Analysis of the Middle and Extremes The Scripture on the Monk Nāgasena

The king asked Nāgasena again, "[Suppose] a chariot transports salt and oxen are yoked to [the chariot transporting] the salt. Would the chariot's oxen be able to know distinctly the flavor of the salt?"

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Nāgasena said, "The chariot's oxen are not able to know distinctly [or even just] know the flavor of the salt."

The king asked Nāgasena, "Can the flavor of the salt be weighed?" Nāgasena said, "The king knows whether one can weigh the flavor of salt." Being asked by the king, Nāgasena [nevertheless] said, "The flavor of salt cannot be weighed; just its weight can be weighed." The king said, "It is well."

[On Karma]

The king asked Nāgasena again, "Have all the five bodily [sense-]knowledges of a person been acquired by a variety of deeds? Does one acquire the five [sense-]knowledges by performing a single deed?"

Nāgasena said:

They have been acquired by a variety of deeds; they have not been acquired by a single deed. It is similar to five cereals [sown] in one field.97 When they will grow, each one of them will grow its own respective type.98 All the five bodily [sense-]knowledges of a person have each arisen by way of a variety of deeds.

The king said, "It is well, it is well."

The king asked Nāgasena again:

People in this world are all completely endowed with a head, hair, beard, skin, face, eyes, ears, nose, mouth, body, four limbs, hands, and feet. What is the reason that some among them have a long life and some among them have a short life; that some [among] them have many diseases and some among them have few diseases; that some among them are poor and some among them are rich; that some among them are valued and some among them are despised; that some among them are eminent persons and some among them are insignificant persons; that some among them are beautiful and some among them are ugly; that some among them are trusted by the people and some among them are suspected by the people; that some among them are bright and filial and some among them are stupid? Why are they not similar?

Nāgasena said:

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It is similar to the many tree fruits. Some among them are sour and not sweet, some among them are bitter, some among them are spicy, some among them are sweet, some among them are really acidic. Nāgasena asked the king, "They all [grow] on trees; why are they not similar?"

The king said, "The reason they are not similar is that [the planted trees] are decidedly different in each case."99

Nāgasena said:

With people it is also like this. Each and every of the thoughts in their minds is different. This is the reason that makes people in the world not just be similar, so that some among them have a short life and some among them have a long life; some among them have many diseases and some among them have few diseases; some among them are rich and some among them are poor; some among them are valued and some among them are despised; some among them are eminent persons and some among them are insignificant persons; some among them are beautiful and some among them are ugly; some among them say what is useful and some among them say what is useless; some among them are bright and some among them are stupid. Nāgasena said:

For this reason the Buddha said that people will get what accords with their own wholesome and evil deeds. Some among them are powerful and wealthy; some among them are poor and needy. All this is from the merit each gained in accordance with their own wholesome and evil deeds in previous lives and former existences in the world.100 The king said, "It is well, it is well."

The king asked Nāgasena again, "A person who wishes to do what is wholesome, should it be done earlier or should it be done later?" Nāgasena said, "It should be done earlier; what will be done later is not capable of benefiting the person [now]. What has been done earlier will benefit the person."

Nāgasena asked the king, "When the king has thirst and wishes to drink, should he employ people to dig the ground and build a well? Will they be able to attend to the king's thirst?"

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The king said, "They will not [be able] to attend to my thirst. They just should have built the well earlier."

Nāgasena said, "With people it is just like that. Wherever people stay, all should be done prior to their stay. Doing it later will be of no benefit." Nāgasena asked the king:

The king is hungry and only at that time he employs people to plow the ground, fertilize the ground, and sow grains. Being hungry, will he be able to get a meal [or] should he have made provisions in advance? The king said, "No, I should have made provisions earlier." Nāgasena said:

With people it is just like that. They should earlier have done what is wholesome. Doing what is wholesome only when one is under pressure will not be of personal benefit.

Nāgasena asked the king:

It is similar to the king having an enemy. Would the king, right at the time of going out to battle, be able to employ people to train the horses, train the elephants, train the people, and produce the tools for battle? The king said:

No, I should have made provisions long ago, [so that] right at that time I can then give battle. Right at that time to train the horses, train the elephants, train the people, [and produce the tools for battle] is of no benefit. Nāgasena said:

The Buddha said in a discourse that people should recollect their own earlier wholesome bodily deeds. To do what is wholesome later will be of no benefit.

Nāgasena said to the king:

One should not discard the great way to undertake the wrong way. To no avail the stupid person, who has discarded what is wholesome and has done evil, sits down afterward and cries; this is of no benefit. A family 181

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man who discards and rejects loyalty and what is right and who undertakes what is wrong will later, right at the time of death, regret it. The king said, "It is well, it is well."

[On Hell]

The king asked Nāgasena again:

Dear, you recluses say, "Fires in the world do not burn like the fires in hell." Dear, you [recluses] further say, "A small stone, placed into a fire in the world, will not be consumed by the evening." Dear, you [recluses] further say, "Placing a very big stone into the fires in hell, it will right away be totally consumed."101 For this reason I do not believe you. Dear, you [recluses] further say, "People who have done evil will at death be [thrown] into hell, where for millions of years those persons will not be consumed or die." For this reason, again, I do not believe such statements. Nāgasena asked the king:

Would the king have heard or seen that in the water there are female pythons, female crocodiles, female tortoises, and female crabs who, being pregnant with a child, eat sandstones?

The king said, "Yes, all of them use this for food." Nāgasena asked the king, "Will the sandstones be consumed in their bellies?"

The king said, "Yes, they will all be consumed."

Nāgasena said, "Will the children with which they are pregnant also be consumed in their bellies?"

The king said, "They will not be consumed."

Nāgasena said, "What is the reason that they will not be consumed?" The king said, "Solely the good fortune of their physiognomy is the reason why they are certainly not consumed."

Nāgasena said:

For people in hell it is just like this; for millions of years they will not be consumed or die. The reason they will not be consumed or die is that the faults committed by these people have not yet been exhausted. 182

Nāgasena asked the king:

A lioness, a tigress, a female dog, and a female cat, being pregnant with a child, all eat meat. Would the bones they chew and swallow be consumed in their belly?

The king said, "They will all be completely consumed." Nāgasena asked the king, "Will the children with which they are pregnant also be consumed in their bellies?"

The king said, "They will not be consumed."

Nāgasena said, "What is the reason that they will not be consumed?" The king said, "It is solely by way of the good fortune of their physiognomy, which is the reason why they are not consumed." Nāgasena said:

For people in hell it is just like this; for millions of years they will not be consumed or die. The reason people in hell will not be consumed or die is that the evil deeds committed by them have not yet been dispelled. Nāgasena asked the king, "Do female cows, mares, female donkeys, female elk, and female deer, being pregnant with a child, all eat grass and hay as their fodder?"

The king said, "Yes, they all use it for their food." Nāgasena said, "Would the hay and grass in their belly be completely consumed?"

The king said, "It will all be completely consumed." Nāgasena said, "Will the children in their bellies be completely consumed?" The king said, "They will not be completely consumed." Nāgasena said, "What is the reason that they will not be completely consumed?" The king said, "It is solely by way of the good fortune of their physiognomy, which is the reason why they are not completely consumed." Nāgasena said, "For people in hell it is just like this, because their faults have not yet been exhausted, they will not be consumed or die." Nāgasena asked the king, "Ladies of high rank and women from rich families all eat delicious food, eating what they like. Would the food in their bellies be consumed?"

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The king said, "It will all be consumed."

Nāgasena asked the king, "Would the children with which they are pregnant be consumed in their bellies?"

The king said, "They will not be consumed."

Nāgasena said, "What is the reason that they will not be consumed?" The king said, "It is solely the good fortune of their physiognomy, which is the reason causing them not to be consumed." Nāgasena said:

For people in hell it is just like this; for millions of years they will not be consumed or die. The reason they will not be consumed or die is that the evil deeds they did in previous lives have not yet been dispelled. Nāgasena said, "People are [born] in hell, grow up in hell, and become old in hell. Their faults being exhausted, they will [eventually] die." The king said, "It is well."

[On the Elements]

The king asked Nāgasena again, "Dear, you recluses say, 'In the entire world, the earth rests on water, water rests on wind, and wind rests on space.' I do not believe this."

Nāgasena in turn came forward and took the king's writing ink. Lifting it up with three fingers, he asked the king, "Is the water in here supported by the wind?"102

The king said, "Yes, it is supported by the wind." Nāgasena said, "The wind supports water just like this." The king said, "It is well."

[On Nirvana]

The king asked Nāgasena again, "On awakening to nirvana, is everything past left behind and there is no further becoming?" Nāgasena said, "On awakening to nirvana there is no further becoming." Nāgasena said:

Ignorant people come by the track of being in quest of bodily cravings, internally and externally. Settled on [such craving], they are for this reason unable to attain deliverance from old age, disease, and death. 184

Nāgasena said:

The wise who train in the path are persons who do not attach to bodily [cravings], internally and externally. They are persons who have no craving. One who has no craving has no lustful desires. One who has no lustful desires is not [subject] to conception in a womb. One who is not [subject] to conception in a womb is not born and does not age. Not being born and not aging, there is no disease and no death. There being no disease [and no death],103 there is no sadness and no lamentation. There being no sadness and no lamentation, one is not internally afflicted in the mind and in turn attains awakening to nirvana.

The king said, "It is well."

The king asked Nāgasena again, "Are all those who train in the path able to attain awakening to nirvana?"

Nāgasena said:

Not all of them are able to attain awakening to nirvana. Those who rightly proceed on the path of wholesomeness, who train in understanding things correctly, who pursue what should be pursued, who keep away from and discard what should not be pursued, who think what should be thought, who discard what should not be thought—people like this will attain awakening to nirvana. The king said, "It is well."

The king asked Nāgasena again, "Would a person who has not attained awakening to nirvana know that awakening to nirvana is happiness?" Nāgasena said, "Yes, although they have not attained awakening to nirvana, they have reasons to know that awakening to nirvana is happiness." The king said, "How does a person, who has not attained awakening to nirvana, know that it is happiness?"

Nāgasena asked the king, "A person who since birth has never had their hands and feet cut off, [would they know that] this is an occasion for pain?"104 The king said, "Although a person has never had their hands and feet cut off, they have reasons to know that this is painful." Nāgasena said, "How do they know that this is painful?" 185

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The king said, "[When seeing] another person scream on having their hands and feet cut off,105 one has reason to know that this is painful." Nāgasena said:

It is just like this with people. Those who have previously attained awakening to nirvana state in continuity that awakening to nirvana is happiness. This is the reason why [those who have not yet attained it] believe in it. The king said, "It is well."

[On the Buddha]

The king asked Nāgasena again, "Would Nāgasena have seen the Buddha before?"

Nāgasena said, "I have never seen him."

The king asked, "Would Nāgasena's teachers have seen the Buddha before?"

Nāgasena said, "My teachers have also not seen the Buddha." [The king said,]106 "Given that Nāgasena and his teachers have not seen the Buddha, there certainly is no Buddha."

Nāgasena asked the king, "Has the king seen the place of conjunction of the five hundred waters?"107

The king said, "I have not seen it."

Nāgasena said, "Have the king's father or grandfather all seen this water?" The king said, "They all have not seen it."

Nāgasena said, "The king, his father, and his grandfather all have not seen the place of conjunction of the five hundred waters. So, is there certainly no place of conjunction of these five hundred waters in the world?" The king said, "Although myself, my father, and my grandfather, all of us have not seen this water, it is true that this water exists." Nāgasena said, "Although myself and my teachers have not seen the Buddha, it is true that the Buddha existed."

The king said, "It is well."

