T1609 Three Short Treatises by Vasubandhu, Sengzhao, and Zongmi

THREE SHORT TREATISES BY VASUBANDHU, SENGZHAO, AND ZONGMI

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BDK English Tripiṭaka Series THREE SHORT TREATISES BY VASUBANDHU,

SENGZHAO, AND

ZONGMI

A Mahayana Demonstration on the Theme of Action (Taishō Volume 31, Number 1609) Translated by John P. Keenan Essays of Sengzhao (Taishō Volume 45, Number 1858) Translated by Rafal Felbur Treatise on the Origin of Humanity

(Taishō Volume 45, Number 1886) Translated by Jan Yün-hua BDK America, Inc. 2017

Copyright © 2017 by BukkyōDendōKyōkai and BDK America, Inc.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transcribed in any form or by any means —electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise— without the prior written permission of the publisher. First Printing, 2017

ISBN: 978-1-886439-66-5

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 2017956495 Published by

BDK America, Inc.

1675 School Street

Moraga, California 94556

Printed in the United States of America

A Message on the Publication of the

English Tripiṭaka

The Buddhist canon is said to contain eighty-four thousand different teachings. I believe that this is because the Buddha's basic approach was to prescribe a different treatment for every spiritual ailment, much as a doctor prescribes a different medicine for every medical ailment. Thus his teachings were always appropriate for the particular suffering individual and for the time at which the teaching was given, and over the ages not one of his prescriptions has failed to relieve the suffering to which it was addressed.

Ever since the Buddha's Great Demise over twenty-five hundred years ago, his message of wisdom and compassion has spread throughout the world. Yet no one has ever attempted to translate the entire Buddhist canon into English throughout the history of Japan. It is my greatest wish to see this done and to make the translations available to the many English-speaking people who have never had the opportunity to learn about the Buddha's teachings. Of course, it would be impossible to translate all of the Buddha's eighty-four thousand teachings in a few years. I have, therefore, had one hundred thirty-nine of the scriptural texts in the prodigious Taishō edition of the Chinese Buddhist canon selected for inclusion in the First Series of this translation project. It is in the nature of this undertaking that the results are bound to be criticized. Nonetheless, I am convinced that unless someone takes it upon himself or herself to initiate this project, it will never be done. At the same time, I hope that an improved, revised edition will appear in the future.

It is most gratifying that, thanks to the efforts of more than a hundred Buddhist scholars from the East and the West, this monumental project has finally gotten off the ground. May the rays of the Wisdom of the CompassionateOne reach each and every person in the world.

NUMATAYehan

Founder of the English

August 7, 1991 Tripiṭaka Project

v

Editorial Foreword

In the long history of Buddhist transmission throughout East Asia, translations of Buddhist texts were often carried out as national projects supported and funded by emperors and political leaders. The BDK English Tripiṭaka project, on the other hand, began as a result of the dream and commitment of one man. In January 1982 Dr. NUMATA Yehan, founder of Bukkyō Dendō Kyōkai (Society for the Promotion of Buddhism), initiated the monumental task of translating the complete Taishō shinshū daizōkyō edition of the Chinese Tripiṭaka (Buddhist canon) into the English language. Under his leadership, a special preparatory committee was organized in April 1982. By July of the same year the Translation Committee of the English Tripiṭaka was officially convened. The initial Committee included the following members: (late) HANAYAMA Shōyū (Chairperson), (late) BANDŌShōjun, ISHIGAMIZennō, (late) KAMATA Shigeo, (late) KANAOKAShūyū, MAYEDASengaku, NARAYasuaki, (late) SAYEKIShinkō, (late) SHIOIRIRyōtatsu, TAMARUNoriyoshi, (late) TAMURA Kwansei, (late) URYŪZURyūshin, and YUYAMAAkira. Assistant members of the Committee were as follows: KANAZAWAAtsushi, WATANABEShōgo, Rolf Giebel of New Zealand, and Rudy Smet of Belgium.

After holding planning meetings on a monthly basis, the Committee selected one hundred and thirty-nine texts for the First Series of the project, estimated to be one hundred printed volumes in all. The texts selected were not limited to those originally written in India but also included works composed in China and Japan. While the publication of the First Series proceeds, the texts for the Second Series will be selected from among the remaining works; this process will continue until all the texts, in Japanese as well as in Chinese, have been published. Given the huge scope of this project, accomplishing the English translations of all the Chinese and Japanese texts in the Taishō canon may take as long as one hundred years or more. Nevertheless, as Dr. NUMATAwished, it is the sincere hope of the Committee that this project will continue until completion, even after all the present members have passed away.

vii

Publisher’s Foreword

Editorial Foreword

Dr. NUMATApassed away on May 5, 1994, at the age of ninety-seven. He entrusted his son, Mr. NUMATAToshihide with the continuation and completion of the English Tripiṭaka project. Mr. Numata served for twenty-three years, leading the project forward with enormous progress before his sudden passing on February 16, 2017, at the age of eighty-four. The Committee previously lost its able and devoted first Chairperson, Professor HANAYAMAShōyū, on June 16, 1995, at the age of sixty-three. In October 1995 the Committee elected Professor MAYEDA Sengaku (then Vice President of Musashino Women's College) as Chairperson, and upon the retirement of Professor Mayeda in July 2016, the torch was passed to me to serve as the third Chairperson. Despite these losses and changes we, the Editorial Committee members, have renewed our determination to carry out the noble ideals set by Dr. NUMATA. Present members of the Committee are Kenneth K. Tanaka (Chairperson), MAYEDASengaku, ICHISHIMAShōshin, ISHIGAMI Zennō, KATSURAShōryū, NARAYasuaki, SAITŌAkira, SHIMODAMasahiro, WATANABEShōgo, and YONEZAWAYoshiyasu.

The Numata Center for Buddhist Translation and Research was established in November 1984, in Berkeley, California, U.S.A., to assist in the publication of the translated texts. The Publication Committee was organized at the Numata Center in December 1991. In 2010, the Numata Center's operations were merged with Bukkyō Dendō Kyōkai America, Inc. (BDK America), and BDK America continues to oversee the publication side of the English Tripiṭaka project in close cooperation with the Editorial Committee in Tokyo.

At the time of this writing, in February 2017, the project has completed about sixty percent of the seven thousand one hundred and eighty-five Taishō pages of texts selected for the First Series. Much work still lies ahead of us but we are committed to the completion of the remaining texts in order to realize the grand vision of Dr. Numata, shared by Mr. Numata and Professor Hanayama, to make the Buddhist canon more readily accessible to the English-speaking world. Kenneth K.Tanaka

Chairperson

Editorial Committee of

the BDK English Tripiṭaka

viii

Publisher's Foreword

On behalf of the members of the Publication Committee, I am happy to present this volume as the latest contribution to the BDK English Tripiṭaka Series. The Publication Committee members have worked to ensure that this volume, as all other volumes in the series, has gone through a rigorous process of editorial efforts. The initial translation and editing of the Buddhist scriptures found in this and other BDK English Tripiṭaka volumes are performed under the direction of the Editorial Committee in Tokyo, Japan. Both the Editorial Committee in Tokyo and the Publication Committee, headquartered in Moraga, California, are dedicated to the production of accurate and readable English translations of the Buddhist canon. In doing so, the members of both committees and associated staff work to honor the deep faith, spirit, and concern of the late Reverend Dr. Yehan Numata, who founded the BDK English Tripiṭaka Series in order to disseminate the Buddhist teachings throughout the world. The long-term goal of our project is the translation and publication of the texts in the one hundred-volume Taishō edition of the Chinese Buddhist canon, along with a number of influential extracanonical Japanese Buddhist texts. The list of texts selected for the First Series of this translation project may be found at the end of each volume in the series.

