleep, knows nothing [of the theft]. 13

In order to dispel people's delusions, the Tathāgata uses words appropriate to their individual limitations; he rides the vehicle of the nondual ultimate mind, yet elaborates nonsingular diverse teachings. Words that even though contradictory do not impute incongruity to their object—such are the words of the Sage alone.

Hence, from the perspective of the ultimate, he teaches of "not-shifting"; in order to guide the common people, he speaks of things flowing through time. Even though he charts out a thousandfold paths, they all return to a common destination.

Yet, when those who cling to the evidence of texts hear the teaching of "not-shifting" they say that past things do not reach the present, but when they hear of "flow and motion" they say that present things can reach the past. However, once the terms "past" and "present" have been assigned [to their respective moments], why still insist on viewing things as "shifting" [from one to the other]? After all, when it is said that things "pass away, "

this is not to affirm that they literally pass away but only that things of the past and present persist constantly [in their respective moments]—they are not in motion. When it is asserted that things "depart, " this is not to claim

that things literally depart but only that things do not reach the past from the present—they do not come. They do not come: they do not gallop between the past and the present. They do not move; each thing, by nature, persists in just one[—its own particular—]time.

The myriad texts differ in their formulations, the hundred schools teach divergent doctrines, but once you arrive at where they all converge, their diversity will no longer confuse you.

Now, what others call "remaining" I refer to as "departing"; what they call "departing" I speak of as "remaining.

" Yet, though "remaining" and "departing"

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differ in name, in reality they are one. It is not without reason that the classic says,

"True words appear nonsensical.

"14Who would believe them?

How so? People search for past things in the present, and conclude that [things] do not remain. I seek for present [things] in the past and determine that they do not depart. If present [things] could reach the past, then the past should contain those present [things]. If past [things] could reach the present, then the present should contain those past [things]. But there are no past [things] in the present, which shows again that [things] do not come. And there are no present [things] in the past, which shows once more that [things] do not depart.

Since past [things] do not reach the present, nor do present [things] reach the past, therefore each event by nature remains in its own particular time. There is really nothing at all that can be described as either coming or going [in time].

Grasp this subtle meaning, and you will understand that even though the four seasons gallop like a windstorm and the Big Dipper whirls in the sky like thunder, in all their velocity they are forever unmoving. The acts of the Tathāgata are efficacious throughout myriad generations yet they remain always still; his Dao penetrates a hundred eons yet it is all the more unmoving. Piling up a mound is as if complete with the first basket of dirt; reaching the destination of a long journey is accomplished with the first step.

15All this is because meritorious deeds truly do not wither away. That meritorious acts do not wither away means that the act remains in the past time and does not transform out of being. As such, it does not shift in time. It does not shift: it abides forever, unmoving. Thus it is. Therefore it is said in scripture,

"Should the triple deluge consume the

world, my works will abide, unmoving.

"16 True indeed.

How is this so ? The result does not contain the cause, it is brought about by the cause. Since the result is brought about by the cause, in the past moment the cause is not-extinct. Since the result does not include the cause, the cause does not come [from the past] to the present. Neither is the cause extinct [in its own past moment], nor does it come [to the present]. This is further proof of the truth of "not shifting.

"

With this understanding, can one continue to oscillate between "departing" and "staying,

" dither between "motion" and "stillness"?

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Truly, should Heaven collapse and Earth topple over, I will not say things are not still. Should a great deluge submerge the world, I will not say things move. If you can tally your spirit with things in their reality, this truth will be within reach.

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Nonsubstantiality

[Introduction]

The perfectly vacuous, the unborn: such is the wondrous object of prajñā's mysterious mirroring, the unifying apex of existing things. If not through the exceptional realization of sagely insight, how could one tally one's spirit with the space between being and nonbeing?

Thus, the Perfected Person extends his spirit-mind to the limitless, yet individual things cannot obstruct him. He exerts his ear and eye to the utmost, yet sounds and forms have no power over him. Is it not because he has identified with the self-emptiness of all things that things cannot hamper his spiritual brilliance? The sage rides the vehicle of the ultimate mind and yet aligns himself with all principles; there are no obstructions he cannot penetrate. He inhabits the Singular Pneuma and therefrom observes transformations; he moves in accord with all he encounters. Since there are no obstructions he cannot penetrate, he attains simplicity in the midst of complexity. 17 Since he moves in

harmony with all that he encounters, he becomes one with whatever he touches.