The king asked again, "Is there nobody else who excels the Buddha?" Nāgasena said, "Yes, there is nobody who excels the Buddha." The king asked again, "How can one know that there is nobody who excels the Buddha?"

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Nāgasena asked the king:

It is like a person who has never entered the great ocean, would he know that the waters of the ocean are vast? There are five rivers, and [for each great] river there are five hundred smaller rivers that flow into the great rivers: the first is called Ganges, the second is called Indus (Sindhu), the third is called Tarim (Śītā), the fourth is called Oxus (Vakṣu), and the fifth is called Sarasvatī. Day and night water of these five rivers flows into the ocean without there being an increase and also without there being a decrease of the water of the ocean.

Nāgasena said, "Would your majesty be able to hear about and know this?"

The king said, "It is true, I know this."

Nāgasena said, "As people who have attained awakening and share [the experience] of awakening say that there is nobody who excels the Buddha, therefore I believe it."

The king said, "It is well."

The king asked Nāgasena again, "By what [additional] means can one know that there is nobody who excels the Buddha?"

Nāgasena asked the king, "Who is the master who created the script?" The king said, "The master who created the script is called Zhi."108 Nāgasena said, "Would your majesty before have seen Zhi?" The king said, "Zhi died long ago; I have never seen him." Nāgasena said, "As your majesty has never seen Zhi, by what means can you know that Zhi is the master who created the script?" The king said:

The characters of the script have been maintained since ancient times and been continuously taught and explained. For this reason I know his name to have been Zhi.

Nāgasena said:

Due to the [same] reason, [although] I have never seen the Buddha, the discourses and discipline are like seeing the Buddha; there is no difference. The discourses spoken by the Buddha on the path are very profound and 187

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delightful. People who have come to know the Buddha and his discourses and discipline later taught them in turn continuously. For this reason I know that there is no one who is able to excel the Buddha. The king asked Nāgasena again, "Can one practice for a long time having personally seen [just] the Buddha's discourses and discipline?" Nāgasena said, "The precepts, discourses, and discipline taught by the Buddha are so very delightful that one will pursue them until one's old age." The king said, "It is well."

[On Rebirth]

The king asked Nāgasena again, "After a person has died, does the body not follow him to his birth in the next life?"

Nāgasena said, "After a person has died, he will rather receive a new body; the old body does not follow him."

Nāgasena said:

It is similar to lighting a lamp from the wick of another one. The old wick continues to stay; it is rather a new wick that is being lit. The body of a person is like that. The old body does not carry on; one rather receives a new body.

Nāgasena asked the king, "When small, did your majesty learn writing and reading of the scriptures from a teacher?"

The king said, "Yes, and I continue to remember it." Nāgasena asked the king:

The scriptures that your majesty received from his teacher, would the teacher still know these original scriptures? Did you completely carry off those original scriptures?109

The king said, "No, my teacher continued to know himself just those original scriptures." Nāgasena said, "The body of a person is like that, one receives a new body that is apart from the old one."

The king said, "It is well."

The king asked Nāgasena again, "Verily, does one who knows exist [in the sense of a transmigrating entity]?"110

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Nāgasena said, "One who knows does not exist [in the sense of a transmigrating entity]."111 Nāgasena said, "It is similar to a person who steals another person's fruit. Would the thief be at fault?"

The king said, "He is at fault."

Nāgasena said, "At the time of the seed being first planted there were no fruits on it. Why should the thief be at fault?"

The king said, "In case the seed is not planted, how could there be a fruit? For this reason the thief is guilty."

Nāgasena said, "With people it is just like that. Due to doing good and evil in this life, one is born in the next life and again receives a new body." The king said, "Due to having performed good and evil with this old body, a person again receives a new one. In what place do the good and evil [deeds] remain?"

Nāgasena said:

The good and evil done by a person follow that person, like the shadow follows the body. At death a person loses their body; they do not lose their deeds. It is similar to lighting a flame to write in the night. The flame being extinguished, those letters continue to exist. They will again appear when reached by a flame. What has been done in the present life will appear in the next life, like this one receives it in this way. The king said, "It is well."

The king said, "Would Nāgasena be able to distinguish and point out the place where good and evil remain?"

Nāgasena said, "It is not possible to know the place where good and evil remain."

Nāgasena asked the king:

Say, when trees have no fruit as yet, would one be able to distinguish, point out, and say that [in the place of this branch there will be such fruits] and in the place of that branch there will be no fruit?112 Would one be able to know it in advance?

The king said, "It is not possible to know it."

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Nāgasena said, "A person who has not yet attained awakening is unable to know in advance the place where good and evil are." The king said, "It is well."

The king asked again, "A person who will be reborn in the next life, would he be able to know that himself?"

Nāgasena said, "One who will be reborn [can] know that himself." The king said, "By what means does he know it?" Nāgasena said, "It is similar to a farmer who plows and sows and the sky rains in due time. Would that person know in advance that he will get grain?" The king said, "Yes, he even knows that he will get much grain." Nāgasena said, "A person is just like that. A person [can] know for themselves in advance that they will be reborn in the next life." The king said, "It is well."

[On the Buddha]

The king asked Nāgasena again, "Verily, does nirvana exist?" Nāgasena said, "Verily, it exists." The king said, "Would Nāgasena be able to point out to me a certain spot where the Buddha is?"

Nāgasena said:

I am not able to point out a certain spot where the Buddha is. The Buddha has departed by taking final nirvana; it is not possible to point him out, to point out a place to be seen.

Nāgasena said:

It is similar to a person who, having lit a great fire,113 extinguishes that fire. Of that fire, could one further point out and know the place where the light remains?

The king said, "One cannot know the place." Nāgasena said, "The Buddha has departed by taking final nirvana; one cannot further know his place."

The king said, "It is well."

The king asked Nāgasena again, "Would recluses have affection for their own body?"

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Nāgasena said, "Recluses do not have affection for their own body." The king said:

If recluses do not have affection for their own body, what is the reason they lie down to rest, wishing to ease themselves and be comfortable, and they drink and eat, wishing to get what is delicious and good? What is the reason they take care of themselves?

Nāgasena asked the king, "In the past, would you have entered the midst of a battle?"

The king said, "Yes, in the past I entered the midst of a battle." Nāgasena said, "Being in battle in the past, were you cut by a sword or [hit] by an arrow?"

The king said, "In the past I was quite cut by a sword." Nāgasena said, "Your majesty being wounded by a sword-cut [or else] by a spear [or an] arrow, what would you do?"

The king said, "I just applied medical ointment and bandaged it with padded cotton."

Nāgasena asked the king, "Did your majesty have affection for the wound and for this reason applied medical ointment and bandaged it with padded cotton?"

The king said, "I had no affection for the wound."

Nāgasena said, "If you really had no affection for the wound, why did you use medical ointment and use bandaging with padded cotton to protect it?" The king said, "I just wished to get my affliction cured. I did not have affection for the wound."

Nāgasena said:

Recluses are just like that. They do not have affection for their bodies. Although they eat and drink, their mind does not delight in it, they do not use it to become beautiful, they do not use it to become attractive, and they do not use it to get [an attractive] skin color.114 Their aim is just to support the body to pursue the discourses and discipline of the Buddha. The Buddha said in a discourse, "A person has nine apertures. The nine apertures are [like] wounds by a spear. All these apertures are smelly and a place of impurity."115

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The king said, "It is well."

The king asked Nāgasena again, "Did the Buddha verily have thirty-two marks, eighty minor characteristics, and a wholly golden-colored body emitting a halo?"116 Nāgasena said, "The Buddha verily had thirty-two marks and eighty minor characteristics, and he was wholly golden-colored and emitted a halo." The king said, "Would the Buddha's parents also have had thirty-two marks, eighty minor characteristics, and a wholly golden-colored body emitting a halo?" Nāgasena said, "The Buddha's parents did not have these marks." The king said, "Provided the Buddha's parents did not have these marks, [then] the Buddha also did not have these marks."

The king further said, "People and children born of them have similar features. The parents not having these marks, certainly the Buddha did not have these marks."

Nāgasena said:

Although the Buddha's parents did not have these thirty-two marks, eighty minor characteristics, and a golden-colored body [with a halo],117 the Buddha verily had these marks.

Nāgasena asked the king, "Has your majesty in the past seen a lotus flower?" The king said, "I have seen it."

Nāgasena said:

This lotus flower is born in the earth and grows up in mud and water. It has color and is very fragrant and attractive. Would it accord with and resemble the type of color of mud and water?

The king said, "It does not resemble the type of color of earth, mud, and water."

Nāgasena said:

Although the Buddha's parents did not have these marks, the Buddha verily had these marks. The Buddha was born in the world and grew up in the world, yet he did not resemble matters of the world. The king said, "It is well."

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The king asked Nāgasena again, "Was the Buddha's conduct verily like that of Brahmā, the ruler of the seventh heaven; did he not consort with women?"118

Nāgasena said, "Yes, he verily was apart from women, being pure and without flaws."

The king said:

In case the Buddha's conduct was like that of Brahmā, the ruler of the seventh heaven, [then] the Buddha was a disciple of Brahmā, the ruler of the seventh heaven.

Nāgasena asked the king, "Does the ruler of the seventh heaven have intelligence (buddhi) or does he have no intelligence?"119 The king said, "Brahmā, the ruler of the seventh heaven, has intelligence." Nāgasena said, "For this reason, Brahmā, the ruler of the seventh heaven, and all the higher devas are disciples of the 'Buddha.'" Nāgasena asked the king, "Of what type is the sound made by the voice of an elephant?"120

The king said, "The sound made by the voice of an elephant is like the sound of a wild goose."

Nāgasena said:

In this way an elephant would be the disciple of a wild goose, each being of a different species. With the Buddha it is just like that, he is not a disciple of Brahmā, the ruler of the seventh heaven.

The king said, "It is well."

The king asked Nāgasena again, "Was the Buddha completely trained in understanding and pursuing the discourses and the discipline?" Nāgasena said, "The Buddha was completely trained in understanding and pursuing the discourses and the discipline."

The king said, "From which teacher did the Buddha receive the discourses and discipline?"

Nāgasena said:

The Buddha was without a teacher.121 When the Buddha attained awakening, he in turn completely understood by himself all the discourses and the 193

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path. The Buddha is not like the disciples who train in understanding what was taught by the Buddha, which is what all disciples will pursue until their old age.

The king said, "It is well."

The king asked Nāgasena again:

People cry and shed tears at the death of their parents. People also cry and shed tears on hearing the Buddha's discourses. They all shed tears. What is the difference between them?

Nāgasena said:

People who weep for their parents all give attention to their affection and recollect it with grief and pain. Such grievers are aggrieved just out of ignorance. Those who shed tears on hearing the Buddha's discourses on the path all have compassion in their minds on recollecting the afflictions of the world. For this reason they shed tears. The merit they gain [thereby] is enormous.

The king said, "It is well."

The king asked Nāgasena again, "What is the difference between one who has attained deliverance and one who has not yet attained deliverance?" Nāgasena said:

A person who has not yet attained deliverance has lustful desires in the mind. A person who has attained deliverance has no lustful desires in their mind. Nevertheless they wish to get food to eat just to sustain life. The king said, "I have seen people in the world; they all want bodily delights and want to get delicious food without becoming sated of it." Nāgasena said:

A person who has not yet attained deliverance eats food for the sake of thriving in pleasure and to become attractive. A person who has attained deliverance, although they eat food, they do not regard it as pleasurable or regard it as satisfying. Their aim is just to support the body. The king said, "It is well."

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[On Memory]

The king asked Nāgasena again, "Do people remember what they have done and matters of the distant past?"122

Nāgasena said, "When people are worried, they all remember matters of the distant past."