As Chair of the Publication Committee, I am deeply honored to serve as the fifth person in a post previously held by leading figures in the field of Buddhist studies, most recently by my predecessor, John R. McRae.

In conclusion, I wish to thank the members of the Publication Committee for their dedicated and expert work undertaken in the course of preparing this volume for publication: Managing Editor Marianne Dresser, Dr. Hudaya Kandahjaya, Dr. Carl Bielefeldt, Dr. Robert Sharf, and Rev. Brian Kensho Nagata, Director of the BDK English Tripiṭaka Project.

A. Charles Muller

Chairperson

Publication Committee

ix

ix

Contents

A Message on the Publication of the English Tripiṭaka NUMATA Yehan v

Editorial Foreword Kenneth K. Tanaka vii Publisher's Foreword A. Charles Muller ix Three Short Treatises by Vasubandhu, Sengzhao, and Zongmi A Mahayana Demonstration on the Theme of Action Contents 3

Translator's Introduction 5 A Mahayana Demonstration on the Theme of Action 9 Notes 46

Essays of Sengzhao Contents 49

Translator's Introduction 51 Essays of Sengzhao 61 Notes 123

Treatise on the Origin of Humanity Contents 139

Translator's Introduction 141 Treatise on the Origin of Humanity 145 Notes 169

Glossary 171

Bibliography 183 Index 187

A List of the Volumes of the BDK English Tripiṭaka (First Series) 203 xi

A MAHAYANA DEMONSTRATION ON THE THEME OF ACTION

Contents

Translator's Introduction 5 A Mahayana Demonstration on the Theme of Action Part One. Erroneous Theories with Respect to the Nature of Action 11 1. Theory of the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika: The Communicative Act as Shape 11

2. Theory of the Vātsīputrīyas and Sāṃmitīya: The Communicative Act as Movement 14

3. Theory of the Sauryodayika-Dārṣṭāntika: The Communicative Act as Wind 18

Part Two. The Structure of the Maturation of the Action 23 1. Theory of the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika: The Present Existence of Past Acts 23

2. The Theory of the Early Sāṁmitīya: Special Realities— The Increase and the Imperishable 26 3. Vasubandhu's Sautrāntika Theory: The Evolutions of Mental Continuity 27

Part Three. The Continuity of Maturation 1. On Emergence from the Concentration of Cessation 29 29

2. The Storehouse Consciousness 35 Part Four. Vasubandhu's Sautrāntika Theory on the Nature of Action 1. The Three Actions in the Scripture 2. The Body and Action 3. The Meaning of the Term "Body" 4. The Meaning of the Term "Action" 5. The Meaning of the Phrase "Bodily Action" 6. The Meaning of the Phrase "Verbal Action" 41 41

41

42

42

42

43

3

Translator’s Introduction

Contents 7. The Meaning of the Phrase "Mental Action" 8. The Principle of the Classification of Actions 44 45

Notes 46 4

Translator's Introduction

TheMahayana Demonstration on the Theme of Action (Karmasiddhi-prakaraṇa) is a relatively brief text, consisting of one fascicle in the Chinese translation. The original Sanskrit text is not extant. There are two Chinese translations, by Xuanzang (T. 1609), and by Vimokṣaprajñā (T. 1608), and a Tibetan translation, Las grub pa

'i rab tu byed pa(Derge 4062) by Viśuddhasiṃha and Devendra rakṣita. The only commentary on the text is the Karmasiddhiṭīkāof Sumatiśila, extant only in Tibetan (Las grub pa

'i bshad pa, Derge 4071).

Despite its brevity, Vasubandhu's text is densely packed with philosophical argumentation on how to correctly interpret the scriptural references about the three kinds of actions, bodily action, verbal action, and mental action. Vasu bandhu, in accepted commentarial style, assumes that his readers are familiar with the ongoing context of argumentation about action and only infrequently identifies the intellectual landscape. The rhetorical format is in the form of dialogue between the author, Vasubandhu, and a number of proponents of false views whom he refutes, before he frames his presentation of the nature of action by sketching a Yogācāra theory of the storehouse consciousness (ālayavijñāna). The traditional teaching on action (karma) identified mental action as volition, which inexorably matures to produce its subsequent result. There were, however, disputes over the nature of bodily and verbal actions that communicate or make known (vijñapti) this inner volition to others. In Part One Vasubandhu turns to a presentation and refutation of false theories about the nature of a bodily communicative act. He refutes the theories that such an act consists of bodily shape, physical movement, or through a special mentally engendered wind that moves the body. Instead he insists on the Sautrāntika position that any bodily action occurs through a special volition that moves the body to perform a physical action, and that apart from volition one cannot adequately describe a bodily communicative act. The text then turns in Part Two to a consideration of the maturation of actions, how they ripen within the mind to attain their results. Vasubandhu refutes notions that past acts actually maintain a present existence, or that there are special 5

A Mahayana Demonstration on the Theme of Action

realities called "the increase" or "the imperishable" through which acts attain their results. In contrast, he argues that the maturation of action is effected by a special volition that evolves within and permeates the mental continuity, leading to the attainment of the subsequent results of such actions. Part Three reflects on the underlying problem of how karmic maturation functions in the case of entrance into and emergence from the concentration of cessation (nirodha-samāpatti), because this concentration cuts off all mental activity and would seemingly interrupt any maturation of former actions. Vasubandhu's answer is that there is a storehouse consciousness (ālayavijñāna) that, although subtle and latent, remains present even in the so-called mindless concentration. The storehouse consciousness is a central Yogācāra theory, elicited probably in answer to this very question in an earlier Yogācāra compendium, the Yogācārabhūmi.

1

Having interpreted karmic maturation in terms of the storehouse consciousness, Vasubandhu established the context for his presentation, in Part Four, of the Sautrāntika analysis of the nature of action, in which he defines the main terms and summarizes his presentation.

There are questions about both the text and its lineage. The textual questions derive, for the most part, from the difficulty of reconstructing the assumed rhetorical context of argumentation. While its main contours are clear, the back-andforth flow of the argument between contending parties, each of whom tries to catch the other in logical inconsistencies, is at times confusing. This is especially true in Part One, where the issues turn upon early notions of physical matter and sense perception. The originally intended audience likely had no problem identifying the various arguments presented and knew just who was proposing what. Later readers who are far from that classical context, however, have had problems following the flow of the dialogue. Sumatiśila's commentary, the Karma siddhiṭīkā, was composed to elucidate the meaning of the text and he clarifies the flow of argumentation by identifying the various schools of thought. Yet Sumatiśila's identifications of the lines of argumentation are not always the same as those of Xuanzang. At times, where Sumatiśila's commentary identifies a passage as belonging to Vasubandhu's opponent, Xuanzang sees it as reflecting the position of Vasubandhu himself.

2Xuanzang's text also has significant sections

(e.g., 783a20-783b11) that are not found in either the Tibetan or Chinese translations of Vimokṣkaprajña. 3Throughout this English translation I have followed

6

Translator's Introduction

Xuanzang's text exclusively, and have made no attempt either to present any parallel readings or offer any critical analysis.