In this way, though the myriad images are individually discrete, their distinctiveness is not inherent to them. As such, images are not substantially real images. Since they are not substantially real images, I say that images are not images. Indeed, at the root things and I are one, affirmation and negation are the Singular Pneuma. This doctrine is deep and subtle—beyond, I fear, the ken of conventional understanding. Hence of late, whenever the topic of emptiness is raised in debate, disagreements inevitably arise. Is it possible to arrive at agreement when the [thing discussed] is [seen as] incongruous? Conflicting theories proliferate18 and yield no agreement on the nature [of emptiness]. 71

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[Three Doctrines of

Emptiness]

Why? The doctrine of "no mentation" defines emptiness as a state in which the mind no longer reaches out toward things, even though things themselves do not cease to exist. The merit of this doctrine is its valuation of the stillness of spirit; its flaw is its failure to understand that things themselves are empty. The theory of "emptiness is form" rests on the claim that since forms are not self-produced, and despite being called forms, they are not forms. But the analysis of forms should not be limited to forms produced by a coming together of forms; the analysis should apply to forms as such, and should see them as what they are in themselves. This theory acknowledges merely that forms are not self-produced, but it has yet to grasp the truth that forms as such are not forms.

The teaching of "original nonbeing" is obsessed with the idea of nonbeing, which dominates the discussion throughout. It takes negations of being as assertions that being is actually nonexistent, and negations of nonbeing as claims that nonbeing likewise is actually nonexistent. However, if one were to investigate the original purport of the scriptures, one would understand that negations of being are merely a rejection of substantialized being, while negations of nonbeing are merely a refutation of substantialized nonbeing. Why insist that negations of being mean that this being is actually nonexistent, and that negations of nonbeing mean that nonbeing is likewise actually nonexistent? Such words reveal an infatuation with "nonbeing"; surely they cannot harmoniously enter the reality of events nor reach the true character of things. [Argument]

If you conceptualize a thing as a thing, what you thus conceptualize can indeed be called a thing. But if you conceptualize a non-thing a thing, though you conceptualize it as a thing it is not a thing. For things do not derive their reality from names, and names are not brought about simply by virtue of there being things.

Thus ultimate truth dwells in sovereign stillness beyond the domain of ordinary naming;19 how could mere words and letters articulate it? Yet I cannot remain silent and will try to fashion for it an approximation in words. 72

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It is said in the Mahayana Treatise,

"Dharmas do not possess marks, nor

do they lack marks.

"20And in the Middle Way Treatise,

"Dharmas do not

exist, nor do they not exist.

"21 This is the supreme ultimate truth.

Now, on close examination, these assertions of "neither being nor nonbeing" cannot mean that ultimate truth is realized only when one has purged the mind of all things, shut the doors of seeing and hearing, and when the mind is still and empty. Indeed, ultimate truth is realized when one identifies with things and penetrates them harmoniously, for then things in their concrete reality do not oppose it; and when this very reality is rendered selfsame with the ultimate, for then empty Nature does alter their individual reality. Since Nature does not alter their reality, even though they are nonexistent, things do exist. Since things do not oppose [ultimate truth], even though they are existent, they do not exist. While nonexistent, things exist; hence "existence" does not capture them. While existent, they do not exist, hence "nonexistence" also does not apply. Thus, it is not that nothing exists; rather, things are not substantially real things. And since they are not substantially real things, what is there that could possibly be conceptualized as a thing? Thus, when it is said in the sutra,

"Emptiness is the nature of form, not

an obliteration of form,

" this is to demonstrate that the sagely mode of engaging things is to identify with their essential vacuity. Could the sage, in striving for the ultimate, have to "hack" his way there through forms?22 Therefore [Vimalakīrti,] in his sickbed, teaches about insubstantiality; and Supreme Brightness speaks of the identity [of form] and vacuity. In all, though the teachings in the tripartite canon are diverse, what unifies them is one. The Radianceproclaims,

"From the standpoint of supreme ultimate truth

there is no realization [of bodhi], no attainment; from the standpoint of relative truth there is realization and attainment.

"23 Now,

"attainment" is but the

relative name of nonattainment, and "nonattainment" is the ultimate name of attainment. In view of the ultimate name they are ultimate, yet they do not exist. In view of the relative name they are relative, yet they do not nonexist. Thus, to call them "ultimate" is not to say that they exist; to call them "relative" is not to say that they nonexist. These descriptions are mutually opposed, yet the principles behind them are not different. Thus a sutra says,

"Ultimate truth and relative truth: are they distinct? They are not.