The king said, "In what way does one recollect? Does one recollect by way of intention? [Or] does one recollect [just] by way of recollection?" Nāgasena asked the king, "Have you [in vain tried to] recollect at a later time what you trained in and understood in the past?" The king said, "Yes. What I trained in and understood in the past, at a later time I had forgotten again."

Nāgasena said to the king, "Were you without intention at the time of forgetting it?"123 The king said, "At that time I had [simply] forgotten my memories." Nāgasena said, "That distinguishes the [memory] of the king from that of an elephant."124

The king asked Nāgasena again:

Does a person remember all of what he has done; does he understand by way of remembering all of what he has done right from the beginning [up to] what he is doing now, in the present?

Nāgasena said, "He understands all matters that are past by way of remembering them and he understands matters now, in the present, by way of remembering them." The king said, "A person who remembers just matters that are past in this way should be unable to remember new matters as well." Nāgasena said, "It is in this way [only] in case one cannot as well remember new matters that are being done."

The king said, "Is [memory] useless for a person who newly learns the craft of writing?"

Nāgasena said:

A person who newly learns to write and draw has memory. This is the reason that makes a disciple who learns possess knowledge; it is only because they have memory.

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The king said, "It is well."

The king asked Nāgasena again, "In how many ways does memory arise in a person?"

Nāgasena said:

There are sixteen ways in which memory arises in a person. The first is memory arisen of what was done in the distant past. The second is memory arisen from what has been newly learned. The third is memory arisen from a major event. The fourth is memory arisen from reflecting about what is good. The fifth is memory arisen from pain experienced in the past. The sixth is memory arisen from paying attention on one's own. The seventh is memory arisen from diverse former deeds. The eighth is memory arisen from teaching someone. The ninth is memory arisen from a resemblance. The tenth is memory arisen in relation to what one had forgotten in the past. The eleventh is memory arisen because of cognizing. The twelfth is memory arisen from calculation. The thirteenth is memory arisen from having incurred a debt. The fourteenth is memory arisen from unification of the mind. The fifteenth is memory arisen from reading a book. The sixteenth is memory arisen from the experience of seeing what one had in the past entrusted [to others]. These are the sixteen ways in which [memory] arises.

(1) The king asked Nāgasena again, "What is memory of the distant past?" Nāgasena said:

The Buddha's disciple Ānanda and a female disciple, the female lay follower Khujjuttarā, remembered countless past lives and remembered current matters.125 Many of the other practitioners of the path are like Ānanda and the female disciple [Khujjuttarā], all being able to remember matters of the past. They remember, and this is how they in turn give rise to memory. (2) The king asked again, "What is memory arisen from newly learning something?"

Nāgasena said:

It is like a person who in the past learned and knew calculation and later forgot it again. Seeing a person calculating, he in turn experiences the arising of memory.

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(3) The king asked Nāgasena again, "What is memory arisen from a major event?"

Nāgasena said:

It is similar to the crown prince who has been established as the king. He remembers by himself the extraordinary elevation of becoming the king. This is memory arisen from a major event.

(4) The king asked Nāgasena again, "What is memory arisen from reflecting about what is good?" Nāgasena said:

It is similar to being invited and entertained with supreme goodwill by someone. That person remembers by themselves, 'On a former day I was invited and entertained with [supreme] goodwill by someone.' This is memory arisen from reflecting about what is good. (5) The king asked Nāgasena again, "What is memory arisen from the experience of pain?"

Nāgasena said:

It is similar to a person who in the past has been beaten or bound and imprisoned by someone. This is memory arisen from the experience of pain.

(6) The king asked Nāgasena again, "What is memory arisen from paying attention on one's own?"

Nāgasena said:

It is similar to [paying attention] to what one has formerly seen, such as one's wife, relatives, or domestic animals. This is memory arisen from paying attention on one's own.

(7) The king asked Nāgasena again, "What is memory arisen from diverse former deeds?"

Nāgasena said:

It is similar to a person's name, the names of all things, type of colors, fragrances and smells, sweet and bitter [tastes], remembering these things is memory arisen from diversity.126

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(8) The king asked Nāgasena again, "What is memory arisen from teaching someone?"

Nāgasena said:

A person who enjoys himself is forgetful of people close by, of some he has [recollection] and of some he is forgetful. On teaching people, memory arises of what he had forgotten.

(9) The king asked Nāgasena again, "What is memory arisen from a resemblance?" Nāgasena said, "People, cows, and horses each have their own type of resemblance. This is how memory arises from a resemblance." (10) The king asked Nāgasena again, "What is memory arisen in relation to what one had forgotten in the past?"

Nāgasena said:

It is similar to a person who has suddenly forgotten something. Repeatedly remembering it when being alone, he regains it. This is memory arisen in relation to what one had forgotten in the past.

(11) The king asked Nāgasena again, "What is memory arisen because of cognizing?"

Nāgasena said, "Having learned writing, one is able to select a particular letter. This is memory arisen because of cognizing." (12) The king asked Nāgasena again, "What is memory arisen from calculation?" Nāgasena said:

It is like people who have completed calculating together. They all know well their plan and method, which are distinctly clear to them. This is memory arisen from calculation.

(13) The king asked Nāgasena again, "What is memory arisen from having incurred a debt?"

Nāgasena said, "It is similar to looking at what served as a deposit for [one's] debt, [such as] a drum. This is memory arisen from having incurred a debt." (14) The king asked Nāgasena again, "What is memory arisen from unification of the mind?" 198

Nāgasena said:

A recluse who has unification of their mind recollects themselves matters from the time of countless past lives up to now. This is memory arisen from unification of the mind.

(15) The king asked Nāgasena again, "What is memory arisen from reading a book?"

Nāgasena said:

The emperor has ancient books from long ago. From the books he remembers the time of a certain emperor at a certain year. This is memory arisen from reading a book.

(16) The king asked Nāgasena again, "What is memory arisen from the experience of seeing what one had in the past entrusted [to others]?" Nāgasena said:

When a person has entrusted something [to others] and he experiences seeing it with his eyes, memory in turn arises. This is memory arisen from [seeing] what was entrusted [to others]. The king said, "It is well."

[On the Buddha]

The king asked Nāgasena again, "Would the Buddha have known all things in the past, from their beginning to what will come?" Nāgasena said, "Yes, the Buddha knew it all." The king said:

In case the Buddha completely knew all things, what is the reason he did not teach them to his disciples at once? What is the reason he taught them little by little?127

Nāgasena asked the king, "Is there a physician in the country?" The king said, "There is a physician."

[Nāgasena asked the king,] "Would he know all the medicines on earth?" The king said, "He is completely able to discern all medicines." 199

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Nāgasena asked the king, "When that physician cures a disease, does he give the medicine all at once or does he give it little by little?" The king said, "He cannot give medicine in advance to a person who has not yet become sick. He will just give medicine only in conformity with the sickness."

Nāgasena said:

Although the Buddha knows all matters past, present, and future, he also cannot teach them all at once to people on the earth. He will teach to them little by little the discourses and discipline just so that they pursue them. The king said, "It is well."

The king asked Nāgasena again:

Dear, you recluses say that people who do evil in their life for up to hundred years, and who at the time close to death recollect the Buddha, will after death all be reborn in heaven. I do not believe this statement. Again, you say that killing a single being, on passing away one will enter hell. I also do not believe this statement.128

Nāgasena asked the king, "It is like a person who takes a small stone and places it on water. Will the stone float or will it sink?" The king said, "The stone will sink."

Nāgasena said, "Suppose he were to take a hundred big stones and place them on a boat. Will the boat sink?"

The king said, "It will not sink."

Nāgasena said:

Because of the boat, a hundred big stones in the boat will not sink.129 Although a person has formerly been evil, recollecting the Buddha once, he will, for this reason, not enter hell and in turn will reach rebirth in heaven. The sinking of the small stone is like the evil done by a person who, not knowing the discourses of the Buddha, after death will in turn enter hell. The king said, "It is well."

[On Time]

The king asked Nāgasena again, "Dear, for what reason did you become recluses to train in the path?"

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Nāgasena said:

We wish to discard all dukkha—dukkha of the past, dukkha of the present, and dukkha of the future—we do not wish to experience it further. This is the reason why we became recluses to train in the path. The king asked Nāgasena again, "Dukkha being of the future, why train in the path in advance, becoming recluses?" Nāgasena asked the king, "Would your majesty have adversaries from enemy countries who wish to attack him?"

The king said, "Yes, there are adversaries from enemy countries who constantly wish to attack me." Nāgasena asked the king:

Will your majesty, when the time has come and the leader of the enemies is close, only then produce the tools for battle and have moats dug out for protection, or will you have this done in advance? The king said, "I will get preparations ready in advance." Nāgasena asked the king, "What is the reason for getting preparations ready in advance?"

The king said, "The reason is that, when the enemy comes, there is no [more] time to get ready."

Nāgasena asked the king, "Is it for this reason that you are getting ready in advance for an enemy that has not yet come?" [The king said, "Yes."]

Nāgasena asked the king again, "Should one plow and sow only on becoming hungry? Should one dig a well only on becoming thirsty?" The king said, "It should all be done in advance." Nāgasena said, "Is it for this reason that one has provisions in advance when one is not yet hungry or thirsty?"

The king said, "It is well."

The king asked Nāgasena again, "How far away is the seventh heaven of Brahmā?"

Nāgasena said:

It is very far away. Letting a stone as big as the king's palace fall from 201

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the seventh heaven of Brahmā, it will only fall on this earth just here after six days."130

The king said:

Dear, you recluses say that one who has attained the awakening of an arahant is able to fly up to the seventh heaven of Brahmā as quickly as a person bends or stretches an arm.

The king said, "I do not believe this. How could one travel millions of (Chinese) miles so quickly?"

Nāgasena asked the king, "In what country was the king originally born?" The king said, "I was originally born in a city called Alisan (Alexandria),131 in the great Qin (Greek colonial) empire."

Nāgasena asked the king, "How many (Chinese) miles from here is Alisan?"

The king said, "It is two thousand yojanas or about eight thousand (Chinese) miles."132 Nāgasena asked the king, "In the past, would you have thought of some matter in your distant country of origin?"

The king said, "Yes, I often think just of matters in my country of origin." Nāgasena said, "May your majesty try to think again of a matter in your country of origin, something you did in the past." The king said, "I have thought of it."

Nāgasena said, "How has the king traversed eight thousand miles and come back again so quickly?"

The king said, "It is well."

The king asked Nāgasena again:

If there are two people who pass away at the same time, one person is born in the seventh heaven of Brahmā and one person is born in Kashmir, seven hundred and twenty (Chinese) miles from here, who of them arrives first?133 Nāgasena said, "The two persons arrive just at the same time." The king said, "There is a great difference in the respective distance, how could they arrive at the same [time]?"

Nāgasena said,134 "May your majesty try to think of Alisan." 202

The king said. "I have thought of it."

Nāgasena said again, "May your majesty try to think again of Kashmir." The king said, "I have thought of it."

Nāgasena asked the king, "Which of these two countries did you think of faster?"

The king said, "[I thought] of both just equally [as fast]." Nāgasena said:

The two persons who died together, one person being reborn up in the seventh heaven of Brahmā and one person reborn in Kashmir, were also just equally [as fast]."

Nāgasena asked the king:

If there is a pair of birds flying and one bird settles on a big tree and one bird settles on an inferior small tree, the two birds settling together, whose shadow falls first on the ground?

The king said, "Their shadows just reach the ground together." Nāgasena said:

The two persons who died together, one person being reborn up in the seventh heaven of Brahmā and one person being reborn in Kashmir, they also just arrive at the same time.

The king said, "It is well."