There is some dispute among modern scholars about the text's lineage because even though it has been attributed to the Yogācāra philosopher Vasu bandhu, it makes no use of central Mahayana themes. For instance, emptiness, the two truths, or even the central Yogācāra theme of the three patterns of consciousness (trisvabhāva) are never mentioned in the text. This led the French scholar Étienne Lamotte, in his translation of the text, Le Traite: de l'Acte de Vasubandhu (Karma-siddhi-prakaraṇa), to identify its lineage as Hinayana, as it presents simply a Sautrāntika point of view even in the presentation of the storehouse consciousness.

4 On the other hand, Stefan Anacker, in "A Discussion for the Demonstration of Action (Karma-Siddhi-Prakaraṇa),

" argues that the text is

indeed a Mahayana work; it not only quotes the Yogācāra Explication of the Underlying Meaning(Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra) but also ends with the traditional Mahayana transference of merit to all sentient beings. If the text is not itself Hinayana, however, it is certainly directed at Hinayana thinkers. 5 Xuanzang

clearly thought that this text was a Mahayana composition, and he alone adds the term "Mahayana" to the title.

In this English translation I identify Vasubandhu's sections by placing them in plain type, while those of his interlocuters appear in italics. In order to lend clarity to the flow of the argumentation I have added subheadings (not present in the Chinese text) drawn from Leo M. Pruden's English version of Lamotte's translation, Karmasiddhi Prakaraṇa: The Treatise on Action by Vasubandhu (Berkeley: Asian Humanities Press, 1988).

7

A Mahayana Demonstration on the Theme of Action by

Bodhisattva Vasubandhu

Translated by the Tang Tripiṭaka Master Xuanzang

Part One

Erroneous Theories

with Respect to the

Nature of Action

In various scriptures the Bhagavat has taught the three kinds of actions: bodily action, verbal action, and mental action. 1. Theory of the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika: The Communicative Act as Shape The[Vaibhāṣika] theory holds that a bodily action refers to what is done by the body. Since language itself is an act, it is called a verbal action. In themselves, these two can be either acts of communicating information [to others] or not. A mental action refers to action concomitant with thinking and consists solely in mind.

What do you mean by "communicate"? A bodily act of communicating consists in physical shape and is engendered by mental states that take that [shape] as object. What shape?

The shape of the body.

If [a bodily act of communication] is the physical shape of the body, then why do you say that a bodily action is an act done by the body? It is said to be physical shape of the body because[shape]is constituted by the individual members of the entire body. It is said to be done by the body because[shape] comes about in dependence on the primary elements of the body. That which is predicated of the body as a whole also applies to its members. In common parlance people say, "I live in the village

"

or

"I live

in the forest,

"[while in fact we live in houses in the village, or in groves in the forest].

Why do you say that [the bodily act of communicating] is engendered by mental states that take that [shape] as object? 11

781a29

781b

A Mahayana Demonstration on the Theme of Action In order to exclude [such things as] the physical shape of the lips, because [a bodily act of communicating] is not engendered by mental actions that take that, [the shape of the lips,] as their object. Rather, [the shape of the lips] is engendered by mental states that take as their object the enunciation of language. We also want to exclude shapes elicited from the mental states of former aspirations, because[a bodily act of communicating] is not engendered by mental states that take those [wished-for shapes] as its object. Rather, these[wished-for shapes] are engendered by mental states that have a residual cause for maturation.

Why is [bodily shape] said to be communicative? Because a mind that informs and manifests an act, which it itself has engendered, communicates that to others. In order to clarify this, we present a stanza:

Since we manifest outwardly through the body and speech, We communicate the volitions of our inner mind. Just as a fish hidden in the deep

Communicates its presence by beating the waves. What then is physical shape?

This refers to [the categories of shape:] long, [short, square, circular, high, low, same, different].

But what is length, etc.?

This refers to that by which the ideas designated as long, etc. are engendered. In what sphere is [physical shape] included? It is included in the sphere of physical form. Critique of the Theory that the Communicative Act is Shape Now, we must carefully examine [this Vaibhāṣika theory]. Are [the shapes of] length, etc. specific atoms, as are colors? Or are they composites of specific atoms? Or are they a discrete and unique reality pervading the composites of color?

What errors are these in these options?

If [the shape of] length, etc. were a specific atom, then it would be analogous to color. Then in each and every minute part of a physical composite [the shape of] length, etc. would be apprehensible. 12

Part One

If [the shape of length, etc.] were a composite of specific atoms, then would there be no difference between [this composite] and a composite of the atoms of color? And then the specificity of the composites of all the colors would themselves have to be long, etc.!

If [the shape of length, etc.] were a discrete and unique reality pervading the composites of colors, then, because it is both unique and pervasive it would be found in each and every part, since it would be concomitantly present in all parts. It would not then be unique, however, for it would abide separately in all the parts.

Moreover, this [theory] refutes your own [Vaibhāṣika] tenet that the ten spheres are all composites of atoms, and it confirms the [Vaiśeṣika] thesis of Kaṇāda's followers that substances exist in the parts because they pervade all the parts, i.e., in all the composite physical matter so united. [Our explanation is that] the notion of "length" occurs when one sees a great quantity lying in a single direction. The notion of "short" occurs when one sees a small quantity lying in one direction. The notion of "square" occurs when one sees [a figure that is] equal in four directions. The notion of "circle" occurs when one sees [a figure that is ] full in all directions. The notion of "high" occurs when one sees a protrusion jutting out from a center. The notion of "low" occurs when one sees a hollow indentation in a center. The notion of "even" occurs when one sees a surface that is level. The notion of "uneven" occurs when one sees a surface that in irregular. We conceive various different notions of shape as we roll out and inspect a brocaded tapestry, but, just as with colors, this does not mean that these various physical shapes really exist together in the same one section. If we were to allow this to be the case, then in each and every section we would engender the notions of all the shapes. This is not what happens, however. Therefore, physical shapes have no distinct reality. The colors seen in a squareshaped piece of linen do not simultaneously engender the notion of length, such as might be [engendered] by a row of trees or a column of ants. There is no logical error here! If this is true[that shape and color are not distinct substances], then how is it that from a distance and in a dark place we do not discern color but we do discern shape?

How is it that we do not discern the shape of [individual] trees and yet can discern the shape of a row of trees? Now, apart from the [individual] 13

781c

A Mahayana Demonstration on the Theme of Action

trees there is no separate row [of trees]. Rather, in distant or darkened composite matter neither color nor shape is discernible. Even when we can perceive [that something is there], it remains unclear and we wonder what it is that we are seeing. We conclude that we apprehend only color [and not shape]. Our vision is indistinct when we are far away [from the observed object] and in darkness. Therefore, [the objection is invalid and] it is not logically proven that a communicative act is shape. 2. Theory of the Vātsīputrīyas and Sāṃmitīya:

The Communicative Act as Movement

Another theory[of the Vātsīputrīya and the Sāṃmitīya] holds that a bodily act of communication consists in movement, engendered by mental states that take[movement]as object.

Why does [this theory] repeat [the claim that a bodily act of communication] is engendered by mental states that take that as object? In order to exclude the physical movement of the lips, because that [movement] is engendered by mental states that take as object the enunciation of language.

What does the term "movement" mean?

It means a change of position.

In what sphere is [movement] included?

It is included in the sphere of physical form.

How does one know that [a bodily act of communication] is a change in position?

Because no specifying characteristic can be ascertained [in the bodily act beyond its change in position].

