Yongjia’s Song of Actualizing the Way Observing the Mind Awakening from a Dream

VII

Twelvefold Dependent Arising

1. Explanation of the

Twelve Limbs

Question: What is it that triggers transmigration through cyclic existence? Response: In terms of its source, it is triggered by nescience. This means that the minds of ordinary people are extremely ignorant, such that they do not understand the principle of cause and effect and do not comprehend the path to liberation. They have still not wearied of the painful retribution of the three unfortunate destinies. How much more difficult it is to turn away from the superior karmic rewards of rebirth as a human or a god! Here we are referring to the power of the discriminating nescience that functions with the sixth consciousness, which is called the limb of nescience. Depending on the power of this ignorance, the two kinds of mental inclinations of wholesome and unwholesome fully come into play as the karmic causes of transmigration. These "karmas" come into play through the mental factor "volition" (cetanā) that functions with the sixth consciousness. Volition sometimes functions with faith and other wholesome mental functions. At that time, in accordance with bodily, verbal, and mental activity, it creates all wholesome dharmas. At other times it functions with craving and other afflictions. Then, in accordance with bodily, verbal, and mental activity, it creates all unwholesome dharmas. These wholesome and unwholesome orientations associated with the three modes of karmic activity each perfume their own seeds. These seeds are all deposited in the root consciousness, which represents the continuity of the individual's nominal self. This is called the limb of formation (saṃskāra). This limb of formation supports the root consciousness according to its ability. This is called the seeds of painful effects supported by formation. These seeds of painful effects that are supported are of five kinds. (1) Seeds actively produced by the root consciousness; this is called the limb of consciousness (vijñāna).

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(2) Seeds that produce name and form. This refers to all the other seeds— beyond the seeds produced from the root consciousness as well as the seeds of contact and sensation in the six internal sense bases—whose karmic ripening is of indeterminate moral quality. This is called the limb of name-andform (nāma-rūpa). (3) Seeds of the six faculties of vision and so forth. This is the limb of the sixfold sphere of sense contact (ṣaḍāyatana). The faculty of thought referred to here is not the manas, but it does have the meaning of "uninterrupted ripening."

(4) Ripening seeds of the mental factor of contact; this is this limb of contact (sparśa). (5) Ripening seeds of the mental factor of sensation; this is the limb of sensation (vedanā).

To summarize the main points of the seeds of these five limbs of consciousness and so forth, they are all seeds that can produce circumstantial and direct unpleasant future effects. Nevertheless, as ripened factors they are impotent and unable to independently produce their own manifest effects, and so must await the empowerment of contributory factors. Hence, they provide supporting energy to wholesome and unwholesome activities. Sometimes they produce wholesome effects, sometimes unwholesome effects. However, even though fruition differs in being wholesome or unwholesome, both are of indeterminate character.

The seeds of these six limbs of formation and so forth need to be nourished by conditions before they can actually manifest. It is like actual seeds in the natural world that after having been planted in the ground still need the nourishment of rain and dew before they produce sprouts. Seeds of internal mental functions are the same in this way, and their nourishing conditions are the afflictions. When we give rise to afflictions this nourishes the seeds of future painful consequences. And although all afflictions have this kind of power, thirst (tṛṣṇā) serves as the root and desire (rāga) is like the water. This is because they have the distinctive power of providing nourishing energy. Thus, at the moment of death, when they are in a state of extremely subtle conceptual activity, intrinsic low-intensity thirst arises naturally, longing for one's own existence and the world. At that time, the seeds of the six limbs 128

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of formation and so forth are directly nourished but do not reach full pitch. This low-intensity thirst is called the "limb of desire" (tṛṣṇā). This kind of yearning is steadily habituated, eventually giving rise to intrinsic high-intensity thirst and so forth. At that time the nourishing conditions of the seeds of the six limbs are in full supply, so their ability to generate effects is all set. These kinds of high-intensity afflictions such as desire are called the "limb of grasping" (upādāna).

The direct nourishing of desire and grasping is none other than the intrinsic afflictions that function with the sixth consciousness. These six limbs of volition and so forth that have been nourished are collectively called the "limb of becoming" (bhava).

This limb of becoming, arriving at the first instant of rebirth, directly produces unpleasant circumstantial and directive retributions. These unpleasant retributions of the body with its sense faculties come forth intact. They are comprehensively termed the "limb of birth" (jāti). After [the life force] declines one reaches the point of the end of life; this is called the limb of old age and death (jarā-maraṇa). [Ryōhen: The limbs proper are directive retribution, which subsumes circumstantial retribution according to their type.] 2. Characteristics of

Transmigration

After this one round, one again gives rise to nescience. Nescience produces karma, eventually giving rise to desire, which nourishes the seeds of suffering (for an unpleasant rebirth). And on it goes, in exactly the same order with no variation. Again and again, one transmigrates endlessly, from time immemorial, reaching up to the present. Hence cyclic existence has nescience as it source.

This nescience is produced from the seeds of nescience. These seeds have been perfumed by the activities of previous nescience. These perfumed seeds reside in the root consciousness, producing seeds of the same type without interruption—again and again producing nescience. Since they continuously produce nescience, beings transmigrate again and again, without end. The root consciousness that keeps the seeds is produced from its own seeds. These seeds of the root consciousness also reside in the root consciousness. These are the same as the seeds of raw data that are perfumed in the 129

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objective aspect of consciousness as the transformation of the sixth and seventh consciousnesses. The sixth and seventh consciousnesses are also produced from seeds of the sixth and seventh consciousnesses. These seeds are thus perfumed by their own sixth and seventh consciousnesses. Once they are perfumed, they already reside in their own root consciousness. In this way, the seeds all reside in the eighth consciousness, reproducing themselves, like a raging river that flows on without interruption. From time immemorial the seeds produce manifest activity. Since manifest activity perfumes seeds, and seeds produce seeds, transmigration through cyclic existence is endless. Thus, you can see that transmigration through cyclic existence is created from nothing other than one's own mind.