[On Miscellaneous Matters]

The king asked Nāgasena again, "By training in how many ways does a person come to know the path?"

Nāgasena said:

By training in seven ways one comes to know the path. What are the seven? The first is being mindful of good and evil things. The second is being energetic. The third is delighting in the path. The fourth is subduing the mind in what is wholesome. The fifth is being mindful of the path. The sixth is unification of the mind. The seventh is being without aversion or craving in regard to whatever one encounters. 718a

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The king asked Nāgasena again, "Does a person train by way of these seven ways to come to know the path?"

Nāgasena said:

It is not by training in all of the seven ways that one comes to know the path. The wise take up wisdom to distinguish good and evil. By way of just this one way they distinctly come to know [the path]. The king asked Nāgasena again, "In case one comes to know it by one way, why do you speak of seven ways?"

Nāgasena asked the king, "If a person takes a sword, puts it into the scabbard, and leans that against a wall, would the sword by itself be able to cut anything?"

The king said, "It would not be able to cut anything." Nāgasena said, "Even though a person has clarity in the heart, he ought to obtain these six ways together just to accomplish wisdom." The king said, "It is well."

The king asked Nāgasena again, "Is the gaining of merit by people who have done good greater or is their gaining of demerit on having done evil greater?"

Nāgasena said:

The gain of merit by people who have done good is greater; the gaining of demerit on having done evil is less. People who have done evil themselves regret it daily, therefore daily their fault becomes less. People who do good themselves recollect it day and night with joy, therefore the merit they attain becomes greater.

Nāgasena said:

Formerly, at the time the Buddha was alive, in the country there was a mutilated person without hands and feet. He took a lotus flower and offered it to the Buddha. The Buddha said to the monks, "This mutilated child without hands and feet will for ninety-one eons in the future no more descend into hell or be born as an animal or on the path of hungry ghosts. He will gain rebirth up in heaven, and at the end of life up in heaven he will return to become a human again." For this reason I know that a person who does a small good will gain merit that becomes greater. Having done 204

evil, people regret their own fault. It daily diminishes and is exhausted. For this reason I know that the demerit of a person who has committed a fault becomes less.

The king said, "It is well."

The king asked Nāgasena again, "A wise one does evil and a fool does evil. Which of these two persons gains greater demerit?" Nāgasena said, "The fool who does evil gains greater demerit; the wise one who does evil gains lesser demerit."135

The king said, "Nāgasena says that they are not equal!" The king said:

The governmental law of my country heavily punishes a chief minister who is at fault and lightly punishes an ignorant person who is at fault. Therefore [I know] that the wise one who does evil gains greater demerit,136 the fool who does evil gains lesser demerit.

Nāgasena asked the king:

It is similar to burning iron that is on the ground. One person knows that this is burning iron; one person does not know it. The two persons come forward together and take hold of the burning iron. Whose hands will have greater burns?

The king said, "The hands of the one who did not know it will have greater burns."137

Nāgasena said:

A fool who does evil is unable to regret it on his own; for this reason their demerit becomes greater. A wise one who does evil knows that what they did is not proper and daily regrets their fault, for this reason their demerit becomes less.

The king said, "It is well."

The king asked Nāgasena again:

Are there people able to fly by means of their body up to the seventh heaven of Brahmā, to reach the territory of Uttarakuru, or to reach [other] places according to their wish?

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Nāgasena said, "They have the ability."

The king said:

How do they fly by means of their body up to the seventh heaven of Brahmā, to reach the territory of Uttarakuru, or to reach [other] places according to their wish?

Nāgasena asked the king, "Would your majesty remember that, when being small yourself and in a game, you jumped a distance of one zhang?" The king said, "I remember that when I was of young age and had in my mind the wish to jump, I would jump for a distance of one zhang or more." Nāgasena said:

It is like this when a person who has attained awakening wishes to jump and reach up to the seventh heaven of Brahmā or reach the territory of Uttarakuru.

The king said, "It is well."

The king asked Nāgasena again:

Dear, you recluses say, "There are bones which are four thousand (Chinese) miles long." What body could have bones that are up to four thousand (Chinese) miles long?

Nāgasena asked the king, "Did you hear formerly that in the great ocean there is a large fish called Zhi, whose body is twenty-eight thousand (Chinese) miles long?"

The king said, "Yes, I formerly heard that these exist." Nāgasena said, "Of a fish twenty-eight thousand (Chinese) miles long like this, the rib bones are four thousand (Chinese) miles long." The king was surprised on account of this.

The king asked Nāgasena again, "Dear, you recluses say, 'We are able to stop the activity of breathing.'"

The king said, "How can one stop the air of breathing?" Nāgasena asked the king, "Have you formerly heard of 'intention'?"138 The king said, "I have heard of it."

Nāgasena said, "Does your majesty consider intention to be inside of a person's body?"

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The king said, "I consider intention to be inside of a person's body." Nāgasena said to the king:

Consider a foolish person who is unable to control body and speech and unable to uphold the discourses and discipline. Such persons are also without the bodily delight [of attaining absorption]. Nāgasena said:

Persons who train in the path are able to control body and speech, able to uphold the discourses and discipline, and able to have unification of the mind. They attain the fourth absorption and in turn are just able to have no more breath.

The king said, "It is well."

The king asked Nāgasena, "One speaks of the 'ocean'. Is the ocean called 'ocean' on account of its water or is it called 'ocean' because of other reasons?" Nāgasena said, "The reason people call it the 'ocean' is that the water is mixed with salt; each is half [of the reason]. This is just the reason for [calling] it 'ocean.'"

The king asked Nāgasena again, "What is the reason that the ocean is completely salty and has a taste like salt?"

Nāgasena said:

The reason the water of the ocean is salty is that insipid water accumulated for a long time and many fish, turtles, and reptiles have together stained it in turn.139 For this reason it has become just salty. The king said, "It is well."

The king asked Nāgasena again, "Would a person who has attained awakening be able to attend to all profound types of matters?" Nāgasena said, "Yes, a person who has attained awakening is able to attend to all profound matters."

Nāgasena said:

The discourses of the Buddha are on understanding very profound types of matters, types of matters that are beyond measure, all of which can evenly be decided by wisdom.

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The king said, "It is well."

The king asked Nāgasena again, "A person's consciousness, wisdom, and original nature, would these three things be the same and [only] their names be different?"

Nāgasena said, "From a person's consciousness, awareness arises.140 Wisdom is the dawn of awakening. As one's nature is empty, there is no person [as such]."

The king asked Nāgasena again:

[People say that] a person [as such] is obtained.141 What kind of a person is being obtained? The eye sees forms, the ear hears sounds, the nose smells fragrances, the mouth knows flavors, the body knows what is touched,142 and the mind knows matters good and evil. Where else could a person be obtained?

Nāgasena asked the king:

If one could make the "person" be able to see through their own eyes, on taking out the pupils, would they be able to see far and wide? Breaking up and enlarging their ear, would they be able to hear sounds far and wide? Cutting off the nose to enlarge [its orifices], would they be able to smell many fragrances? Opening the mouth to enlarge it, would they be able to know many flavors? Peeling off the skin and muscles, do you believe that would make them know [better] what is touched? Removing intention, would they be thriving with many thoughts?

The king said, "No."

Nāgasena said, "What the Buddha did, while being alive, was very difficult. What the Buddha [did, while being alive,] was very sublime." The king asked Nāgasena again, "How was what he did very difficult? How was it very sublime?"

Nāgasena said:

The Buddha spoke of and was able to know what is inside a person's bosom. He was able to comprehend all matters invisible to the eyes,143 and he was able to comprehend matters of the eye, able to comprehend matters of the ear, able to comprehend matters of the nose, able to comprehend matters of the mouth, able to comprehend matters of the body, 208

able to comprehend matters in decline, able to comprehend doubtful matters, able to comprehend matters of memory, and able to comprehend matters of consciousness. Nāgasena said:

A person who takes water from the ocean in his mouth, would he be able to know distinctly that the water in his mouth is water from that spring, water from that particular stream, water from that particular river? The king said, "The various waters are all conjoined and have become one, it is difficult to know each distinctly."

Nāgasena said:

What the Buddha did was very difficult. He was able to know distinctly the flavor of all these waters. Now the water of the ocean is a matter visible before one's eyes, yet your majesty is not able to know it distinctly now, [let alone knowing distinctly] a person's consciousness, which is invisible, [or] the six ways [of sense experience] in a person's body, which cannot be seen.

Nāgasena said:

The reason is that the Buddha comprehended that, following the mind, thought reaches what is seen by the eye; following the mind, thought reaches what is heard by the ear; following the mind, thought reaches what is smelled by the nose; following the mind, thought reaches flavors known by the mouth; following the mind, thought reaches pain and pleasure known by the body, tangibles that are cold and warm, rough and solid. Following the mind, thought proceeds toward whatever there is. The Buddha knew it all, analyzed it, and comprehended it. The king said, "It is well."

[Conclusion]

Nāgasena said, "It is already midnight, I wish to retire." The king ordered the ministers of his entourage to take four pieces of cotton rolled up and dipped in oil to carry as lamps and escort Nāgasena on his return, "Be as respectful to Nāgasena as if you were waiting on me." 209

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The ministers of the entourage all said, "We have received your instruction." The king said, "Gaining a teacher like Nāgasena and having a disciple like me, awakening can be attained quickly."

All the questions by the king had been fully answered each time. The king was greatly delighted. The king took out from the treasury an exquisite cloth worth a hundred thousand [coins] and offered it to Nāgasena. The king said to Nāgasena:

From now on may Nāgasena with eight hundred recluses together daily take the meal in the palace. May he take from the king whatever he wishes to get.

Nāgasena replied to the king, "I am a person practicing the path; in short, there is nothing I desire."

The king said to Nāgasena, "You should protect yourself and you should also personally protect me."

Nāgasena said, "How should I protect myself and personally protect your majesty?"

The king replied:

I am afraid people who discuss it will say that the king is a miser. Nāga sena has explained to the king all that he had doubts about, yet he was unable to grant him a gift. I am afraid that people will say that Nāgasena was unable to explain what the king had doubts about and for this reason the king has not granted him a reward.

The king said, "[If] Nāgasena accepts it, it will make me gain merit and Nāgasena will also protect his reputation."

The king said:

I am similar to a lion in a golden cage who, in spite of being shut up, constantly has the wish to leave in the mind. Although I am now the king of the country in the royal palace, my mind does not delight in it. I wish to abandon the country, leave it, and engage in the training of the path. [When] the king had finished speaking, Nāgasena in turn got up to return to the monastery. [When] Nāgasena had left, the king thought quietly to himself, 210

"What matters did I ask Nāgasena about? What matters has Nāgasena explained to me?" The king thought to himself, "Of what I asked Nāgasena, there is nothing I had on my mind that he has not explained." Returning to the monastery, Nāgasena also thought to himself, "What matters did the king ask me? Also, what matters did I reply to the king?" Nāgasena thought to himself, "What the king asked me, I have explained it all." They thought about these matters until dawn.

The next day Nāgasena put on his robe, took his bowl, and went directly into the upper hall of the palace to sit down. The king came forward and, having paid respect to Nāgasena, stepped back to sit down. The king said to Nāgasena:

[When] Nāgasena had left, I thought to myself, "What did I ask Nāgasena? What did Nāgasena reply to me?" I further thought, "Whatever I asked Nāgasena, there is nothing I had on my mind that Nāgasena has not explained." Thinking of these statements I was happy and slept well until dawn.

Nāgasena said:

Returning to the monastery, I also thought to myself, "What matters has the king asked me about? Also, what matters have I explained to the king?"144 I further thought to myself, "What the king has asked me, I have fully explained it." For this reason I was happy until dawn. Having finished speaking, Nāgasena wished to leave. The king in turn rose up and paid respect to Nāgasena.