Critique of the Theory that the Communicative Act is Movement This reasoning [that it must be a change in position just because we cannot ascertain the specifying characteristics of things] is invalid. Let us use as an example the heating of objects [such as pottery, or in cooking food]. Although [the product] has come into direct contact with [agents that transform it, such as] fire, sunlight, snow, vinegar, etc., and the causes for all these heatingsare indeed different, one cannot ascertain these specifying characteristics [in the finished product]. Nevertheless, the [product's] later state differs from its 14

Part One

former state. This is analogous [to the case of a bodily act of communication, so you cannot claim that simply because we cannot ascertain its specifying characteristics the bodily act of communication has no change beyond its change in position, because we cannot ascertain those characteristics even when things clearly do change].

Another example: comparable bunches of grass to be burned as fuel each produce different flames. Although they are different, we cannot ascertain their specifying characteristics. Nevertheless, those comparable [bunches of grass] are certainly different. This is also analogous [with the bodily act of communication. So although we cannot ascertain the specifying characteristics of those acts, we should not conclude that they are all identical, except for the change in the position of that body].

Suppose that when a fired product came into direct contact with the cause [of its firing] its characteristics as a fired product did not immediately arise— even afterward they would not arise because that cause would not have changed. If the comparable bunches of grass to be burned as fuel did not each produce different flames, then the flames would have no cause to differ, yet they do differ in their dimensions, luminescence, and heat. Therefore, it does not follow that because specifying characteristics [of a bodily act] cannot be ascertained, we must conclude that [a bodily act of communication] is a change of position. [Rather,] we must [more] carefully examine and understand these specifying characteristics. We claim that [a bodily act of communication] is a change in the position [of the body] because a cause for the extinction [of such things as bodies] cannot be ascertained.[Such things as bodies have a certain duration and do not perish from moment to moment, as they belong to the category of things that do not perish instantaneously. Therefore, the only specifying characteristic of the bodily act of communication must be its change in position.] This is also unreasonable. It is like mind, mental states, sound, light, flames, etc., [all of which you include in the category of things that do perish from moment to moment without a cause]. What cause for extinction do these things have? Yet they do perish from moment to moment. This applies also to the other things [you hold to have a certain duration]. Extinction does not depend on a cause.

15

782a

A Mahayana Demonstration on the Theme of Action

Mind, etc. do have a cause for extinction, however—each and every item [included in our list of mind, mental states, sound, light, flame, etc.]is itself characterized by impermanence.

Why then does this not apply to other things [and not just your restricted list]? You recognize that the extinction of mind, etc. does not depend on a cause. If that is true of mind etc., why is it not true of other things too? If, in the case of things other than[the impermanent mind, etc.] extinction did not depend on a cause, [for example, the destruction of wood by fire,] then the material nature [of the firewood]could not be ascertained even before the wood had come into contact with flame, because[if the wood perishes from moment to moment without any other cause, then] its later state would be the same as its former state. How then could it be perceived at all? [Let us take flame and sound, which you admit perishes from moment to moment without any cause.] Before the wind has contacted the lamp and before the hand has grasped the bell, the lamp's flame and the bell's sound are distinctly perceptible, but this is not the case after [they have been touched by the wind or grasped by the hand]. However, the extinction of the flame and the sound do not depend on the wind or the hand [because they spontaneously perish from moment to moment]. The same applies to the firewood. This should present no logical difficulty. [All things perish from moment to moment and need no cause for their extinction.]

Moreover, even if [we grant that] the firewood is destroyed because of the fire and its material nature cannot be perceived, then, at the very moment it comes into contact [with the fire] one would not perceive it, since when it has come into contact it is altered.

Moreover, all heated products have degrees: slightly, medium, and completely [heated], although the external cause [of the fire] remains unchanged. Although these differences in the characteristics of what is heated do occur, their cause is [the unchanged external fire]. Now, how could [the fire] be both the cause for the later occurrence of the products fired and also the cause for their prior extinction? It is impossible that that because of which a thing arises should also be that because of which it is destroyed. Two contrary states do not have a single common cause. Common sense confirms this! Conditioned things do not depend on a cause for their extinction; they perish spontaneously. Whether or not they are perceived as they were, we must recognize that this is the specific 16

Part One

characteristic of either the evolutions or the extinctions of their continuities, because they have a subtle progression.

Moreover, if things that are destroyed did indeed have a cause [for their destruction], and thus there is nothing that is destroyed without a cause, then the mind and mental states, etc., [which you assert need no cause for their extinction], would need a cause for their extinction too, just as they need a cause for their arising. Yet it is not true that there is a separate impermanence [for things] different from mind etc. Common sense confirms this! Moreover, since these causes [for extinction] would differ, the extinctions would also be different, since fire, sunlight, snow, and vinegar differ and the products prepared [with them also] differ.

Moreover, a thing already destroyed would again be destroyed, because it would be granted a cause, just as physical form, etc. Therefore, extinction definitely has no cause. Because extinction has no cause, as soon as something occurs it immediately perishes. Thus we conclude that [a bodily act of communication] is not a change of place. We claim that this state [of a bodily act of communication]is indeed a change of position because no cause for the arising [of a bodily act of communication]is perceptible. This is unreasonable because there is a cause for the arising [of a bodily act of communication]. The prior state serves as cause for the later state. It is just as the mind of a previous moment issues in the mind of a later moment. It is just as a prior [moment of] heating issues in a later [moment of] heating; just as milk issues in curdled cream; just as grape juice issues in wine, or as wine issues into vinegar. Not the slightest thing changes position. Since there is no change of position, what movement is there?

Moreover, [in your theory movement can take place in certain things, such as physical bodies, because they are not destroyed from moment to moment but have a certain duration of existence]. If they have such duration, however, then they would have no movement—only something that is unmovingwould have stable duration. Even if a thing has no duration, [as we claim,] it would still have no movement because something that perishes as soon as it arises precludes movement.

If this is true, what is it that we observe as movement[in changes of position]? 17

782b

A Mahayana Demonstration on the Theme of Action

That which is seen in another place is not the same thing as before. How do you know that it is not the same thing as before? Because new things arise in sundry places, like flames from a grass fire or the play of shadows. The shadow of one place is not seen at another place. A stationary form does not move but sunlight moves off and comes back and one can see the shade that is produced, either long or short, or changing. Moreover, when one covers the light only small streaks occur. You are very critical! Why all these subtle objections against a change of position? How can you be sure that what is seen in another place is not the same thing as before?

We must repeat the above reasoning as proof. As we have explained, if there is duration then there would be no movement, and so forth. Moreover, even though an external cause of fire, etc. does not change, afterward differences are perceived. Thus, we conclude that from moment to moment there is a different thing.

Moreover, despite your argument that what is seen in another place is the selfsame thing as before because there is no cause for these differences, you have given no reason to show that it is indeed the same thing as before. So why not grant that it is not the same thing as before? Both of these assertions [that it is the same thing as before and that it is not] remain unproven. Therefore, the assertion about change of place is invalid. 3. Theory of the Sauryodayika-Dārṣṭāntika:

The Communicative Act as Wind

The Sauryodayika theory holds that all activity in fact does not change position, since conditioned things, of their nature, are destroyed from moment to moment. However, there is a distinct reality that is the cause for a special thought. This reality, arising in dependence on the hand, the foot, and so forth, activates that hand or foot and is the reason something arises in a different position. This is what is termed movement and bodily communication. In what sphere is it included?

In the sphere of physical form.

If this is true, then why can [this special reality] not be seen with the eye, as are all the colors [in the sphere of physical form]? If it cannot be seen, it does not communicate to others. Why then call it communicative? How does 18

Part One

one even know this reality in fact exists? How does this reality cause the body itself to move into another position and arise in a different manner? We claim that the wind, arisen [internally]from a special thought, is this [reality].The very essence of the wind element is movement. It is the general cause whereby the foot changes its position. Apart from the wind, what [other] element of movement can one identify?