3. Nescience and the Nescience

Entrenchments

Question: Is this present nescience the same as the nescience entrenchments (Skt. *avidyâvāsa-bhūmi) taught in the [Śrīmālā]-sūtra?85 Response: It is not the same. The Śrīmālā-sūtra speaks of nescience as constituted by the afflictive hindrances and the cognitive hindrances.86 This is equivalent to the individual ten afflictions and the twenty derivative afflictions in our Hossō system. In this model the cognitive hindrances refer to the most subtle aspect of each one of the afflictions. Conversely, we can say that the coarsest aspects of the cognitive aspect of the hindrances are the afflictions. The afflictions are delusions in regard to function, which torment sentient beings and drag them into birth and death; thus they are called the afflictive hindrances. The cognitive hindrances are the essence of delusion; they obscure the knowable objects such that one cannot obtain bodhi and these are called the cognitive hindrances. The afflictive hindrances function to produce karma and nourish rebirth. These karma-producing afflictions proper are the afflictions arising from discrimination in the present life; in their aiding the inviting of karma, they also share with the innate afflictions. The nourishing afflictions proper are the innately arisen afflictions. In their aiding of the nourishing of affliction they also share with the afflictions produced by discrimination. Within the karma-producing afflictions the power of nescience is predominant. However, since the dharmas that produce karma do not occur repeatedly, only one occurrence of the limb of nescience is posited. Among the nourishing 130

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afflictions the power of desire is predominant. Yet nourishing afflictions flow on repeatedly; therefore, the two limbs of desire and grasping are posited. The cognitive hindrances do not have the functions of producing karma or nourishing rebirth. They are merely able to obscure the knowable objects and prevent people from giving rise to the Buddha's bodhi-wisdom. The nescience entrenchments taught in the Śrīmālā-sūtra are none other than the cognitive hindrances. Therefore, it is not the same as the limb of nescience under discussion here.

Question: If all afflictions contain cognitive hindrances, they can also be labeled as craving, hatred, conceit, and so forth. Why, then, does the Śrīmālāsūtra separately posit them with the term "nescience entrenchments"? Response: Since nescience is predominant within the cognitive hindrances, it is generally labeled as nescience. In reality, it is not the case that there is no thirst, anger, or conceit and so forth (i.e., afflictive aspects). 4. Admonition against

Disparagement

In the above and below sections where comparisons with the teachings of other systems are made, this is only for the purpose of preventing later scholars from attaching to mistaken terms. We have no intention of disparaging the marvelous principles of their correct Dharma. They are all profound essentials, so why should they not be believed and practiced? If you meet the difficultto-encounter Dharma with a twisted and attached attitude, you will be unable to clarify the orthodox principles of your own school and you will further greatly malign the doctrine of other schools. Acting in this way, you will certainly fall into the great hells, unable to escape for a hundred thousand eons. These are the consequences of attachment to your own views. If you harmonize with other schools, your buddha-wisdom eye will naturally penetrate everywhere. The benefit you bring according to the situation will be inexhaustible. If you malign other schools, uncountable Dharma jewels will be obliterated at once. All sentient beings will undergo great suffering and there will be nothing but anguish among the great sages. Wanting to do away with this attachment, however, you end up seeming to reject the Dharma. When you want to establish the Dharma it is just like establishing attachment. If neither is` rejected, then who indeed will warn 131

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people regarding their attachments? You are stuck between a rock and a hard place. What is one to do? Requesting humbly to the wise, inquiring about refuting others, you must reflect on your own attachments. If you would establish yourself, you must first seek to harmonize with others. The pure, single flavor is the same as the true Dharma of old.

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1. General Explanation

Question: How are the hundred dharmas classified among the three kinds of natures such as the fabricated nature and so forth?

Response: Generally speaking, the first ninety-four dharmas are of otherdependent nature. The last six unconditioned dharmas are of perfectly real nature. If we discuss it in detail, among the six unconditioned dharmas there is a distinction between those that are transformed by consciousness and those that are based on thusness, as we have already explained in detail. Within these hundred dharmas that have either other-dependent or perfectly real nature, there are some cases where they are reified such that we attach to their existence, and some cases where they are deconstructed such that we attach to their emptiness. Thus we can say that the manifestation of these attachments as the extreme view of attachment to existence and the extreme view of attachment to emptiness are what is known as the fabricated nature. This is removed by [the meditation on] the two kinds of selflessness. Question: Why are these types of nature known as the fabricated, [the other-dependent,] and the perfectly real?

Response: False fabrications are what we attach to, and hence this is called the "pervasively fabricated nature" (lit., "pervasively fabricated and attachedto nature"). Therefore, pervasive fabrication is a term for "the grasper." "The grasped" is a term for the false objects. Delusion and false discriminations pervasively fabricate everything, and therefore it is said to be "pervasive fabrication." Since the false objects that are cognized are what are attached to, it is called "the fabricated." "Other-dependent" means that things arise depending on myriad other conditions, hence this name. "Perfectly real" means that the actual natures of dharmas are perfectly accomplished, hence this name. Question: Among these three natures, which are nonexistent and which are existent? Which are nominal and which are real?

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Response: The fabricated nature is devoid of substantiality. It only exists as mistaken discrimination and fabrication. Therefore, it is called a dharma that is imaginarily existent but in principle nonexistent. The other-dependent nature is like an illusion, ephemerally existent, formed from myriad conditions. Its substance is nonempty. The perfectly real nature is real and always thus. Its nature is firm, neither ephemeral nor nonexistent. These latter two natures are of the sphere of holy cognition and not the objects of delusive imagination. Therefore, they are called dharmas that exist in principle but do not exist for the worldly.

Question: If it is the case that the fabricated nature is devoid of substance, based on what kinds of objects does it arise in the deluded minds of ordinary people?

Response: It arises because the characteristics of the other-dependent that appear in the mind are perceived as objects, and then these other-dependent characteristics are said to be really existing—or utterly nonexistent. Therefore, such objects that are apprehended outside the mind are either reified or denied. Hence, false imagination is the fabricator and the objects appearing in the mind are the fabricated. The deludedly imagined appearances are said to be of pervasively fabricated nature.