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Notes

1 According to the summary by J. W. de Jong, "Review," Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 59/2 (1996): 383, of the research undertaken by Mizuno (which due to my ignorance of Japanese I have been unable to consult): "Mizuno argues that the renderings of technical terms suggest the second or third century A.D. as date of the translation into Chinese." For a survey of archaic translation terminology employed in the text, see Guang Xing, "The Different Chinese Versions of the Nāgasena Bhikṣu Sūtra," Journal of the Centre for Buddhist Studies, Sri Lanka 7 (2009): 236-239. 2 T.203.4:493a28, translated by J. Takakusu, "Chinese Translations of Milinda Pañho," Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (1896): 20; by Édouard Chavannes, Cinq Cents Contes et Apologues, Extraits du Tripiṭaka Chinois et Traduits en Français (Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1911), p. 123; and by Charles Willemen, The Storehouse of Sundry Valuables (Berkeley: Numata Center for Buddhist Translation and Research, 1994), p. 226. 3 A translation of the Chinese version was provided by Sylvain Lévi, "Un nouveau document sur le Milinda-praçna," Comptes rendus des séances de l'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres 37/4 (1893): 233f; see also Louis de La Vallée Poussin, L'Abhi dharmakośa de Vasubandhu, Traduction et annotations, Nouvelle édition anastatique présentée par Étienne Lamotte (Bruxelles: Institut Belge des Hautes Études Chinoises, 1925, reprint 1980), vol 5, p. 263. For a comprehensive study with edition and translation of the Sanskrit and Tibetan versions, see Peter Skilling, "A Note on King Milinda in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya," Journal of the Pali Text Society 24 (1998): 81-101. The question leading to the simile differs slightly, as in the Abhi dharma kośa bhāṣya quotation the issue at stake is the identity or difference of body and self, whereas in the Avadāna text it is the permanent or impermanent nature of the self.

4 If T. 203 should indeed be Sarvāstivāda, as argued by Charles Willemen, "A Chinese Kṣudrakapiṭaka (T. IV. 203)," Asiatische Studien 46/1 (1992): 513, and given that the quote from the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya would reflect a Mūlasarvāstivāda version of the text (school affiliations that would fit with the quote being similar but differing in details), then the complete absence of this dilemma from the Pāli and Chinese versions would make it less probable that any of these should be considered as reflecting a Sarvāstivāda line of transmission. Of course, within reciter lineages of a particular school divergent texts can come into existence; in fact, by now we are aware even of "the existence of multiple Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinayas," as noted by Shayne Clarke, "Vinayas," in J. Silk, O. von Hinüber, V. Eltschinger, eds., Brill's Encyclopedia of Buddhism (Leiden: Brill, 2015), p. 73. My point is only that a Sarvāstivāda affiliation of the original now extant in Pāli, for example, would need to be established beyond 213

the mere fact that in Mil 268,14 and 271,11 Nāgasena considers space not to be the product of conditions, supposedly standing in contrast to Theravāda orthodoxy; see, e.g., I. B. Horner, Milinda's Questions, Volume I, Translated from the Pali (London: Luzac & Company Ltd., 1969), pp. xviii, xlii; and K. R. Norman, Pāli Literature, Including the Canonical Literature in Prakrit and Sanskrit of all the Hīnayāna Schools of Buddhism (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1983), p. 112. Another argument by Guang Xing, "Introduction to the Nāgasena Bhikṣu Sūtra," Journal of the Centre for Buddhist Studies, Sri Lanka 6 (2008): 238, concerns a reference to past, present, and future in Mil 49,30 and T.1670B.32:711b13, yet this distinction is regularly found in the early discourses and thus is not a marker of Sarvāstivāda influence. As noted by Y. Karunadasa, Buddhist Analysis of Matter (Singapore: Buddhist Research Society, 1967, reprint 1989), p. 94, according to the Kathāvatthu space should not be reckoned as either conditioned or as unconditioned; see Kv 330,6. Edward Conze, "Review," Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 33/2 (1970): 412, comments that this "disposes of the argument of some scholars . . . who believe that the Milindapañha was originally a Sarvāstivādin work because it is said to reckon ākāśa among the asaṅkhatas." Thus this reference involves only a relatively minor difference from the position taken in the Kathāvatthu, inasmuch as the Kathāvatthu reckons space as not saṅkhata but nevertheless not asaṅkhata, whereas the Milindapañha has no qualms about qualifying it as ahetuja. This does not suffice to turn the entire Milindapañha into a Sarvāstivāda treatise. Besides, this minor issue occurs in a part of the work that, judging from the Chinese parallels, is a later addition. This would support the suggestion by Skilling, "A Note on King Milinda in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya," p. 94, that, rather than being of Ceylonese (Sri Lankan) origins, the parts not found in Chinese "may have been composed in India and circulated independently―that is . . . they could represent another development of the rich Indian Milinda tradition―and later translated into Pāli and conjoined with the main text." Had the additions been composed in Ceylon, as assumed by, e.g., H. Bechert, "Einleitung," in Nyanaponika, ed., Milindapañha, die Fragen des Königs Milinda, Zwiegespräche zwischen einem Griechenkönig und einem buddhistischen Mönch, Aus dem Pāli übersetzt von Nyanatiloka (Interlaken: Ansata-Verlag, 1985), p. 20, it could reasonably well be expected that the position taken in the Kathāvatthu on the nature of space would have been followed to the letter. 5 Bunyiu Nanjio, A Catalogue of the Chinese Translation of the Buddhist Tripitaka, The Sacred Canon of the Buddhists in China and Japan (Delhi: Classics India Publications,1883, reprint 1989), p. 304, reported that his entry number 1358 "seems to be a translation of a text similar to the Milinda-pañho, though the introductory part is not exactly the same as that of the Pāli text."

6 Mil 89,17: milindapañhānaṃ pucchāvissajjanā samattā; although, as noted by F. Otto Schrader, Die Fragen des Königs Menandros, Aus dem Pali zum ersten Male ins Deutsche übersetzt (Berlin: Paul Raatz, 1907), p. xxviii, and Wilhelm Geiger, Pāli Literatur und Sprache (Strassburg: Karl J. Trübner, 1916), p. 18 (§20), in the PTS edition already at an earlier point the statement nāgasena milindarāja-pañhā 214

Notes

niṭṭhitā can be found; see Mil 64,25. In his discussion of the Milindapañha, Oskar von Hinüber, Handbook of Pāli Literature (Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1996, reprint 1997), p. 84, n. 296, points out that a concluding remark is also found in the midst of the Parivāra; see Vin V 179,19.

7 DN 23 at DN II 316,1; for a comparative study and translation of one of the Chinese parallels see Anālayo, "Debate with a Sceptic—The Dīrgha-āgama Parallel to the Pāyāsi-sutta (1)," Indian International Journal of Buddhist Studies 13 (2012): 1-26, and "Debate with a Sceptic—The Dīrgha-āgama Parallel to the Pāyāsi-sutta (2)," Indian International Journal of Buddhist Studies 14 (2013): 1-27. The similarity in debate character between this discourse and the Milindapañha has already been noted by Jan Gonda, "Tarn's Hypothesis on the Origin of the Milindapañha," Mnemosyne (fourth series) 2/1 (1949): 60. T. W. Rhys Davids, "Milinda," in J. Hastings, ed., Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1916), vol. 8, p. 631, rather considers the Sakkapañha-sutta (DN 21) as a model for the Milindapañha, stating that "in all probability it was with the Sakka Pañha Suttanta in his mind that the author of the Milinda Pañha, whoever he was, framed his work." This seems less probable, as the Sakkapañha-sutta is not a debate, nor does it involve the type of dilemmas raised in DN 23 and the Milindapañha.

8 Edited and translated in William B. Bollée, The Story of Paesi (Paesi-kahāṇayaṃ): Soul and Body in Ancient India. A Dialogue on Materialism, Text, Translation, Notes and Commentary (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 2002). A comparison of the Buddhist and Jain versions can be found in Ernst Leumann, "Beziehungen der Jaina-Literatur zu anderen Literaturkreisen Indiens," Actes du Sixième Congrès International des Orientalistes tenu en 1883 à Leyde, troisième partie, section 2, Aryenne 3/2 (1885): 470-539, and Walter Ruben, "Materialismus im Leben des alten Indiens," Acta Orientalia 13 (1935): 143-151. 9 On the continuity of the debate concerned with these topics see Anālayo, Rebirth in Early Buddhism and Current Research (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2018). 10 T. W. Rhys Davids, The Questions of King Milinda, Translated from the Pāli (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1890), p. xvi, highlights that the Milindapañha is "the only book, outside of the Pāli Piṭakas, which Buddhaghosa defers to" as authoritative; in fact as noted by Jessica Main, "The Karma of Others: Stories from the Milindapañha and the Petavatthu-aṭṭhakathā," in C. Prebish, D. Keown, and D. S. Wright, eds., Revisioning Karma (Journal of Buddhist Ethics Online Books, 2005, reprint 2007), p. 311, the Milindapañha "remains a key narrative in . . . Theravāda regions." G. P. Malalasekera, The Pāli Literature of Ceylon (Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society,1928, reprint 1994), p. 303f, reports how for the "Buddhist renaissance movement" in nineteenthcentury Ceylon, the publication of a Sinhala translation of the Milindapañha was a project of foremost importance, as "it was felt that the book would be most useful in refuting the arguments hurled at the Buddhists by their adversaries." As already pointed out by Mabel Haynes Bode, The Pali Literature of Burma (London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1903), p. 4, in Burma (Myanmar) the Milindapañha is even considered 215

11 12 13 14 15 16 canonical. The text has also been of continuous interest in the academic realm; for a survey of publications concerned with the Milindapañha, see Siegfried Behrsing, "Beiträge zu einer Milindapañha Bibliographie," Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 7/2 (1943): 335-348, 7/3 (1943): 517-539; with supplements in Oskar von Hinüber, "The Oldest Dated Manuscript of the Milindapañha," Journal of the Pali Text Society 11 (1987): 118f, and "An Additional Note on the Oldest Dated Manuscript of the Milindapañha," Journal of the Pali Text Society 12 (1988): 173; and in Peter Skilling, "Problems with Milinda (I): The Opening Verses and Prose of the Printed Siamese Milindapañhā," Journal of the Centre for Buddhist Studies, Sri Lanka 8 (2010): 14-20.

Bhikkhu Bodhi, "Introduction," in The Questions of King Milinda: An Abridgement of the Milindapañha (Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society, 1993), p. 13, notes that the text "is the product of the encounter of two great civilizations―Hellenistic Greece and Buddhist India―and as such it throws into relief issues that are still very much alive today."

Regarding the count of ninety-six teachings, Max Deeg, Das Gaoseng-Faxian-Zhuan als religionsgeschichtliche Quelle, Der älteste Bericht eines chinesischen buddhist ischen Pilgermönchs über seine Reise nach Indien mit Übersetzung des Textes (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 2005), p. 310, n. 1512, refers to an explanation in the Vinayavibhāṣā, T.1440.23:536a22, according to which the doctrines of every one of the six teachers (described in the Sāmaññaphala-sutta and its parallels) led in each case to further doctrines by fifteen disciples, resulting in a total count of six plus six times fifteen and thus ninety-six.