Furthermore, even grasses and leaves have no separate movement apart from the wind. How could they move about? Yet when the wind touches them they all naturally begin to move. This is why we should conclude that this [wind element]causes the hand to move its position. Why dither about other theories? [Other things]either by their essence or by their activity cannot engender any reality capable of movement.

Critique of the Theory that the Communicative Act is Wind You incorrectly hold that the wind, engendered by a special thought, is the generative cause whereby the hand alters its position, and that this is a bodily act of communication. Since the wind has nothing whereby it communicates, however, how can you call it communicative? Furthermore, how can you claim that the sphere of the tangible, [which includes the wind,] is either morally good or bad? This is not [the theory of] a disciple of the Buddha!

If you incorrectly claim that a special thought causes the body itself to arise in different positions, and that this bodily act is then bodily communication, such a bodily communication is [only] a verbal designation and not real, because the body itself is essentially a composite of many elements. Moreover, how can that which is not communicative be termed communicative? The nose and [the other parts of the body] do not communicate with others.

Moreover, if you hold that the sense of smell [and the activities of the other parts of the body] are either morally good or bad, this is not [a theory of] a disciple of the Buddha!

If you incorrectly hold that physical color, arising from a special thought, would be bodily communication, [we remind you that] physical color does not arise from any special thought, it arises from its own seeds (bījas) and a special wind. Moreover, if you hold that physical color is either good or bad, this is not [a theory of] a disciple of the Buddha!

19

782c

A Mahayana Demonstration on the Theme of Action

Even if the essence of physical color is not a bodily communication, its arising in other positions can still be a bodily communication. Good heavens! You artfully exhaust your abilities discussing the act of communicating and assiduously pile up whirling images. Even with the best of effort, however, you cannot validate your demonstration. Why continue to weary yourself in this regard? Who could prove that this arising [of physical color] has a special reality [apart from physical color itself]? If the arising you propose is not homogeneous with physical form, etc., and what is seen is not homogeneous with the eye, then how could the observer ever know of its existence? And if it were invisible, how could it be termed communicative? It was explained above that [the wind] cannot communicate to others! Moreover, if physical color is either morally good or bad, one could claim that it engenders bodily acts of communication, but physical color is neither morally good or bad, as we have explained above. Likewise, its arising is [neither good or bad]. Therefore, it most certainly is not the bodily act of communication!

If this is true, then acts of the body would be exclusively noncommunicative, [as the Sarvāstivāda and Vaibhāṣika propose]!

What do you identify as "noncommunicative"?

I refer to the physical form of discipline included within the sphere of thought.

Then, in the realm of desire can a good noncommunicative [act] be elicited apart from a communicative act?

What problem is there if in the realm of desire there is such a noncommunicative[act]? It would have to flow from thought, as in the realm of form, [where noncommunicative acts are not engendered from communicative acts but from a strong thought]. Then, when one has another thought or is unconscious, there would be neither restraint nor its absence.

We avoid this error because we claim that [a noncommunicative act] endures for a time, since it has been projected at the appointed time by the recitation[of the Rules of Discipline].

How then could one who, when the Scripture on Discipline is recited, keeps silent and says nothing during the appointed time [for confession] incur the transgression of lying?

20

Part One

Moreover, [if a noncommunicative act always comes from a communicative act], then there could be no morally neutral act of the body, because the noncommunicative [act] is only of the two varieties [of morally good and bad].

Also, there could be no bodily acts that are both good and bad at the same moment, since all noncommunicative [acts] have a definite continuity. A weak thought does not engender a noncommunicative act, while that engendered by a strong thought maintains a definite continuity. 21

Part Two

The Structure of the

Maturation of Action

1. Theory of the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika:

The Present Existence of Past Acts

Even though one follows his whims and imagines really existent physical acts of body and speech, still he cannot demonstrate that they are good or bad. Why? Because what some call physical acts are entirely abandoned at the end of life. How could they have a future result that is either agreeable or disagreeable?

Some[of the Vaibhāṣika thinkers] say,

"Why is this unreasonable? Past

acts essentially and really do exist, and can produce their fruit in the future. "

Critique of the Theory that Past Acts Really Exist Pimples popping out of a boil! You claim even that past acts essentially exist! The past means that which has previously existed but now no longer exists. How can you claim that [past acts] essentially and really exist? If you are correct, then how could the Bhagavat himself have said: Acts, even after a hundred years pass by,

Still do not perish. When they encounter the convergence of [Proper] conditions and an[appropriate] occasion, They necessarily bear their fruit.

What does this phrase "they do not perish" mean? It clearly means that past acts do not lack their results, just as is shown in the latter half of the stanza. Who does not admit that good or bad acts produce their results long afterward? However, we must examine with care just how they produce those results. Is it due to a special evolution in one's mental continuity, just as rice seeds produce their fruit? Or is it because their specific natures remain unchanged over a long time and thus produce their results? 23

783a

A Mahayana Demonstration on the Theme of Action

It is admissible to hold that they produce their results because of a special evolution of mental continuity. If they produce their results because their specific natures remain unchanged over a long time, however, then you are saying that these acts essentially do not come to an end even after a long time. Our claim about these acts is that they are said to come to an end not because their specific natures do not exist but because they have no further activity.

How is it that they have no further activity?

Because they no longer can project a future result.

Why are they unable to project a future result?

Because having already projected that result, they are without ability in its regard and cannot project it again. This is just as how things that have already arisen do not arise again.

Since there is no limitation to the flow of similar results [of acts once performed], why do they not project other similar results? One would expect that a present result, having already been projected once, would not necessarily project again. The essence of the act does not perish but remains eternally in the present.

Why then does it not eternally project the result it has brought about? Have I not just explained that it is unable to project again its already projected result, just as a thing that has already arisen does not arise again? Why do you keep raising this objection?

Even though you have treated this above you have not resolved the difficulty. An act that essentially exists forever must be coextensive with time. Being eternal, it should eternally project its results in the present. It should constantly be able to arise anew as at its inception. We hold that although a past act essentially exists it is not present, inasmuch as it lacks activity.

This is not admissible! Indeed, existing forever by its essence it should always have activity in the present. Besides, in your theory all past things have the activity to give forth their results. Why not then in the present? We hold that the present refers only to the activity of grasping a result in dependence on a multitude of factors.

This reasoning doesn't hold. Since the meaning of activity is univocal, there would be things simultaneously present and past. 24

Part Two

Now, the past denotes the absence of activity to grasp a result, while the present denotes the existence of an activity to give forth a result. When this activity is exhausted[acts are] said to come to an end. It then follows that all these things would both perish and then perish again. Consequently, it would follow that [things] arise and then arise again. Therefore, the reasoning behind your theory is invalid. How can anything be said to be able to project a result?

We hold that it disposes other factors that lead to its later arising. When at the last moment [an arhat] has exhausted all impure outflows, he clearly does not project future results because they no longer arise. Thus, his thoughts are certainly not present. They are neither annihilated again nor do they enter into the past. If at first they have no activity in the present, then how can you claim that later they fail and perish?

We hold that, although they lack activity [in the present] they can still be destroyed again [later]. This is how a past act must again be annihilated. If [a past act] has already been annihilated and then is annihilated again, it follows that something that has arisen again will once more arise. This contradicts what you have asserted above.