Question: Might it not be the case that the perfectly real nature is fabricated? Response: The real is not an object cognized by false attachment. Therefore, even though it is not an object fabricated by direct delusion, since it is the real nature of the other-dependent we can also say by extension that it is fabricated.

Question: Are these three natures regarded as being essentially the same or different from one another?

Response: The Cheng weishi lun says:

We should say that neither is the case, for although they do not have separate essences, the connotations of false fabrication, dependent arising, and reality are different.87

Hence, these three are neither identical nor different. Since they do not have separate essences they are said to be nondifferent. Since there is false fabrication and so forth, they are said to be nonidentical. 134

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Question: Although I have heard the general overview of this teaching, I have still not seen it treated in detail. Can you provide us with an example to clarify its meaning?

Response: Let's take the example of a single blade of grass, green in color. This green color does not exist independently, it is the product of the two causal aspects of direct causation and contingent causation.88 The direct causes are the seeds contained in the store consciousness. The contingent causes are the various contingent conditions such as the wind, rain, earth, and so forth. A vast number of direct and indirect causes and conditions combine to produce the color of this blade of grass. Since it is produced by the combination of causes and conditions, even though it has no nature of its own it is also not totally nonexistent. Like an illusion, like a dream, it is neither existent nor nonexistent. This is other-dependency. When presented with the illusory green color of the blade of grass, ordinary unenlightened beings imagine the color as being real. At the time of this imagining, what is actually being represented in the mind is this illusory green. What is delusively represented is the appearance of a truly existing green. This appearance lacks any underlying reality. This is called pervasive fabrication by reification.

Some also see it from the perspective of emptiness, and reject this appearance of color and take it to be utterly nonexistent. What is represented in the mind at the time of this apprehension is the appearance of utter nonexistence. What is represented in the minds of the deluded is real nonexistence. This appearance lacks any underlying basis and is pervasive fabrication by annihilation. Now within these falsely imagined appearances of reified real existence and annihilated utter nonexistence there is, within this green blade of grass, a principle that is at every moment and at all times completed removed, stable, and permanently abiding. This principle is real; it neither arises nor ceases. Therefore, is it called the perfectly real nature. These three natures are neither identical nor different. [Ryōhen: Here we offer a single example but all phenomena are like this.]

Question: It is easy to get confused about this recondite teaching of the Hossō school. Can you offer a simile to clarify its meaning? Response: A verse in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha relates the simile of a snake, a rope, and hemp.89 Put briefly, on a dark evening there is a rope lying on the 135

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ground. A foolish man sees it and sees it as a snake. Based on this, all kinds of fears are generated: his eyes glaze over, his mind is unsettled, his hands and legs tremble. At that time, an enlightened person teaches him to try to make him aware of the actuality. Since his confusion runs deep it is difficult to awaken him so easily. After repeated contemplation he gradually comes to understand. Removing his confusion, he suddenly understands that the snake is unreal. Once he knows this, he sees that it was merely a rope. The features of the rope are quite similar to the shape of a snake, and since they are similar the eyes of a fool mistakenly take a rope to be a snake. This is one level of awareness.

Yet he still apprehends the rope as a real thing. With further thought, he eventually understands that the rope is unreal. Its actual substance is hemp, so it is not really a rope. The characteristics of the rope are merely produced from myriad conditions. It is illusory, nominally existent, neither existing nor empty. The hemp is the true substance of the rope, which is neither existing nor empty. The appearance of a real snake and the appearance of a real rope are completely removed in the awareness of the hemp. The three natures are also like this.

The delusive vision of the fool is a metaphor for the fabricator; his various fears are a metaphor for the suffering through birth and death. The enlightened person who teaches him is a metaphor for the buddhas and bodhisattvas; the appearance of a real snake is a metaphor for the appearance of a real self. Suddenly knowing that the snake is empty is a metaphor for knowing the emptiness of person; the appearance of a real rope is a metaphor for the appearance of real dharmas. Knowing the rope to be unreal is a metaphor for knowing that dharmas are empty; the nominally existing snake is a metaphor for an other-dependent essence. The similarity of the appearance of the snake and the rope is a metaphor for the aspect of a nominal self; its substance being hemp is a metaphor for the perfectly real nature. The fact that within the hemp there has never been the appearances of a real snake or a real rope is a metaphor for the principle lacking appearances. When applying this kind of simile, the marvelous principle can be clarified. [Ryōhen: It is in order to elucidate this understanding that I applied a simile.] These three kinds of natures are neither identical nor different. Therefore, this can be called the "single-layered Middle Way."

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2. One Kind of Emptiness and

Existence in the Three Natures

A. The Middle Way of the Fabricated

Question: Is this pervasively fabricated nature to be regarded as exclusive emptiness?90

Response: It is not exclusive emptiness. Why? Despite the fact that a substance is utterly nonexistent, one falsely fabricates its apparent characteristics. But you can't say that there is nothing there at all. We can thus say that this appearance is exactly the existence of emptiness. It is explained as the fabricated nature, and therefore the Essay on the Forest of Meanings says, "It is said to be nonexistent, but the nonexistent can also be said to be existent. This is because ordinary discrimination manifests the pair of self and dharmas."91 Even though92 it is said to exist, in reality it is utterly devoid of substance and only exists as a delusive fabrication. Thus, we can say that this emptiness is the emptiness of existence. When we talk about marvelous emptiness, it is called the lack of essence in characteristics. Therefore, the Forest of Meanings also says, "The fabricated is nonexistent; know that self and dharmas are both dispelled."93 Hence this is the Middle Way. B. The Middle Way of the Other-Dependent

Question: Can other-dependent ephemeral dharmas be regarded as exclusive existence? Response: Since you have already called them ephemeral, how could they be exclusive existence? Since the phenomena that are produced by causes and conditions lack their own substantiality they are said to be empty. Since ephemeral appearances are there they are said to be existent. Since it is definitely an existence that does not get stuck in existence it is called the otherdependent nature; since it is definitely a nonexistence that does not get stuck in nonexistence it is called the lack of substantiality in the arising of phenomena. Hence it is also the Middle Way. C. The Middle Way of the Perfectly Real

Question: Is the principle of the perfectly real nature regarded as exclusively existent?