校羅; see the discussion in Paul Demiéville, "Les versions chinoises du Milindapañha," Bulletin de l'École Française d'Extrême Orient 24 (1924): 76, n. 4. A departure of the Buddha to live alone in the company of a solitary elephant is reported in discourses in the Udāna and the Madhyama-āgama, Ud 4.5 at Ud 41,19 and MĀ 72 at T.26.1:536a7, as well as in the Mahīśāsaka and Theravāda Vinayas, T.1421.22:160a24 and Vin I 352,34; on this episode see also Reiko Ohnuma, "An Elephant Good to Think: The Buddha in Pārileyyaka Forest," Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 35/1-2 (2012-2013): 259-293. These sources (for Ud 4.5 see Ud-a 248,20) relate his withdrawal to the Kosambī incident, when monks had begun to quarrel with each other, regarding a minor matter of monastic discipline, to the extent of being unwilling to accept the Buddha's injunction that they should stop their litigation.

迦羅洹; see Demiéville, "Les versions chinoises du Milindapañha," p. 77, n. 5. As explained by Haiyan Hu-von Hinüber, "Aśoka und die buddhistische Uposatha-Zeremonie (I), Aśoka's 256 Nächte," Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens 40 (1996): 90, the count of six refers to what actually are only four days in a month, namely the eighth and either the fourteenth or else the fifteenth of every fortnight. 216

Notes

17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 A comparable contrast in aspiration between two monks can be found in MĀ 66 at T.26.1:510a2 and T.44.1:830b2, where one monk expresses in front of the Buddha his aspiration to become a wheel-turning king in the future, whereas another monk rather aspires to become the future Buddha Maitreya.

彌蘭, Mílán, which thus only really corresponds to the first syllable of the Pāli counterpart Milinda. 陀獵; see also Demiéville, "Les versions chinoises du Milindapañha," p. 80, n. 1. Takakusu, "Chinese Translations of Milinda Pañho," p. 9, suggested a possible dhāra; Guang Xing, "Nāgasena Bhikṣu Sūtra," Journal of the Centre for Buddhist Studies, Sri Lanka 5 (2007): 192, n. 23: dhārin; yet M. Paul Pelliot, "Les noms propres dans les traductions chinoises du Milindapañha," Journal Asiatique 11/4 (1914): 388, objected that the transcription requires a final labial.

那, na, which only reflects the first syllable of nāga.

那先, Naxian, which only reflect the first and third syllable of its Pāli counterpart Nāgasena; see also the previous note.

樓漢, Louhan, for which Demiéville, "Les versions chinoises du Milindapañha," p. 83, n. 1, gives Rohaṇa.

According to the Milindapañha, Mil 11,30, the uncle rather got Nāgasena to join the Buddhist monastic order by stipulating this as a precondition for giving him teachings. The account in the Milindapañha in general resembles, as noted by Bimala Charan Law, The Life and Work of Buddhaghosa (Delhi: Low Price Publications, 1923, reprint 2005), p. 44, the story of Buddhaghosa's birth, early life, and conversion. The Milindapañha, Mil 14,11, speaks of Assagutta.

The comparison with a jackal among a pride of lions occurs also in the Mahāsāṅghika Vinaya, T.1425.22:491a22, where it is spoken by Mahākassapa at the first saṅgīti when expressing his refusal to let Ānanda participate in the gathering of five hundred arahants who were to recite the Dharma and Vinaya.

A comparable comportment by a group of monks is reported in the commentary on the Satipaṭṭhāna-sutta, Ps I 258,33. Having agreed not to speak to each other until they had attained arahantship, they filled their mouths with water on entering the village to beg for alms, spitting it out after having left the village. The villagers were then able to know from the spots of water that had been spat out the number of monks that had come to the village for alms.

The supplementation of "never" is based on the parallel T.1670A.32:694c23: 未曾 (the corresponding passage in the Milindapañha, Mil 16,1, proceeds differently and does not have the injunction to keep water in the mouth and the reaction by the teacher when Nāgasena does not follow this injunction). Given the setting, with the teacher asking Nāgasena to keep water in the mouth as a mode of conduct apparently incumbent 217

28 29 30 31 32 33 on anyone going to this householder or even anywhere else to receive alms, it seems more probable that the householder had not been receiving teachings when donating food. Guang Xing, "Nāgasena Bhikṣu Sūtra," p. 194, n. 49, observes that "according to the tradition, after a meal monks should give some short talks on dharma to those who offered the meal." Yet the custom of keeping water in the mouth would only be meaningful (and its breach warrant punishment, as evident in the later denouement of the tale) if the tradition of giving a short talk after the meal had not been followed. The teaching given here by Nāgasena is in line with the standard procedure in the early discourses of providing first basic instructions on generosity, morality, and rebirth in heaven. Seeing that the audience is receptive, teachings on insight are given next. In the Milindapañha, Mil 16,4, however, Nāgasena straightaway teaches Abhi dharma. As noted by Thich Minh Chau, Milindapañha and Nāgasenabhikshusūtra: A Comparative Study Through Pāli and Chinese Sources (Calcutta: K. L. Mukho padyay, 1964), p. 25f, this is one of several such references in the Pāli version supporting the impression that the Milindapañha presents a more developed and later version of the debate between Nāgasena and Milinda.

This would refer to being expelled from that particular monastery, in the sense that by not following the conduct agreed among its monastic inhabitants he had lost his residential rights. It could not intend the type of expulsion that is appropriate when a fully ordained monk conceals having violated one of the four main rules, pārājika, on which see Anālayo, "The Legal Consequences of pārājika," Sri Lanka International Journal of Buddhist Studies 5 (2016): 1-22.

舍竭, counterpart to Sāgala in Mil 19,4.

大秦國, counterpart to the country of the Yonakas in Mil 1,13. A reference to the Yonaka country that is then interpreted from the viewpoint of local geographical awareness occurs also in two cases noted by Emmanuel Guillon, "Le questions de Milinda. Un roi gréco-indien dans un texte mōn," Cahiers de l'Asie du Sud-Est 29/30 (1991): 85f. In one case a Mon version of the Milindapañha takes the term to refer to the Vietnamese, in the other case a Burmese version understands it to denote those from the region of Chiang Mai in Thailand.

My conjectural translation is based on adopting the variant 陂門 instead of 乘門. Demiéville, "Les versions chinoises du Milindapañha," p. 91, n. 7, comments that the expression 乘門, "ne parait pas offrir de sens," based on which he suggests an emendation of the first character and then translates it as a reference to "recluse." Guang Xing "Nāgasena Bhikṣu Sūtra," p. 195, n. 68, objects against this, arguing that 乘門 means wealthy people. Both thus take the phrase to refer to a particular group of people. Yet, it seems to me that, once the main modes of locomotion have been mentioned (elephants, horses, chariots, and pedestrian), what follows need not intend still other people on the roads, but could also be about the city as a whole having pools as gathering places.

The supplementation of "other" follows T.1670A.32:695b12: 及餘小國 (T. 1670B reads: 及諸小國).

218

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34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 The supplementation "surplus" follows T.1670A.32:695b14: 有餘. The Milindapañha, Mil 19,14, speaks of Āyupāla.

The translation is based on emending 行忠政, probably the result of a textual corruption, by instead relying on the corresponding passage in T.1670A.32:695b28: 行中正. Mil 19,29 refers to dhammacariyasamacariyatthā. Nevertheless, the reading 行忠政 could perhaps be made sense of as a reference to "acting with loyalty to the government," in the sense that, presumably being the first Buddhist monk to meet the king, he might want to assure the king that both monastic and lay followers of the Buddha are loyal to the government. Such a reading would fit the impression of some degree of similarity between the present encounter and that of the Buddha and the king Ajātasattu in the Sāmaññaphala-sutta; similarities already noted for the Milindapañha by T. W. Rhys Davids, The Questions of King Milinda, Translated from the Pāli (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1890), p. 8, n. 2; p. 10, n. 1, 3; p. 37, n. 1; p. 38, n. 1, 2; p. 41, n. 2, 3; p. 42, n. 1. Graeme MacQueen, A Study of the Śrāmaṇyaphala-sūtra (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1988), p. 206f, suggests that the question posed by the king to the Buddha in the Sāmaññaphala-sutta carries with it a subtle challenge, in that the head of a government asserting control asks a representative of the community of recluses to stand up and define their role and function. The Buddha then dexterously meets this challenge by getting the king to affirm publicly his respect for a recluse even if the same person had gone forth after earlier being a slave in the royal household. On possible political motivations behind Milinda's wish to discuss with Buddhist monks see also Osmund Bopearachchi, "King Milinda's Conversion to Buddhism, Fact or Fiction?", Ancient Ceylon, Journal of the Archaeological Survey Department of Sri Lanka 7 (1990): 7ff. In the Milindapañha, Mil 20,11, the king adds that becoming a Buddhist monk and undertaking ascetic practices must be the result of evils done in former lives. Such a more detailed argument fits the context well as a means to reduce the monk to silence. The continuous relevance of this type of question up to nowadays has been noted by A. Foucher, "Á propos de la conversion au bouddhisme du roi indo-grec Ménandre," Mémoires de l'Institut National de France 43/2 (1951): 279, who writes, "la première réaction, toute spontanée, d'un Européen confronté . . . avec les représentants réguliers du bouddhisme est de se demander, puisque la salut est accessible aux laïques, 'à quoi bon se faire moine?'"

The translation is based on adopting the variant 不 instead of 難, in keeping with the formulation found in the previous sentence.

These are the twelve (or nine) aṅgas; see, e.g., Anālayo, "Āgama and aṅga in the Early Buddhist Oral Tradition," Singaporean Journal of Buddhist Studies 3 (2016): 9-37. These are monks, nuns, male lay disciples, and female lay disciples. The one who informs the king in the Milindapañha, Mil 22,18, is called Devamantiya. The meeting between the two appears to have taken place in the same location as the meeting with Yeheluo. In fact, after only a short exchange between the king and 219

43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 Nāgasena, it has become too late to continue and the king needs to return to his palace, inviting Nāgasena to meet him there the next day. This makes it clear that the initial meeting with Nāgasena did not take place in the palace.

Contentment as the greatest wealth and nirvana as the highest happiness are also mentioned in Dhp 204, but the rest of the verse differs. The Milindapañha does not report that Nāgasena started the conversation by delivering a teaching on his own account. In fact, given the debate setting, the presentation in the Chinese version is unexpected. C. A. F. Rhys Davids, The Milinda-Questions: An Inquiry into its Place in the History of Buddhism with a Theory as to its Author (London: George Routledge & Sons,1930), p. 25f, reasons that the debate would have been conducted in a Prakrit, as one would expect Milinda to be bilingual, whereas there is no reason why Nāgasena should be fluent in Greek.

In the Milindapañha, Mil 26,23, the king presses his point more strongly by accusing Nāgasena of falsehood, inasmuch as there is no Nāgasena to be found. The supplementation "you came in" takes its inspiration from the Milindapañha, Mil 26,32, where in reply to an inquiry by Nāgasena the king had stated that he had come in a chariot. This helps understand why Nāgasena would take up a chariot in his reply, making it fairly probable that the same sense also underlies his inquiry in T. 1670B. A corresponding passage can be found in SN 5.10 at SN I 135,20, SĀ 1202 at T.99.2:327b9, SĀ2 218 at T.100.2:454c29, and D 4094 nyu 82a1; see Anālayo, "Defying Māra—Bhikkhunīs in the Saṃyukta-āgama," in A. Collett, ed., Women in Early Indian Buddhism: Comparative Textual Studies (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 126. Notably, Mil 28,5 agrees with SN 5.10 in attributing the verses to Vajirā, whereas in the parallels they are instead spoken by Selā. In the Milindapañha, Mil 28,29, Nāgasena distinguishes between paṇḍitavāda and rājavāda.

The translation is based on emending 諸 to read 語, following a suggestion by Demiéville, "Les versions chinoises du Milindapañha," p. 99, n. 1. A version of this exchange can be found in T.2004.48:253b26.