We hold that even though the thoughts [of an arhat who has exhausted outflows] do have the activity to engender subsequent results, because conditions are lacking the subsequent results do not arise. This is not reasonable. If a result is never engendered, how can you know that they have the activity to engender it? You are forced to state that these thoughts [of the arhat] both counter and harmonize with two conditions, because they would both exist and not exist: even though they arise from a cause they lack any activity to engender a subsequent result! Therefore, this theory that in sundry modes [a past act] can project a result is logically invalid. Rather, we should conclude that because a seed can nourish a result, we can speak about the projection of results. Your theory holds that the past and the future both really exist. Then how would the future not be able to project a result, just as the present does? If everything always exists, would anything essentially ever not exist? Yet the scriptural passage [cited above] says that [acts] "produce their results when they encounter a convergence of conditions and occasion.

" You should explain just what, how, and in which state [an act] can be described as "disposing other [factors] that lead to the future 25

783b

783c

A Mahayana Demonstration on the Theme of Action

arising [of results],

" called the projection of results because everything always exists [in your theory]. Therefore, we deem invalid this theory that holds that past acts essentially and really exist and can realize the future results they give forth.

2. The Theory of the Early Sāṃmitīya:

Special Realities—The Increase

and the Imperishable

Then one must admit that the two acts of body and speech, whether morally good or bad, engender a special reality in the continuity of the aggregates, which essentially and really exist and which is included among the aggregate of formations not associated with mind. Some,[i.e., Mahāsaṃgikas] call this reality the increase, while others,[the Sāmṃitīyas,] call it the imperishable. It is because of this reality that one can realize future results, whether agreeable or disagreeable. One must grant that mental acts must have such a reality. Otherwise, when an alternate mind arises and the[former mind] disappears, how could that[former act] realize a future result if such a special reality were not elicited within the mental continuity? Therefore, one must certainly admit that there is such a reality.

Critique of the Theory of the Special Realities of Increase and Imperishability

If this is true, then, when one first studies a text and recalls it to memory after a long period of time has elapsed, , or when one at first sees or hears things and recalls a memory of those things after a long period of time has elapsed, at what instant is this reality [that enables one to remember] engendered? Moreover, when one first enters the concentration of cessation, what reality is elicited by the mind whereby one might later return from that concentration and elicit a mind leaving concentration?

Moreover, if one were to dye the flowers of a citron tree with the juice of purple lac, after both [the dye and flower] perish, what reality is engendered whereby the later result is that the pith of the fruit has a red color? Therefore, we distance ourselves from this imagined special reality engendered by the two acts of body and speech. 26

Part Two

3. Vasubandhu's Sautrāntika Theory:

The Evolutions of Mental Continuity

However, we conclude that a special kind of volition does exercise its permeations on the mental continuity, causing it to engender its activity. It is due to the special evolution of such activity that the varieties of future results occur. This is similar to dyeing the flowers of a citron tree with the juice of purple lac—when the evolution of its continuity reaches its term the pith of the fruit is colored red. We should recognize that the permeations of inner states of consciousness is analogous.

When then do you not allow that the two acts of body and speech also permeate the mental continuity?

Acts of body and speech become morally good or bad because they are engendered from thought. Since they become morally good or bad because of thought, it does not follow that they themselves can give forth future results in a different mental continuity, either agreeable or disagreeable. It is not that one thing performs the act and another experiences the result. Although in fact an already performed act terminates, the mental continuity that has been so permeated does experience a special evolution of its potentialities and can realize future results, either agreeable or disagreeable. 27

Part Three

The Continuity of

Maturation

1. On Emergence from the

Concentration of Cessation

The question arises: When the mental continuity of one abiding in a concentration of the cessation [of all mental activity] or among the unconscious gods is severed, how can an act prior [to those unconscious states] realize a future result, either agreeable or disagreeable, [viz., the reemergence of conscious life in any of the destinies]? The theory of some[Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika thinkers] holds that in this life a mind previously permeated necessarily returns to its continuity and thus realizes its results, either agreeable or disagreeable. If [consciousness] has already been severed for some time, however, what can cause it to reconnect [with conscious life]?

The mind entering into concentration is the immediately antecedent and similar condition whereby it can bring about that reconnection. That [mind] has already come to an end long before. How then can it serve as the immediately antecedent condition? We have already refuted the notion that past acts can realize results. By the same token, this too is logically refuted. Therefore, the mind that emerges from those concentrations is unconnected with [the mind prior to entry into those concentrations]. Some others[among the Dārṣṭantikas] hold that the mind after [emergence from those unconscious states]returns because of the force of seeds that adhere in the sense organs. These seeds that engender mind and mental states rely as needed on two continuities, mental continuity and sense organ continuity. Do the scriptures not teach that "Thinking and things [thought] are the causes that engender thinking consciousness?" Apart from thought, how can thinking consciousness arise [supported only in seeds in the sense organs]? 29

784a

A Mahayana Demonstration on the Theme of Action

You should recognize that the seeds of thought are sometimes referred to as thought [as in the scripture], as they speak about the result in place of the cause, just as one might refer to hunger or thirst in place of the tangible. Yet how can each thought and mental state arise from these [two] continuities of seeds? It is never observed that sprouts engender things from [two sets of] seeds, or anything like this. It is possible that [seeds] engender a single fruit in reliance on many conditions, but the arising of a single fruit never comes from two seeds.

In your theory of returning [consciousness] you fail to avoid the error outlined above. This is to say, when the mental continuity of one abiding in a concentration bereft of mind or among the unconscious gods is severed, how can an act prior [to those unconscious states] realize a future result, either agreeable or disagreeable, [i.e., the reemergence of conscious life in any of the destinies]?

Yet others hold that this opinion is erroneous.

What opinion?

The opinion that these states are devoid of mind. Some hold that these states do possess mind. This is how we avoid this error. In the Inquiry, Blessed Vasumitra says,

"Those who hold that the concentration of cessation is entirely devoid of mind encounter this error. However, I teach that even the concentration of cessation has a subtle mind and thus I avoid this fault. " He also

quotes the scriptures to demonstrate his interpretation, such as a passage that states,

"In those who abide in the concentration of cessation, the formations of the body are eliminated, . . . but the sense organs remain unchanged, undestroyed, and consciousness does not leave the body. "

Well then, what is the consciousness present in that state? Some hold that it is the sixth thinking consciousness. Yet a scripture states,

"Thinking and things [thought] are the causes that

engender thinking consciousness.

" The convergence of these three issues is

contact, and with contact sensation, conceptualization, and volition arise. How then could the [unconscious] states actually have a thinking consciousness without the convergence of these three, (i.e., thinking, things [thought], and thinking consciousness)? Even if this was possible, how could these three come together yet there is no contact? Even if that was possible, how could contact be present without sensation and conceptualization? We are 30

Part Three

speaking, however, about a concentration that has extinguished sensation and conceptualization.

There is yet another interpretation of the Bhagavat'

s teaching that "

sensation causes craving.

" Not every sensation invariably causes craving. This

same can apply to contact. Not every contact invariably causes sensation. In other scriptures the Bhagavat himself has examined this issue. He explained that "all sensation engendered by contact that is qualified by primal ignorance is the cause engendering craving.

" Nowhere has he identified the

contact that engenders sensation, however. Since he has not specified [the different kinds of contact], yours is not a good interpretation. Yet another interpretation holds that the assertion that the phrase "the convergence of the three issues in contact"

means that contact arises when these

three factors have the force to come together. In these [unconscious]states, however, the three factors lack the force to engender contact, or to engender sensation or conceptualization, since the mind that enters into concentration is extinguished. If indeed these states of concentration lack contact, then obviously sensation and conceptualization will be absent. Therefore, in these states, all that remains is the mental consciousness without any mental states. If this is true, how can the mental consciousness in these states be morally good, defiled, or undefined?