Response: Since we have already called it the principle without appearances, how could it be exclusively existent? The selflessness of dharmas is 137

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free from all obstructions—it is like space. All delusive conceptualization is definitely separated from it; therefore, it is said to be empty. This principle of emptiness is real and always thus, therefore it is said to exist. We can thus say that this existence is the existence of emptiness. Therefore, it is called the perfectly real nature. Thus, we can say that this emptiness is the emptiness of existence. Therefore, it is called the ultimate meaning of lack of substance. Hence it is also the Middle Way.

D. Two Kinds of Emptiness and Existence in Each of the Three Natures Question: Is the extreme of deluded existence that is fabricated exclusive existence? Is the extreme of nonexistence in principle exclusive nonexistence? Response: This is also incorrect. What is referred to as deluded existence is already not really existent. Whether through appearances of reification or the appearances of annihilation, exclusively deludedly conceptualized existence has no set appearances. Hence it is also the Middle Way. The two appearances of this reified existence and annihilated emptiness are both unobtainable, and this is called nonexistence in principle. How could it be exclusive emptiness? Hence it is also the Middle Way.

Question: Is other-dependent nominal existence entirely existent? And is this real nonexistence entirely nonexistent?

Response: Both of these propositions are wrong. Reification and annihilation are both free from existence, thus it is called nominal existence. How could it be exclusive existence? Hence it is the Middle Way. Reification and annihilation are both empty and nonexistent; this is called real nonexistence. How could it be exclusive nonexistence? Hence it is the Middle Way. Question: Is the perfectly real emptiness without appearances exclusive emptiness? And is the existence of the real exclusive existence? Response: These propositions are also both wrong. Reification and annihilation are both nonexistent, and this is called no-appearances. How could it be exclusive emptiness? The principle being real is called real existence. How could it be exclusive existence? Hence it is also the Middle Way. However, within the fabricated nature there is deluded existence, which is nonexistent in principle; therefore, it is generally called the Middle Way. Neither of these two approaches gets stuck in an extreme interpretation. 138

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Within the nature of the other-dependent there is nominal existence, which is really nonexistent; therefore, it is generally called the Middle Way. Within the nature of the perfectly real there is reality without appearances; therefore, it is generally called the Middle Way. Neither of the former and latter two approaches gets stuck in an extreme interpretation.

3. Various Connotations

of the Middle Way

Question: Do fabricated deluded existence, other-dependent nominal existence, and perfectly accomplished real existence have entirely distinct meanings? And do the fabricated nonexistence in principle, the other-dependent real nonexistence, and the perfectly real nonappearance also have entirely distinct meanings?

Response: These are also wrong. Fabricated deluded existence is originally represented on the surface of the other-dependent nominal existence. How could the essence of the dharmas be originally utterly nonexistent? In reference to what would delusion arise and fabricate? Even though it is not real existence it is nonetheless nominally real existence. Therefore, false imagination mistakes this nominal existence and represents it as delusive imagination. How could the nominal existence of the other-dependent be distinguished from delusive imagination? Yet they are not simply identical. Thus, we can say that they are neither identical nor different.

This nominal existence originally arises from perfectly real reality. If there were no substantial principle, how could phenomena arise? Even though there are not numerous phenomena there are separate dharma essences. Therefore, when causes and conditions merge, ephemeral phenomena take form. Yet these are not simply identical. Thus, we can say they are neither identical nor different.

How is it that the fabricated that is nonexistent in principle relies on the other-dependent that is really nonexistent? As for the lack of intrinsic nature in dharmas produced by causes and conditions, the intrinsic nature that is denied is an independently arisen nature, i.e., a real self and real dharmas. Yet this nonexistence in principle completely denies appearances, whereas real nonexistence means nonexistence of substance. We can thus say that they are not completely identical, nor are they entirely different. 139

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This meaning of the other-dependent that is really nonexistent depends on the meaning of perfectly real without appearances. Substantial reality is always free from all appearances. This is because it is a principle that has no intrinsic nature. Yet the former falls under the real nonexistence of nominal existence, while the latter falls under the lack of appearances in reality. Therefore, these are neither exclusively identical nor exclusively distinct. These three natures are not different in essence, yet they are also not identical. When they are identical, fabricated emptiness is identical with the emptiness of the other-dependent and the perfectly real. The existence of the otherdependent and the perfectly real is identical with fabricated existence. When they are different, the latter and the former are also different. Principle and phenomena are in the same way, neither identical nor different. If you try to say that they are identical, then characteristics and nature can be bifurcated and mapped to form and emptiness. If you try to distinguish them, then the real and the conventional end up melting together, like ice and water. The countless distinct appearances among phenomena being neither the same nor different are just like this. The unbounded approach of inner realization of the principle being neither identical nor distinct is just like this. Therefore, the Cheng weishi lun says:

This is based on the conventional truth. If it were based on the ultimate truth then the mind and mental functions would be neither distinct nor identical. The interrelationship among the consciousnesses should also be understood in this way. This is called the Great Vehicle's marvelous principle of the real and the conventional.94

It also says:

As is explained above, the distinction in the characteristics of the consciousnesses is based on the principle of the conventional truth, not on the ultimate truth. This is because in the ultimate truth, thought and language are cut off.95 [The Cheng weishi lun] also says:

The distinctive natures of the eight consciousnesses cannot be said to be the same, because of their differences in modes of activity, objective supports, and concomitants, and also because when one ceases the rest do 140

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not necessarily cease, and because they are different in terms of being perfumers of seeds or perfumed by seeds. On the other hand, they are not different, because the [Laṅkâvatāra-]sūtra says that the eight consciousnesses are undifferentiated, like water and waves. If they were different they must not be of the nature of cause and effect [for each other], and because, like illusory things, etc., they are devoid of definite natures [such as identical or different].96

The Essay on Consciousness-only says, "Yet each dharma has its own principle, which is separately identified within each and cannot be said to be shared."97 "Yet in the essence there are no shared characteristics, and the myriad phenomena are not distinguished from each other. Since the principle is one and not two, we can also say that they have shared characteristics."98 [Ryōhen: And so forth.]