"24 In this sutra ultimate truth is asserted only to refute "existence, "

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and relative truth is asserted only to refute "nonexistence. " Just because there

are two "truths,

" must one impute two-ness to the reality of things? Things have both an aspect of not-existing and an aspect of not-nonexisting. Under the aspect of not-existing, even though existent, things do not exist. Under the aspect of not-nonexisting, even though nonexistent, they do not nonexist. While nonexisting they do not nonexist, hence their nonexisting is not a one-sided emptiness. While existing they do not exist, hence their existing is not substantial being. Since the being of things never becomes substantial being, and since their nonexistence is not just an erasure of traces, then even though their "being" and "nonbeing" are distinguished in name, in reality they are one. Thus the youth exclaimed,

"You teach that since things arise due to karmic conditions, they neither exist nor nonexist,

"25and in the Bodhisattva

'

s Diadem

it is written,

"The turnings of the wheel of Dharma are neither turnings nor non-turnings: its very turnings are non-turnings. "26Such are the subtle words

of all sutras.

Also, you wish to argue that things nonexist? Then you would fail to denounce the views of annihilationists. You wish to claim that things do exist? Then you would give sanction to the positions of eternalists. Yet, things do not nonexist, hence annihilationist beliefs are to be denounced. Things do not exist, hence eternalist views are also to be rejected. Negation of both being and nonbeing: verily, such are the words of ultimate truth. Thus it is said in the Dao Practice,

"Mind neither exists nor does not

exist,

"278and in the Middle Way Verses,

"Since things arise from conditions,

they do not exist; since they do arise, they do not nonexist. "28 Consider this

well, and you will see it is so.

Here is why. If being existed substantially, then it would exist of itself, constantly, and it would not depend on conditions in order to come into being. Similarly, substantial nonbeing exists by itself, perdures eternally as nonbeing, and would not depend on conditions in order to come about. However, being is not being by and of itself; it becomes being depending on conditions—therefore, being does not exist substantially. Since being is not substantial being, even though it exists it cannot be called "being. "

Likewise nonbeing. The term "nonbeing" truly applies only to something perfectly quiescent, unchanging. If myriad things nonexisted in this manner, 74

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it would be inconceivable that they would arise at all. Yet they do arise, hence "nonbeing" does not apply. But since it is through conditions that they arise, things do not nonexist.

Thus it is said in the Mahayana Treatisethat all dharmas, constituted as they are by all causes and conditions, should be considered existent; all dharmas, constituted as they are by all causes and conditions, should not be considered existent; all nonexistent dharmas, constituted as they are by all causes and conditions, should be considered existent; all existent dharmas, constituted as they are by all causes and conditions, should not be considered existent. 29

Are these pronouncements on being and nonbeing nothing but a futile exercise in contrariness?

If one were to take things as "being" in a real, substantial sense, then they could not be described as "nonbeing"; if one were to take them as "nonexistent" in a real, substantial sense, then "existence" would not apply. But when "being" is predicated of things, it is merely that the term "being" is used as expedient to refute claims of their "nonbeing. " Likewise, when "nonbeing" is asserted, it is just that the term "nonbeing" is applied provisionally in order to reject the assertions of their "being.

"

The reality is one, even though the concepts are dualistic. The descriptions may be incongruous, but if one grasps the unified reality behind them no disagreement will be left unresolved. From one perspective myriad things truly do not exist —they cannot be described as "being.

" From another perspective they do not nonexist-they

cannot be taken as "nonbeing.

" How so? Do you wish to claim that they

exist? Even though they exist, they do not emerge into substantial being. Do you want to say that they nonexist? Images of events are already formed in them, and with images already formed they cannot be simply nonexistent. Since their being is not substantial they do not really exist. With this, emptiness as nonsubstantiality has been demonstrated. Accordingly, it is said in the Radiance,

"Dharmas, as merely conventional

appellations, are not substantial. They are akin to a phantom. It is not that the phantom does not exist, rather, the phantom is not a substantial being. "30

Now, if one uses names to consider the [respective] things, [one will find that] things lack the actuality corresponding to their names; if one uses things to consider their names, [one will find that] the names lack the power of 75