What error is entailed in these[alternatives]?

If their nature is morally good, how then can that good nature not be associated with the roots of goodness, such as detachment and so forth? And if they are associated with the roots of goodness, such as detachment and so forth, then how could there be no contact?

What we assert is that this consciousness is good because it is projected by an immediately antecedent and similar condition that is good. This reasoning does not follow, since three kinds of mind, [morally good, bad, or neutral], may arise immediately after a good mind. A good mind projected by the force of [antecedent] good roots, however, would be incapable of eliminating detachment and so forth, [and thus could not emerge as either bad or neutral]. And if it lacks good roots, it follows that it could not become good. Yet this concentration of cessation is good, just as cessation is good. [On the other hand,] if it is of a defiled nature, how then can that defiled nature not be associated with the passions, such as covetousness and so forth? 31

784b

A Mahayana Demonstration on the Theme of Action

If it is associated with the passions, such as covetousness and so forth, then how could there be no contact? As the Buddha himself has taught in the Scripture of Ten Questions,

"All the aggregates of sensation, conceptualization,

and formation have contact as their cause.

" Moreover, if a concentration

without conceptualization is not deemed to be defiled, this applies even more to the concentration of cessation.

If you affirm that [this mental consciousness] is unobstructed and undefined, [i.e., morally neutral,] then does it arise from maturation, from deportment, from craftsmanship, or from magical illusions? [These are the only morally undefined states taught in theGreat Book of Optionsthat you follow.] What error is entailed here?

If [this mental consciousness] arises from maturation, then how immediately after the concentrated mind [attains to] the summit of mundane being can it still engender a mind born from maturation that pertains to the realm of desire, because in the lower eight stages of meditation [such a mind] has been severed. Again, how could it be that immediately after one emerges from this mind [of maturation pertaining to the realm of desire], one attains and elicits a mind of utter non-agitation? In the Mahākauṣṭhila-sūtraa question is asked,

"After one emerges from the concentration of cessation, how many contacts does one experience?" [The Buddha] answered,

"Dear student, one

experiences three contacts: contact with non-agitation, contact with the absence of being, and contact with the absence of image. "

Moreover, if [this mental consciousness] is projected by previous acts of a maturing mind, what reason exists whereby the temporal force [of those acts] present prior to the concentration of cessation does not go beyond the time period for emerging from that cessation?

If the mind of concentration at the summit of being, focused on cessation, were to reach its termination and then come to manifest as a mind maturing karmic results, projected by the permeations of former acts in the realm of desire, then why has it not done this during the previous states [of meditation leading up to that concentration of cessation]?

Material forms arisen from elicited maturation that have been engendered by that [previous mind] have already been severed and do not continue. Why then, when that mind engendered by maturation is severed [in the concentration of cessation], would they reconnect [later upon emergence]? 32

Part Three

Perhaps [this mental consciousness is undefined because it relates to] deportment, craftsmanship, or magical illusion.

Why would this mind take as its object deportment, etc.? In the absence of contact [with them,] how could it have such activity? Moreover, you admit that the nine progressive concentrations and the eight liberations, all of which are cultivated, are all by nature good. Thus, it does not follow that in these states there would arise either a defiled or a morally undefined mind.

Moreover, employing the summit of being, focused on cessation as objective, and supported by a concentration that reflects on quietude, one realizes entry into the concentration that eliminates sensation and conceptualization. In the Mahākauṣṭhila-sūtraa question about the concentration of cessation is posed: "How many are the causes and conditions on which one relies for entry into the concentration on the imageless realm?" [The Buddha] answered, "Dear monk, there are two causes and conditions dependent on which one enters the concentration of the imageless realm: the absence of reflection of any image and correct reflection on the imageless realm. " If, as you admit,

there is a mental consciousness in this concentration of cessation, what would its object be? What would be its mode of operation?

What if its object is cessation and its mode of operation is quietude? Then how could it not be good? If you grant that it is good, then why not admit that it is associated with the roots of goodness, such as detachment and so forth? If you grant that it is so associated, why then not admit that contact is its cause for arising?

What if it has another object and another mode of operation? How then could one engender a distracted mind immediately after the mind of entry into the concentration of cessation? Isn't this a contradiction? If you imagine that there exists another undefined state [apart from the four discussed above], you are not correct, because of the two causes [for concentration given above in the passage from the Mahākauṣṭhila-sūtra]. Therefore, you have incorrectly understood the meaning of the scripture and rashly imagined that a sixth mental consciousness is always present in the concentration of cessation, and thus claim that these states have mind. 33

784c

A Mahayana Demonstration on the Theme of Action

Vasubandhu's Theory: The Subtle Mind

Well then, do you hold that the concentration of cessation is a state entirely devoid of mind? Or does it have mind?

It is as some of the Sutrāprāmāṇikas think: a subtle mind is present in these states. A consciousness that matures results, endowed with all the seeds [of those results], from the first moment of taking birth until final death, evolves in continuity without interruption. Throughout the various lifetimes, because it is the cause of their maturation the various different continuities [that characterize those different lifetimes] flow forth, until it is finally eliminated at cessation. Indeed, because this consciousness is uninterrupted, one can say that there is mind during these mindless states. One can also say that there is no mind, however, because the complex of the other six consciousnesses do not function at all in these states. It is because of the dominant force of the mind preparatory to the concentration of cessation that the seeds of the six consciousnesses are temporarily suppressed and remain unmanifested. This is why [those states] are said to be devoid of mind, but they are not entirely so devoid. Mind has two varieties. The first is a mind that accumulates innumerable seeds. The second is a polymorphous mind that functions with differences in object and modality. Since this second [polymorphous] mind is lacking in these states of the concentration of cessation, we say that it is "without mind.

" It is just as if a chair has one leg but is missing the other [three], we say that it doesn't have its legs. In states in which the seeds of the [six] consciousnesses are subdued, the consciousness that matures results evolves in a special way from moment to moment, as the force of that suppression gradually diminishes [them] until it is entirely eliminated, just as the heat of boiling water or the velocity of a released arrow gradually diminishes until it are is exhausted. [When the subduing force is exhausted] the seeds of the [six] consciousnesses again engender their results. At first the mental consciousness is again engendered from the seeds, and later the other [sense] consciousnesses are gradually engendered as conditions warrant. As explained above, the consciousness that matures results harbors the various seeds of all things. When it becomes manifest through the good or bad permeations of the various other consciousnesses and their concomitant states, then the force of the seeds inevitably increase. Because of this special evolution of its continuity and in accord with the powerful maturation of the seeds and the 34

Part Three

auxiliary conditions one encounters, one then engenders future results, whether agreeable or disagreeable. There is a stanza that supports this interpretation: Mind together with unlimited seeds

Continues in a constant stream,

Encountering conditions for specific permeations, These seeds increase in the mind.