This being the case, the relationship between individual phenomena is that of being neither identical nor distinct; the relationship between individual principles is that of being neither identical nor distinct; the relationship between principle and phenomena is that of being neither identical nor distinct. Yet in the case of nonidentity/nondistinction among individual phenomena, nonidentity is primary. This is because the characteristics of phenomena are numerous. In the case of nonidentity/nondistinction between individual principles, nondistinction is primary. This is because the reality-principle is of a single flavor. In the case of nonidentity/nondistinction between principle and phenomena, the two aspects are equal in primacy. In the mutual dependency of characteristics and nature, identity and distinction all follow this same pattern. 4. Detailed Discussion of There

Being neither Identity nor

Distinction among Phenomena

Question: In the case of nonidentity and nondistinction between individual phenomena, why is there nonidentity and why is there nondistinction—and why is nonidentity regarded as primary?

Response: Causally produced dharmas must always be different from each other because (1) causes and conditions differ, (2) their appearances are numerous, and (3) there are myriad distinctions in substance and phenomena. Therefore, nonidentity is primary. However, since they are essentially 80b

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ephemeral—like an illusion, like a dream—and since they serve as cause and effect for each other, there is no definite and real distinction. How could there be a definitive distinction? Therefore, even though they are not identical they are also not distinct. The above-cited text that explains how the eight consciousnesses are neither the same nor different clarifies this point. Let us present an example to clarify this. The various nominal things of the mundane world have innumerable, unbounded distinctions in their characteristics. Take, for example, houses, portals, walls, pavilions, and so forth— phenomena that never have set characteristics. It is possible to tear down a house and use the materials to build a portal, and it is possible to tear down a portal and use the materials to build a wall. Following this reasoning we know that none of these phenomena are determined. The essence of things is like this. Before things have been broken down, their various characteristics are not determined and individual phenomena merge together. This point is certain, without doubt. Yet a house is a house and not a door, etc. A door is a door, and not a house, etc. The characteristics of each phenomenon are distinct and not confused. Since they have no determined characteristics, how could everything be mixed up?

Therefore, even though they are ephemeral, in its ephemerality each thing is distinguished by its characteristics. Even though they lack set characteristics, who rejects the nonexistent characteristics of existence? Hence these can be called the determined characteristics that lack determined characteristics. This being the case, the power produced by causes and conditions cannot disappear. Since the alternating movement of cause and effect continues without anomalies, as long as their causes and conditions are not exhausted various shapes and characteristics are all able to be retained. Yet although they are retained like this, since their intrinsic nature has no set characteristics the fact of their transmutability is also certain.

Conditioned phenomena should also be understood in the same way. Material dharmas, mental dharmas, the consciousnesses, mental functions, five faculties, five objects, three realms, six destinies, the causal stage, the stage of buddhahood—all are the same in type. Since innumerable distinctions are all without exception produced from their own distinct causes and conditions they have no set characteristics. Since they have no set characteristics they are all transmutable. How could they not change into each other? 142

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Yet, since the phenomena formed from causes and conditions are not empty, the inexhaustibly various characteristics of dependently arisen phenomena are sharply distinguished from each other—this and that are not confused in the slightest. Therefore, in the nonidentity and nondistinction among individual phenomena, the aspect of nonidentity is primary. 5. Detailed Discussion of

Nonidentity and Nondistinction

among Principles

Question: Given that separate principles are neither identical nor distinct, why are they not identical? Why are they not distinct? And why is non distinction regarded as being their more prominent aspect? If real principles were to have set distinctions, they would have to be conditioned. The numerous dharmas in their essential natures must await their causes and conditions. If they are produced from causes and conditions it means they are conditioned. This means that if they have different characteristics, then these are characteristics of phenomena. How could they be called dharma-natures? If underlying principles were determined to be the same, there should be no distinctions in nature. If there are no distinctions in nature, how can they be called "various dharma-natures"? Moreover, if they only have a single characteristic, it should be a characteristic of phenomena. How could it be called a "dharma-nature"? Therefore, underlying principles are neither identical nor different. Still, if we were forced to describe it from a doctrinal standpoint, then the "single flavor" would be their prominent aspect. Why so? Because within markless dharmas there are no distinct characteristics. Thus, even though there is a principle of form, given that principle has no material obstruction how would it differ from the nature of mind? Even though there is a principle of mind, given that principle has no cognition how would it differ from the nature of form? The case of the principles of the five faculties, five sense objects, consciousnesses, mental functions, and other dharmas can be understood in this way. Therefore, myriad differences are all conditioned characteristics. Everything that is not an underlying nature has difference. Therefore, that which is within the holy teaching is called "equality in nature," and is also called "immateriality." 143

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These are the numberless myriad distinctions among the characteristics of phenomena. The underlying principle is of a single flavor; it is not born and does not perish; it is neither the same nor different; it is neither form nor mind, neither internal nor external, because it is without distinctions. Therefore, the natures of the three categories,99 Four Noble Truths, and so forth, and the principles of the three realms, five destinies, three vehicles, and so forth all interpenetrate each other; there is no gap between this and that. Yet this single principle is the underlying nature of individual characteristics of phenomena. The nature of form is stable and thus can serve as the principle for obstruction. The nature of mind is stable and can serve as the principle for cognition. All the rest of the individual cases are like this. The aspect of nonidentity follows from the characteristics of phenomena, but if we analyze it in detail, difference is not the most important aspect of its nature. If we directly discuss the essential point of principle, that is its character of being like a single flavor, and then it is neither identical nor distinct. Although it is difficult to conjecture about, if we are forced to characterize it, nondistinction is its most prominent aspect.