Whereas at the present juncture the king rides on a horse to leave, T.1670B.32:706c8: 騎馬, according to the description of his arrival he drove a chariot, 705b22: 乘車. Yaroslav Vasil'kov, "Did East and West Really Meet in Milinda's Questions?", The Petersburg Journal of Cultural Studies 1/1 (1993): 68f, comments on the same contrast in the Milindapañha that in this way the king "first visits Nāgasena in a chariot; but after the [first] discussion, in which he is defeated, he returns home on horseback . . . one might suggest . . . that the king abandons his chariot out of vexation, since it was precisely the celebrated 'example of the chariot' which the monk had just used to prove to him that he was wrong." Or else, perhaps "Milinda's leaving behind the chariot after the [first] dispute with Nāgasena is a direct result of the king's defeat in 220

Notes

52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 the debate. A traditional coupling of two motifs, defeat in a contest, verbal or otherwise, and the surrender of the chariot to the victor, would seem to explain the strange incident of Milinda's departure on horseback."

In the Milindapañha, Mil 30,14, the king does not threaten any punishment. According to the Milindapañha, Mil 30,23, he came with eighty thousand monks, asītiya bhikkhusahassehi saddhiṃ. Such numbers tend to have a symbolic meaning, in fact T. W. Rhys Davids, The Questions of King Milinda, p. 48, and N. K. G. Mendis, The Questions of King Milinda: An Abridgement of the Milindapañha (Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society, 1993), p. 33, have opted to translate the Pāli phrase freely as "with the whole company of the brethren" or just "a large number of monks." The Milindapañha, Mil 31,16, does not mention any gifting of sandals. The Milindapañha, Mil 31,20, does not refer to the presence of the ladies. The Milindapañha, Mil 32,3, also mentions being indebted as a possible reason for going forth. However, being in debt is one of the factors that make a candidate unfit for ordination as a Buddhist monk; cf. Vin I 93,29. As noted by Horner, Milinda's Questions, Volume I, p. 42, n. 5, going forth because of being in debt also finds mention in MN I 463,24 and SN III 93,8, but these instances depict not going forth for such a reason. In the present case, the reference to those who did go forth for such a reason could thus hardly intend Buddhist monks, but must be referring to recluses in general. The text speaks of 孝順, which conveys in particular the sense of filial piety. However, as becomes evident in the exposition given later of the significance of this quality, this sense would not be appropriate in the present context. My rendering as "devotion" attempts to do justice to the later exposition, which relates the present quality to the thirty-seven requisites of awakening.

The original actually speaks of 戲樂, which taken literally conveys the sense of an indulgence in worldly pleasures, although from the context it is clear that this must intend the fourth of the five hindrances. The expression 戲樂蓋 occurs in T.13.1:234c26 as a rendering of the hindrance of restlessness-and-worry, auddhatya-kaukṛtyanīvaraṇa; see Tilman Vetter, A Lexicographical Study of An Shigao's and His Circle's Chinese Translation of Buddhist Texts (Tokyo: The International Institute for Buddhist Studies, 2012), p. 123.

A comparable instruction can be found in the first and last line of a stanza found in SN 10.12 at SN I 214,27 (see also Sn 184) and its parallels SĀ 603 at T.99.2:161a29 (see also SĀ 1326 at T.99.2:365a12) and SĀ² 325 at T.100.2:483a10, according to which one crosses the flood by faith and by wisdom one is purified. Mil 36,15 explicitly indicates that this statement is found in the Saṃyutta-nikāya. Minh Chau, Milindapañha and Nāgasenabhikshusūtra, p. 26, reasons, due to the absence in general of any reference in the Chinese version to specific discourses in particular Nikāyas, that the text reflected in Chinese translation "was compiled at a time, very near after the 221

60 61 62 63 demise of the Buddha, when the above divisions and classifications had not yet been in vogue." Given that the division into Āgamas and Nikāyas appears to be comparatively early and as such is mentioned in the accounts of the first saṅgīti in the Vinayas of different schools (see Anālayo, "Āgama and aṅga in the Early Buddhist Oral Tradition," pp. 12-14), it seems more natural to see the lack of such references simply as a reflection of the debate situation. Neither the king nor his assembly would have been acquainted with subdivisions of the Buddhist scriptural collections such as, in the present instance, the Saṃyutta-nikāya, making it futile for Nāgasena to refer to them. The occurrence of such type of references in the Pāli Milindapañha would simply reflect its increased usage as a work of reference by Buddhists themselves, which makes it indeed meaningful to supply more detailed referencing. Moriz Winternitz, Geschichte der Indischen Literatur, Band 2, Die Buddhistische Literatur und die Heiligen Texte der Jainas (Stuttgart: K. F. Koehler,1920, reprint 1968), p. 146. n. 2, points out that quotations in the first three chapters of the Pāli work are from early parts of the canonical collections, unlike quotations in subsequent chapters as well as in later parts of the introduction. This gives the impression of a process of updating of such referencing in the Milindapañha, which seems to have continued until the time of Buddhaghosa. Padmanabh S. Jaini, Milinda-ṭīkā (London: Pali Text Society, 1986), p. xii, notes that the commentary on the Milindapañha attributes the introductory verses and several other sentences to Buddhaghosa, which "shows the existence of a tradition which believed that he was actively responsible in revising or even recasting the Miln. (Milindapañha). It will not be too bold a conclusion to draw from this statement that the Miln. received several additions during the time of Buddhaghosa."

意止, literally "stilling of the mind," a rendering of satipaṭṭhāna/smṛtyupasthāna also adopted by Ān Shìgāo (安世高); see Vetter, A Lexicographical Study of An Shigao's and His Circle's Chinese Translation of Buddhist Texts, p. 117. It seems that this cryptic passage is meant as a summary of the four right efforts. According to the standard presentation, the four right efforts are concerned with avoiding the arising of evil states, overcoming arisen evil states, developing not yet arisen wholesome states, and maintaining arisen wholesome states; see also T.1670A.32:697b27. Given the more adequate presentation in T. 1670A, the present passage is probably the result of some editorial intervention in China. The whole detailed discussion of the thirty-seven requisites of awakening is without a counterpart in the Milindapañha, which only lists them briefly in its discussion of mindfulness; see Mil 37,10.

The present and the next quality end with a reference to 念, which appears to be the result of a textual corruption. In an attempt to make sense of it, I have rendered it as "remembrance," in the sense that this is an additional benefit accruing from cultivating the four right efforts.

The description presents supernormal abilities that are held to be the potential fruit of cultivating the four bases of success. The standard presentation of these four lists 222

Notes

64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 desire, being energetic, mind, and investigation, each occurring in conjunction with concentration and formations of striving. The presentation in the corresponding part in T.1670A.32:697c1 indeed lists desire, energy, control of the mind, and attention. This supports the suggestion made in note 61 above that the presentation in T. 1670B is probably best considered the result of a maladroit editorial intervention in China. According to the standard presentation, the five faculties (as well as the five powers) are faith, energy, mindfulness, concentration, and wisdom; see T.1670A.32:697c3 and above notes 61 and 63.

意, literally "the mind," a rendering of smṛti/sati also employed by Ān Shìgāo; see Vetter, A Lexicographical Study of An Shigao's and His Circle's Chinese Translation of Buddhist Texts, p. 117.

可, literally "to approve," a character employed by Ān Shìgāo to convey the sense of "pleasant" or "pleasing"; see Vetter, A Lexicographical Study of An Shigao's and His Circle's Chinese Translation of Buddhist Texts, p. 54.

護, literally "to protect," a character sometimes used to render upekkhā/upekṣā. The text qualifies each factor as 直, literally "straight," a translation of sammā/samyak also employed by Ān Shìgāo; see Vetter, A Lexicographical Study of An Shigao's and His Circle's Chinese Translation of Buddhist Texts, p. 209.

治, sometimes employed by Ān Shìgāo as a rendering of ājīva (but at times also to render other path factors); see Vetter, A Lexicographical Study of An Shigao's and His Circle's Chinese Translation of Buddhist Texts, p. 168. If the reference should indeed be to right livelihood here, then this would imply that the sequence got reversed at this juncture, as in the standard presentation right action comes before right livelihood. The supplementation is based on T.1670A.32:697c17: 少; in fact the fewness of the soldiers is also mentioned in the next part of T. 1670B.

A version of the present exchange on unification of the mind can be found in T.2016.48:936b20.

See above (p. 136) the simile of the harvester of wheat.

The original speaks of the 神 of the former body. Earlier in the text the same term 神 did carry a more literal meaning as "spirit," but in the present and later passages it rather functions as a rendering of vijñāna/viññāṇa.

The original speaks of the 精, the "semen." As a literal translation would fail to convey the sense of the passage, in my rendering as "embryo" I follow the example set by Guang Xing, "Nāgasena Bhikṣu Sūtra," p. 141.

The translation is based on emending 主 to read 炷, following the reading found in T.1670A.32:698b23.

The supplementation is based on T.1670A.32:698c4.

223

77 78 79 80 A comparable statement by Sāriputta can be found in Th 1002f, where he states that he longs neither for death nor for life and that he just awaits his time. Notably, the corresponding quotation in Mil 45,3 differs from the actual wording found in Th 1002f, as already noted by T. W. Rhys Davids, The Questions of King Milinda, p. xli. Demiéville, "Les versions chinoises du Milindapañha," p. 122, n. 1, comments that the present passage has suffered from such a degree of corruption that it no longer allows for correction. The text reads: 佛得無不說有樂或有苦. 王言: 如使有為無有苦. Guang Xing "Nāgasena Bhikṣu Sūtra," p 201, n. 168, suggests that a reference to Nāgasena has been lost before the present passage. He then translates it as follows (p. 146): "Nāgasena replied: 'As the Buddha has attained non-activity, he does not speak of suffering or happiness.' 'If so,' the king asked, 'Is it as if there is no suffering in conditioned dharma?'" It is not clear to me in what sense the Buddha "does not speak of suffering or happiness," since in many a discourse he is on record for speaking of these two. My own tentative translation intends to convey the sense that the king expresses an afterthought. In this way, after the inquiry about the ethical perspective on pleasure and pain, based on the assumption that the Buddha could hardly have denied the existence of these two, this afterthought by the king relates to the difference between dukkha as "unsatisfactory," a general characteristic of all conditioned phenomena, and dukkha as "pain," a felt experience that occurs in alternation with experiences felt as pleasant or neutral. The contrast made here and in what follows between 內 and 外 is not entirely clear and my supplementation of "attachment" to references to "outside" is an attempt to make sense of the contrast between the two terms in the light of the ensuing discussion. This discussion appears to be along the lines of an exposition found in MN 137 at MN III 217,9 and MĀ 163 at T.26.1:692c17, which differ from each other insofar as MN 137 distinguishes the sets of six types into those related to the household or to renunciation, whereas MĀ 163 instead distinguishes the same sets into those based on attachment and those based on dispassion; for a comparative study see Anālayo, A Comparative Study of the Majjhima-nikāya (Taipei: Dharma Drum Publishing Corporation, 2011), p. 782. Demiéville, "Les versions chinoises du Milindapañha," p. 123, n. 4, suggests that the distinction between 內 and 外 could perhaps be understood in the sense of "internal" to the household life and "external" in the sense of having renounced household life, hence he translates the two terms as "profane" and "religieuse." Guang Xing "Nāgasena Bhikṣu Sūtra," p. 146f, opts for a literal translation as "internal" and "external" feelings. Although true to the original, a distinction of feelings into internal and external types would relate to their objects, namely external feelings arisen through contact at the five sense-doors, in contrast to internal feelings arisen at the mind-door. This would not work for the present exposition, where both qualifications are used for the entire set of six senses. Nor would the distinction between internal senses and external objects seem relevant.