The force of the seeds gradually matures and Gives forth its fruit when conditions converge. Just as when one has dyed citron flowers, The pith of the ripening fruit will be stained red. In support of this, the Bhagavat declared the following stanza in theGreat Vehicle Scripture on the Explication of the Underlying Meaning: The depth and subtlety of the appropriating consciousness With all its seeds is like a violent torrent. I have not revealed this to worldlings, Fearing they would imagine it to be a self. 2. The Storehouse

Consciousness

Since it continues onward and has the ability to appropriate a body [upon rebirth into another life], it is called the appropriating consciousness. It is also called the storehouse consciousness as it encompasses and stores the seeds of all states. It is also called the consciousness that matures results because [in it] the projected actions of previous lives mature. If one does not admit the existence of this maturing consciousness, then what consciousness can appropriate a body? There is no other consciousness that is adequate for taking up an entire body and remaining without abandoning it until the end of a lifetime.

Moreover, what [other] sphere or aggregate is able to sever the passions and their residues when their antidote arises? We think that aggregate is found in the very mind that counters[the passions and their residues]. This is incorrect. How could that which conforms to those residues and passions be able to counter [them]?

35

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A Mahayana Demonstration on the Theme of Action

Moreover, when a mind, defiled, good, or without outflows, is generated among beings born into the formless realm, where would these maturing states that support those destinies lodge? Alternately, you would have to admit that in these destinies the pervasive presence of states that are not maturation or that are unconnected [with maturation], but this contradicts reason. Moreover, the result of a non-returner (anāgāmin), when born into the summit of being, is the eradication of the remaining outflows and the cultivation of the path that counters [them]. Now, when the absence of outflows occurs in the sphere of nonbeing, what is the specific reality at the summit of being, what is the substance that continues to exist whereby [such a nonreturner] is deemed not to be dead? It is not true that a homogeneous existence or a vital force, [as proposed by the Vaibhāṣika theory,] exist separately as realities apart from the mind and material form. These two are only metaphors for the successive progression of the maturing aggregates. This successive progression is not a distinct substance; it is just like the successive progression of weeds in a field, [which does not entail any reality apart from the weeds themselves]. Therefore, we must indeed conclude that apart from the complex of the six consciousnesses, there does exist the essence of this seminal consciousness, as described above. In support of this consciousness, in the canon of the Tāmraparṇīya [the Buddha] established what is called the branching consciousness [between two lifetimes]. The canon of the Mahāsāṃgika calls it the foundational consciousness. The canon of the Mahīśāsaka speaks about the aggregate that remains until the end of transmigration.

What is the object and the mode of operation of this consciousness? Its object and mode of operation cannot be identified.

Then why call it a consciousness?

In your theory there is another consciousness in states of the concentration of cessation, object, and mode of operation, which are difficult to perceive. The same applies here.

Within which of the appropriating aggregates is this consciousness included?

It is only reasonable to answer that it is included within the appropriating aggregate of consciousness.

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Part Three

If that is the case, then how do you interpret the scriptural passage, "What

is called the appropriating aggregate of consciousness? This refers to the complex of the six consciousnesses.

" Or again,

"Conditioned by consciousness

is name and form. Consciousness refers to the six consciousnesses. "

We must recognize that these scriptural [passages] have a special, underlying intent. It is just as a scripture says, "What is the aggregate of karmic

formation? This refers to the complex of the six volitions. " This does not

mean that in the aggregate of karmic formation there are no other states, however. The same applies here.

What is this underlying intent when[the scripture] speaks about the six [consciousnesses] and not about any other[consciousness]? It is as the Bhagavat explained in theExplication of the Underlying Meaning: I have not revealed it to worldlings

Fearing they would imagine it to be a self.

Why would the foolish imagine it to be a self?

This [consciousness] has no beginning and lasts until the end of transmigration. Having a subtle mode of operation, it does not change. However, the supports, objects, modes of operation, and varieties of the six consciousnesses are gross and easily understood, since they are associated with the passions and the practices of countering [those passions], and since they establish the categories of defilement and purification. In essence, they are consciousness as result. Therefore, we infer that this seminal consciousness does exist.

Because [scriptures] teach only what is appropriate [for their hearers] [the Buddha] did not teach about this causal consciousness in the scriptures, as it would have been just the opposite of [the gross consciousnesses] he had just explained. This was his underlying intent when he spoke about the six [consciousnesses] and not about the [storehouse consciousness]. As we have already explained, in other canons he only spoke of the complex of the six consciousnesses as the branching consciousness. Since the scriptures teach only as appropriate, they are not opposed [to what we propose]. Furthermore, in each of the various canons untold scriptures are no longer extant, as we know from the discussions in the Rules for Interpretation.Therefore, we 37

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A Mahayana Demonstration on the Theme of Action

cannot assert that the store consciousness has never been discussed in the scriptures; clearly it is reasonable that it was.

If this is true, then one person would have two consciousnesses active simultaneously, the maturing consciousness and the other active consciousnesses. What error is there in this?

If two consciousnesses are simultaneously active in the same one person, it follows that they would simultaneously establish two sentient beings, for those two consciousnesses would be active in different bodies. There is no such defect [in our reasoning], since these two consciousnesses evolve in mutual support as cause and result and are not disassociated from each other, and because the maturing consciousness is permeated by the other active consciousnesses. It is not the case, then, that these two consciousnesses are simultaneously active in different persons. Therefore, we avoid this fault in reasoning.

Can you not see that the seed and the result of that seed are different continuities? In the world we do observe that in the case of blue lotus flowers, the roots and stems have different continuities, which lead to the production of fruit from seed. This also applies to [the two consciousnesses]. Furthermore, whether or not it can be observed by worldly seeing, if you do not grant that the store consciousness exists, you commit the logical errors outlined above. Thus, one must certainly admit that the store consciousness essentially exists apart from the six consciousnesses.

Why then not admit that an essential self exists as the support for the complex of the six consciousnesses? What would be the characteristics of this self you propose, which you describe as the support of the six consciousnesses? If you admit that like the store consciousness this self continuously arises and perishes, evolving according to conditions, then how is it preferable to this [storehouse] consciousness? Why would you proffer it as a self? We claim that the essence of the self is one and eternal, forever unchanging. How then can you say that [such a self] is supported by the permeations of the consciousnesses that [arise] from sensation? Now, these permeations are the causes of the mental continuity thus permeated so that it evolves with 38

Part Three

its distinct abilities, just as citron flowers, permeated and dyed by purple lac, engender enabling changes in their continuities. If there were no permeation, there would be no such evolution of different abilities. How then would the many different permeations of former experience, knowledge, and attachment arise much later as differences in memory, knowledge, and attachment? Moreover, since the essence of the self is not altered, either within or after emerging from unconscious states, there would be no consciousness. So how could a subsequent thinking consciousness and the other [sense consciousnesses] arise? Moreover, what power does the self have over the consciousnesses that would lead you to think that it is the support of those consciousnesses? We say that the consciousnesses arise because of the self. Yet if the essence of a self is forever unaltered, how could the consciousnesses arise, one after the other, at all? Why wouldn't they arise simultaneously and instantaneously?

We suggest that they must wait upon other conditions as aids for their arising.

How can you be sure, then, that the existent self functions apart from these other conditions in engendering [the consciousnesses]? We say that the consciousnesses become active in reliance on the self. As soon as things arise they immediately perish. Indeed, this is what their instability means. How could they last and remain active? Therefore, we do not allow the theory that the essence of the self is the support of the complex of the six consciousnesses. Moreover, the theory that there is a self contradicts the scriptural authority that says that "all things are without self. " Your opinion

of a unique and eternal self is entirely without true reasoning. It issues solely from your mistaken emotions!

Therefore, we have demonstrated that special volitions simultaneously permeate the store consciousness and cause its continuity to differ in all its evolutions, projecting future results, either agreeable or disagreeable. They are not characterized as bodily or verbal actions, as you assert. 39

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