Question: If this is the case, then is the principle of the realms of hell identical with the principle of the buddha realm? And is the principle of the buddha realm identical with the principle of the hells? And would this be the case for all of the realms, from those of the hungry ghosts and animals up to the realm of direct disciples (śrāvakas) and so forth? Response: The mutual inclusion of the ten realms is a doctrine of another school!100 In our school there are two ways one might explain this. When we discuss the ten realms from the standpoint of conditioned phenomena, the traditional position is that they are not mutually inclusive. Why? Rebirth in a hell is a circumstantial and direct reward of extreme suffering in body and mind. If we discuss its underlying nature, it is called posited thusness.101 The buddha realm is a circumstantial and direct reward of an extremely wholesome subtle body. If we discuss its real nature, it is called thusness of correct practices.102 The principle of the natures of the former and the latter are clearly distinguished without confusion. This is because the nature of each dharma is witnessed individually. If we speak directly from the perspective of the essence of the principle, they are equal without distinctions—there is no gap between them.

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The interpretation of mutual inclusion should also be applied. Posited thusness and the thusness of correct practice are both the same thusness, as they are the principle of dharma-nature. Therefore, the Commentary on the Cheng weishi lun says, "Abandoning discursive interpretations and discussing the essence is precisely the single thusness."103 How much more so with the characteristics of phenomena and indeterminate characteristics? Even though nonidentity is primary, there is also an aspect of nondistinctness. How could each individual real principle have set differences? If from this perspective we understand that the characteristics of phenomena all interpenetrate and contain each other, then we need not be troubled.

6. Detailed Discussion of Nonidentity

and Nondistinction between

Principles and Phenomena

Question: When there is neither identity nor distinction between principle and phenomena, why isn't there identity, and why isn't there distinction? And how is it that the two approaches are equalized?

Response: The Cheng weishi lun says:

If the [other-dependent nature and perfectly real nature] were different, thusness would not be the real nature of that [dependent on others]; if they were nondifferent, this [perfectly real] nature would be impermanent. Both [natures] would be both pure and impure realms, and then the functions of original cognition and subsequently acquired cognition would not be different.104

This is like the discussion seen in our founding sutra, the Saṃdhinirmocana, where Suviśuddhimati Bodhisattva ascends to the stages of resolute practice and a number of minor bodhisattvas get stuck in debate over principle and phenomena and sameness and difference.105

Some argue that principle and phenomena are entirely identical with each other; some say that they are entirely distinct from each other. Some are indecisive and unable to reach a conclusion. Enmeshed in these various disagreements they pose the question to the Tathāgata. The Tathāgata answers them telling them that they have fallen into the two extremes of exclusive identity and exclusive distinction. From here, the Buddha refutes various objections 81a

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and severely rebukes them, saying, "[You people are] stupid, dull, dim, and clumsy, and do not practice according to reality."106 This text is lengthy and complicated but it is worth a look. The Cheng weishi lun and so forth pick up from this argument.

The gist of the matter is like this: If phenomena and principle are entirely distinct, thusness should not be the true nature of all dharmas, since "nature" is the ultimate reality of dharmas. If phenomena and principle are entirely identical, thusness should not be the constant thusness of reality, since that which comes forth according to conditions should arise and cease. The rest of these objections are resolved as explained in the complicated discourse of the text, so we will not deal with them here. These principles are all definitely like this, so the relationship between phenomena and principle is that of being neither identical nor distinct. The two approaches being equal, there are no further differences. Whether you say that sameness is primary or that difference is primary, neither is tenable. This is because there is no means whatsoever to do so.

7. Detailed Explanation

of Identity

Question: Phenomena have characteristics, principles do not have characteristics. Phenomena arise and cease, principles abide eternally. Phenomena are multifarious, principles are equal. Since they are not the same, it is truly problematic to lump them together; i.e., they should be completely distinguished. How can they have an aspect of identity? Response: If phenomena were substantial then this objection might be justified. Since phenomena are ephemeral, however, how can you come to this doubt? Since on one hand they are created based on external forces and don't have their own nature, even though they seem to have characteristics these are not real characteristics. Even though they seem to arise and cease, they don't really arise and cease. Even though they seem to be manifold, they are not really manifold. All are like objects in a dream, inconceivable. Therefore, phenomena are actually not different from markless reality. In this the one and the other merge and are mutually identical. Question: If this is so, they should be entirely identical. How could they have an aspect of distinction?

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Response: This point has already been clarified. Why do you bother us with this question? Even though there are no real characteristics there are also no ephemeral characteristics. Even though there is no real arising and ceasing there is also no ephemeral arising and ceasing. Even through there are no real distinctions there are also no ephemeral distinctions. Since the real principle is not like this, there is also the aspect of nonidentity. Question: This point is difficult to grasp, can you give us an example? Response: The surface of the water is calm, without any highs or lows; it has no features. When the wind and other conditions come waves suddenly rise up. Their energy is sometimes high and sometimes low; sometimes they look like flowers, sometimes they look like patterned silk. These characteristics of phenomena arise when conditions arrive; when the conditions disappear, they cease. The water, as substance, does not arise for the first time contingent upon the arrival of conditions, and it does not lose its energy when conditions are exhausted. [Ryōhen: In this case, water is contrasted to the waves as not arising and ceasing.] Therefore, we take the water as a metaphor for the originally existent eternally abiding. How could it be entirely identical to the waves? Yet the waves are entirely water, and outside of the water what else could serve as their substance? When we look at it like this, they are indeed truly nondistinct. In this case, those characteristics exist nominally but are actually nonexistent. Even though there seem to be characteristics, there are no real characteristics. Even though they seem to arise and cease, they do not really arise and cease. Even though they seem to be manifold, they are not really manifold. This is because illusory conditioned arising is difficult to fathom. If the waves were real, they would be distinguished from the water. Since the waves are ephemeral, they merge with the water, being neither identical nor different. In the same way, the phenomena and principles of all dharmas are neither identical nor different. Can you understand the point through this simile? Question: This is a simile that supports the interpretation of mutual identity. Water and waves are entirely of a single essence, with no aspect of distinction whatsoever. Therefore, the characteristics of the wave that is produced based on the conditions of the wind and so forth actually have no essence. Nonetheless, these highs and lows on the surface of the water resemble the appearance of flowers and so forth. Even though they resemble them, these appearances actually do not exist. If you take this as the metaphor, then it should be the 147

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case for all dharmas that there are no separate dharmas outside of the real principle and that the characteristics of all conditioned phenomena are all delusions in regard to manifest objects. What is the point of using this as an example?