The present passage is clearly the result of a textual corruption. In order to arrive at a coherent presentation, I add "nor sadness" to "no joy," 不喜, on the assumption that a reference to 不愁亦 has been lost. The exposition of this topic also seems to miss 224

Notes

81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 some text that somehow conveys the sense of non-reactivity toward what is unpleasant. In order to make up for that lack, I supplement "if."

The presentation here differs from the standard account of dependent arising (paṭicca samuppāda), which proceeds from ignorance to the six sense-spheres via the following links: formations, consciousness, and name-and-form. Although one might take 身 to stand for formations (see Demiéville, "Les versions chinoises du Milindapañha," p. 131, n. 3), it would still be out of sequence. Moreover, name-and-form normally occur together rather than name conditioning form.

The translation is only tentative; the original reads: 人以是故生死無有絕時, 人故本身 不可得也. I assume that the second part corresponds in sense to the indication in Mil 50,21 that a beginning point of dukkha cannot be designated. The comparison with a chariot's wheel is found in SN 4.10 at SN I 109,2 and its parallels SĀ 1085 at T.99.2:284c20 and SĀ² 24 at T.100.2:381b21. The present exchange is rather cryptic and the translation is only tentative. The supplementation of "no" suggests itself from the ensuing statement by the king. In the corresponding section in Mil 51,32, Nāgasena at first clarifies that the statement regarding the impossibility to designate an origin refers to ignorance. In contrast, an origin can be designated of what comes into existence from not existing and of what falls apart after having been in existence.

陽燧鉤; for a discussion of which see Demiéville, "Les versions chinoises du Milinda pañha," p. 136f, n. 7. I follow Guang Xing "Nāgasena Bhikṣu Sūtra," p. 158, who translates the expression as "speculum."

The translation is based on emending 有有 to read 有.

The translation is only tentative.

In the Milindapañha, Mil 54,18, the king explains that what he means with the vedagū is the life principle within that sees through the eyes, hears through the nose, etc. This helps explain the ensuing refutation by Nāgasena of the existence of such an entity as the recipient of six sense-door experience.

The possibility of seeing forms seems to be missing in the original. Here, again, the possibility of seeing something seems to be missing in the original. The reference to the eye could be the result of a textual error. The Milindapañha, Mil 60,20, speaks of two cymbals, instead of two stones. The translation is based on adopting the variant 兩 instead of 雨. The original speaks of "burning" 燒, which fails to make sense in this context; see Guang Xing "Nāgasena Bhikṣu Sūtra" p. 206, n. 248. The Milindapañha, Mil 62,31, speaks of a copper vessel being beaten, kaṃsathālaṃ ākoṭitaṃ. 225

95 The translation is based on adopting the variant 手 instead of 乎. 96 The translation is based on adopting a variant that adds 次取肉味來. 97 The supplementation is based on T.1670A.32:698c9: 種. 98 The translation is based on emending 動類 to read 種類, the reading found in the corresponding passage in T.1670A.32:698c10. 99 The supplementation is based on T.1670A.32:698c19: 本栽. 100 A comparable but much more detailed exposition can be found in MN 135 at MN III 203,16 and a range of parallels; see Anālayo, A Comparative Study of the Majjhimanikāya, pp. 767-775. 101 Versions of this dilemma can be found in T.1719.34:246a3, T.2122.53:326c9, and T.2123.54:170a16.

102 T. W. Rhys Davids, The Questions of King Milinda, p. 106, n. 2, comments on the corresponding simile in the Pāli version that "this was a pot so made that no water could pass from it except through a filtering medium. When not being actually used, the water was no doubt kept at a certain height in it by the pressure of the atmosphere." 103 The supplementation is based on T.1670A.32:699b24: 不死. 104 The text here seems to have suffered from loss; the supplementation is based on T.1670A.32:699c4: 寧知.

105 The supplementation is based on T.1670A.32:699c6: 見. 106 The supplementation is based on T.1670A.32:699c11: 王言. 107 On the five hundred waters see also DĀ 30 at T.1.1:116c24. 108 The Milindapañha, Mil 71,6, speaks of the Elder Tissa. 109 The translation is based on emending 舊得 to read 奪得, which is the reading found in the corresponding section in T.1670A.32:700a14.

110 According to Demiéville, "Les versions chinoises du Milindapañha," p. 155, n. 1, here 智 corresponds to vedagū, which in the Milindapañha carries the connotation of a transmigrating soul; see T. W. Rhys Davids and W. Stede, Pali-English Dictionary (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1921, reprint 1993), p. 647: "a peculiar meaning of vedagū is that of 'soul' (lit. attainer of wisdom) at Miln 54 & 71." 111 In the Milindapañha, Mil 72,3, the king next asks if, given that there is no transmigrating entity, there will be no continuity of evil deeds either. This helps explain why Nāgasena next takes up the topic of the theft of fruit. 112 The supplementation is based on T.1670A.32:700a29: 某枝間有某菓. 113 The translation is based on adopting the variant 已 instead of 以. 226

Notes

114 This appears to be a reference to the standard food reflection; see, e.g., MN 2 at MN I 10,8. Notably, the parallels MĀ 10 at T.26.1:432b24 and EĀ 40.6 at T.125.2:741a4 do not mention the use of food to become attractive or beautiful; see also the discussion in Anālayo, A Comparative Study of the Majjhima-nikāya, p. 31. 115 See AN 9.15 at AN IV 386,15, Sn 197f, Th 1151f, SĀ3 9 at T.101.2:495b9, EĀ 12.1 at T.125.2:568b1 (not specified to be nine), EĀ2 29 at T.150A.2:880b2, and T.210.4:573c27.

116 A version of this dilemma can be found in T.1719.34:246a11. 117 The supplementation is based on T.1670A.32:700c9: 光.

118 The inquiry is based on a play on the etymological relationship between brahmacariya, literally "the conduct of Brahmā" as a reference to the celibate life of a monastic, and the actual conduct of Brahmā.

119 The reply involves a play on words similar to the king's question on brahmacariya (see previous note), proposing that those endowed with buddhi, intelligence, on adopting the same type of reasoning should be considered disciples of the Buddha. 120 The text speaks of a bird 鳥, which in this context does not make sense. The emendation follows T.1670A.32:700c21, which rather refers to an elephant 象; see also Demiéville, "Les versions chinoises du Milindapañha," p. 158, n. 4. In the Milindapañha, Mil 76,1, Nāgasena's second reply to the etymological play by the king on the term brahma cariya is based on a play of words involving koñcanāda, "the trumpeting of an elephant," and koñca, the heron.

121 A version of this dilemma can be found in T.1912.46:143c2. 122 The text here alternates between 人家 and 人, which I take to be equivalents. 123 The translation is based on adopting the variant 志 instead of 忘. 124 The text is probably corrupt here; the translation is based on assuming that a contrast is made between the proverbial ability of elephants to remember well and the king's loss of memory.

125 Both are on record for remembering many discourses spoken by the Buddha, therefore being foremost among their respective class of disciples in being bahussuta, literally "having heard much"; see AN at AN I 24,32 and 26,19. In the case of Khujjuttarā, the texts remembered by her are according to tradition those collected in the Itivuttaka; see Malalasekera, Dictionary of Pāli Proper Names, vol. 1, p. 720. 126 The translation is based on emending 語 to read 諸, following T.1670A.32:701b21. 127 In the Milindapañha, Mil 74,20, the king's question is more specifically why the Buddha only gradually laid down the rules of training, sikkhāpada. Toshiichi Endo, "Some Significant Epithets and Qualities of the Buddha as found in the Milindapañha," in Y. Karunadasa, ed., Ānanda: Papers on Buddhism and Indology, A Felicitation 227

Volume Presented to Ānanda Weihena Palliya Guruge on His Sixtieth Birthday (Colombo: Felicitation Volume Editorial Committee, 1990), p. 164, comments that "here the Buddha's all-knowing and all-seeing cognitive faculty is questioned in terms of his knowledge of the future." As pointed out by Richard F. Gombrich, "Popperian Vinaya: Conjecture and Refutation in Practice," in B. Kellner, et al., ed., Pramāṇakīrtiḥ: Papers Dedicated to Ernst Steinkellner on the Occasion of His 70th Birthday (Wien: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien, Universität Wien, 2007), p. 206f, "the idea that the Buddha was omniscient is strikingly at odds with the picture of him presented in every Vinaya tradition." These "show that the Buddha . . . occasionally made a false start and found it necessary to reverse a decision. Since omniscience includes knowledge of the future, this is not omniscience." In the formulation of the dilemma adopted in the Milindapañha, the problem that results from attributing omniscience to the Buddha comes out with increased clarity. 128 Versions of this dilemma can be found in T.1718.34:57c9, T.1969A.47:199a18, T.1972.47:299b12, T.1976.47:398b9, T.2017.48:967a12, T.2122.53:457c26, and T.2123.54:165a8.

129 In the Milindapañha, Mil 80,26, Nāgasena explains that the boat represents wholesome actions.

130 The rendering "six days" is based on emending 六月日 to read 六日, thus deleting a reference to "months." The corresponding section in T.1670A.32:702a15 speaks of six days, 六日.

131 According to Gérard Fussman, "L'Indo-Grec Ménandre ou Paul Demiéville revisité," Journal Asiatique 281/1-2 (1993): 79, this would refer to Alexandria in Egypt; see also the discussion in Étienne Lamotte, Histoire du Bouddhisme Indien, des origines à l'ère Śaka (Louvain-la-Neuve: Institut Orientaliste, 1958), p. 414. 132 One yojana corresponds to about seven miles; see the detailed discussion in Peter Skilling, "A Note on Dhammapada 60 and the Length of the Yojana," Journal of the Pali Text Society 24 (1998): 149-170.

133 Versions of Nāgasena's reply to this dilemma with the help of the simile of two birds can be found in T.1719.34:246a15, T.2122.53:458a8, and T.2123.54:165a18. 134 The translation is based on emending 問 to read 言, the reading found in the corresponding section in T.1670A.32:702a28. 135 A version of this dilemma can be found in T.2122.53:458a12 and T.2123.54:165a22. 136 The supplementation is based on T.1670B.32:702c3: 我知.

137 James Paul McDermott, "Kamma in the Milindapañha," Journal of the American Oriental Society 97/4 (1977): 464, comments on the version of this simile in the Milindapañha that of the two persons, "one individual is ignorant of the temperature of the ball. Thus it is to be supposed that he seizes it less carefully, with a stronger grasp, and that he is more severely burnt for this reason. As the illustration is set up, 228

Notes

the only difference between the two men who grasp the ball is that one of them is ignorant of its true nature. It is precisely this which results in his being burned more severely."

138 In the Milindapañha, Mil 85,22, Nāgasena asks if the king has heard someone snoring and if that could not be stopped if the person bent his body. Given that even an untrained person can accomplish this simply by bending the body, why should those accomplished in the three trainings not be able to stop their breathing on attaining the fourth absorption?

139 The translation is based on emending 清 to read 漬; the reading found in T.1670A.32: 702c14.

140 The translation is based on emending 主 to read 生; the reading found in T.1670A.32: 702c21.

141 The supplementation is based on text found additionally in T.1670A.32:703a16: 人言. 142 麁軟, literally what is "rough and fine," a rendering of spraṣṭavya/phoṭṭhabba also employed by Ān Shìgāo; see Vetter, A Lexicographical Study of An Shigao's and His Circle's Chinese Translation of Buddhist Texts, p. 342.

143 The translation is based on emending 目所見事 to read 目所不見事; the reading found in T.1670A.32:703a22.

144 The translation is based on emending 說 to read 解, the reading found in T.1670A.32: 703c1.

229