Response: Your objection is absurd. The connotations of nonidentity have been fully clarified above. If you object to the above, then are you totally rejecting the premise that the waves arise and cease? Or are you entirely rejecting the premise that the aspect of water is eternally abiding? If you reject both, then you are being obtuse. If you accept both, then the connotations of identity are automatically proved. Appearances are ephemeral yet are not utterly nonexistent. If you insist on holding to the objection you are probably mistaking ephemeral dharmas as nonexistent dharmas. Ephemeral dharmas and nonexistent dharmas have different meanings, which we should not mix up. Ephemeral includes the meanings of both existent and nonexistent. Nonexistent means utterly nonexistent without any aspect of existence. The waves are ephemeral and not nonexistent. If they were utterly nonexistent, how could they appear when the appropriate conditions arrive, and how could their features vanish when their conditions are exhausted? If you admit that they are ephemeral, how can you object to the answer given above? Therefore, this simile is valid as an example of nonidentity and nondistinction. If you raise this sort of objection, it means that you are entirely rejecting phenomenal appearances. If phenomenal appearances are nonexistent, the real principle is nonexistent. The real principle is not the only reality, since there must be conventional reality. If you reject both the real and the conventional, this is a severely wrong view. If you still say phenomena do not exist but principle exists, this interpretation is certainly untenable. If you say that you do not reject phenomena because they reside in the presence of illusion or, similarly, that in the presence of awakening they are nonexistent, how can you acknowledge [the existence of] phenomena? The assertion "existent in delusion, but nonexistent in principle" is based on the rejection of dharma essences. If, based on this, you accept phenomena in the presence of awakening, this is wholly identity, and one's case collapses on its own. This is because the principle of nonarising and ephemeral arising and ceasing are definitely distinguished from one another and are not simply one thing. 148

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If you say that they are identical because they are ephemeral, or that you object to their definitely being identical because they are ephemeral, then this is the connotation of neither identical nor distinct. How could this be a position of exclusive mutual identity? If, based on this, you say "I accept the position of neither identical nor distinct," the doctrinal position of the Dharma-character school is automatically validated. The natures and characteristics of the hundred dharmas, the as-it-is-ness of things, the five predispositions—all of these lie within the ephemeral characteristics of phenomena of the single aspect of nonidentity. That is to say, in the presence of illusory persons and dharmas, they are the reason that things are not one but are instead distinguished. If you further say that even though phenomenal characteristics in the presence of awakening are phenomenal characteristics, since dharma essences abide permanently without arising and without ceasing, they are therefore mutually identical, then are these phenomenal characteristics produced by causes and conditions or not produced by causes and conditions? If they are produced by causes and conditions, why do they neither arise nor cease? To [say that they] arise from conditions but do not cease is illogical. If they are not produced by causes and conditions, they are not the phenomena under discussion here. What is being discussed here is the interpretation of sameness and difference in regard to dependently arisen phenomena. How much more so in the case of phenomena having characteristics or not having characteristics? If they have characteristics they must be produced by causes and conditions. [To say that they are] independently existent without cause is illogical, and taking just-so as cause is also wrong causation.

If they have no characteristics, then this is the principle of thusness. How can you discuss the characteristics of phenomena and the eternal abiding of dharma essences with the aim of proving the doctrine of the mutual identity of phenomena and principle? If you furthermore say that thusness is called phenomena because it is a dharma essence, eternally abiding phenomena are precisely what are called the characteristics of this phenomena, and since they are the characteristics of real characteristics, this is the profound principle. This is also not what we are discussing here. What we are discussing here is in the context of dependent arising.

If you further say that "phenomena produced by causes and conditions are the characteristics of the underlying principle, and therefore phenomena 82a

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are identical with principle and neither arise nor cease, then outside of this how could there be a separate underlying principle?", then we have returned to the previous problem. This is because the proposition that dependently arisen phenomena do not arise and cease is untenable. If you say that arising and ceasing are merely the ephemeral appearances of arising and ceasing, and therefore they are included in the nonarising and ceasing of the real principle, then this is equivalent to the doctrine of nondistinction taught in our school's teaching of neither identity nor distinction. Why go to so much trouble to concoct another doctrine? In general, the detailed articulation of the doctrine of the three kinds of natures is clearly explained in the "General Outline" chapter's discussion of doctrinal classification and so forth. I recommend that you take a look at that. 150

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[Ryōhen: The lack of nature in characteristics applies to the fabricated nature; the lack of nature in arising applies to the other-dependent nature; the lack of nature in ultimate reality applies to the perfectly real nature. This is the gist.] Question: Among the three non-natures, what do the latter two have as their substance? If they have the fabricated as their substance, then why would the non-nature of characteristics need to be separately distinguished? If they have the other-dependent and perfectly real as their essence, how can the other-dependent and the perfectly real not have their own natures? Regarding the essence of the latter two natures, there are two traditions coming down from the prior scholars. If we follow the opinion of the scholars of the Southern Temple,107 the fabricated is the essence of all three non-natures. If we follow the opinions of Rector Gomyō of the Southern Temple and the members of the Northern Temple,108 the latter two non-natures have as their essence the other-dependent and the perfectly real, respectively. If, for the time being, we base ourselves on the opinion of the latter transmission, the two natures of other-dependent and perfectly real are the existence of the Middle Way and therefore, even if we say they exist, it is not exclusive existence. Since it is not exclusive existence, it has to carry with it the meaning of emptiness. Apprehending this connotation of emptiness is called "non-nature." This connotation of emptiness implies that the other-dependent does not exist independently. The perfectly real nature is free from all characteristics. This ephemeral emptiness, as well as the emptiness of empty nature, are the meanings imposed on the primordial and original essences of dharmas. Here this meaning is appropriated and called "non-nature."

Since it has this kind of meaning, although it is not that nature is entirely nonexistent, in order to remove mistaken attachment it is nominally designated as "non-nature." Therefore, in regard to the latter two non-natures, the Cheng weishi lun includes both explanations: (1) nominally designated non-nature 151

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and (2) that nature is not is utterly nonexistent. As for the explanation of it not being the case that nature is utterly nonexistent, since it is the Middle Way of dharma essences, even though we call it existence we should not get stuck in existence. Even if we do not get stuck in existence it is also not utterly nonexistent. This is a partial meaning of nonexistence. We generally explain nonnature utilizing this partial meaning. [This is the gist.] Therefore, the three non-natures take the three kinds of natures respectively as their essence. The respective metaphors of sky-flowers, apparitions, and vast space are applied based on this. If all of these had the fabricated as their essence, then the only metaphor that would be needed would be that of the sky-flowers. What need would there be for three metaphors? When the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra discusses these three types, its profound teaching says "all dharmas lack their own nature," but it does not explain these three kinds of non-nature. Therefore, the Prajñāpāramitā period of the teaching is called the period of the "general teaching of the three kinds of natures."109

Question: Why is the meaning of emptiness in the two natures of otherdependent and perfectly real the same as that of the emptiness of the fabricated nature? The lack of independent existence of the other-dependent nature is because the independent existence that is rejected is fabricated independent existence. The markless emptiness of the perfectly real nature is because the characteristics that are rejected are the various characteristics of the fabricated. In this case, the proper explanation of the emptiness of the latter two nonnatures are all made in reference to the fabricated. Why do you reject the transmission that advocates emptiness of the fabricated (the Southern Temple transmission)? As for those who reject this and prize the emptiness of essence (the Northern Temple transmission, plus Gomyō), they don't pay attention to the dharmas that they take as empty. If you say directly that the essences of the other-dependent and the perfectly real are empty, then what part is the empty part, and what part is the nonempty part? It is because of fabricated delusive concepts that there is a way to empty them, and it is because the other-dependent and the perfectly real are not delusory that there is a way for them to be present. Within the nondelusory, through what means could there be an empty part? If all are not excluded then we end up, on the other hand, with the emptiness of the fabricated. If all are excluded then one falls into the [mistaken] view of emptiness. If you 152

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consider both positions fully, neither one is as good as that of the emptiness of the fabricated.

Response: This doctrine is extremely subtle, and thus it is easy to unearth points of contention. It can only be understood after serious reflection. For the time being, this is guidance for beginners, so let's stick with the doctrine that says the dharmas without fabrication are the other-dependent and the perfectly real. Therefore, these dharmas are called "non-natures." The term "nonexistence" is already made to cover dharma essences—therefore the term "emptiness of dharmas." Yet since they are not completely nonexistent they are nominally designated as "non-natures."

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of the Two Truths

Question: The scope of Buddhist teachings is inexhaustible. What kind of doctrine do you regard as the approach of the ultimate truth? Response: The tenets of our school are posited in the form of four levels of each of the two truths: i.e., the conventional truth has four levels, as does the ultimate truth. The four levels of conventional truth are: (1) the mundane conventional truth, which refers to composite designations such as jars, clothes, armies, and forests; (2) the conventional truth based on real principles, referring to the three categories of the aggregates, sense bases, and elements; (3) the actualized conventional truth, referring to the truth of suffering and the rest of the Four Truths; (4) ultimate conventional truth, referring to the thusness of the two kinds of emptiness.

The four levels of ultimate truth are patterned after the four levels of conventional truth, in the same order. Thus, (1) in the pattern of the first conventional truth, there are four kinds of ultimate truth. These are the three categories [of real principles], the Four Truths, the two kinds of emptiness, and the single reality. (2) Patterned after the second conventional truth, there are established three levels of truth: the Four Truths, the two kinds of emptiness, and the single reality. (3) Patterned after the third conventional truth, there are established two levels of truth: the two kinds of emptiness and the single reality. (4) Patterned after the fourth conventional truth, there is one level of truth: the one true realm of reality. In this method of discarding then positing, the three vehicles are clarified together.

There is a special definition of the two truths that applies only for bodhisattvas. In this case, the first conventional truth is belief in a real self and real dharmas. The second conventional truth includes the ten approaches for contemplating reality, including contemplation of the five aggregates, the Four Truths and so forth. The third conventional truth includes consciousness-only 155

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principles such as the three kinds of natures and three non-natures. The fourth conventional truth includes the thusness of the two kinds of emptiness. Here, the latter three items are the same as the first three in the ultimate truth. In the fourth level of ultimate truth, the two kinds of emptiness give way to the single realm of reality, which is the nondiscursive approach to apprehending reality. The format for positing the four levels of ultimate truth within the first conventional truth is as explained above.

Taken in a broad sense, the real is not the only reality; there has to be conventional reality. The conventional is not simply conventional; there has to be a real conventional. This is what it means to say that real and conventional give form to each other.110 Therefore, within mundane phenomena there must be a real principle, and within real principles there must be mundane phenomena. If you miss one, you will definitely lose sight of the other. If you miss both, then this is the grave wrong view of annihilationism. Without mundane phenomena you cannot have real principles. Without real principles you cannot have mundane phenomena. This is a certainty.

At the point when accurate cognition apprehends thusness, myriad conditioned phenomena stay just as they are, without loss. This accurate cognition that apprehends objects is merely one dharma among the myriad phenomena. The real principle that is cognized is the intrinsic nature of the apprehending cognition. "Accurate cognition" is categorized as the name of one of the dharmas concomitant with mind. More precisely speaking, each consciousness functions concurrently with twenty-two mental factors. At that time each one witnesses the underlying equality of its own essence. The body-as-basis and so forth are things that the eighth consciousness has incarnated for a long time. The seventh and eighth consciousnesses and so forth remain just as they are. The numberless phenomenal characteristics of all sentient beings, limitless buddhas, as well as countless circumstantial and direct rewards, should also be understood in the same way. The equal underlying nature of these minds and buddhas and sentient beings are precisely the objects apprehended by accurate cognition. If these myriad distinctions, manifold characteristics of phenomena did not exist, whose reality-principle would this reality-principle be? Therefore, it is only when the conventional truth is posited that the real truth can be accomplished. And once the real truth is established, the conventional truth is accomplished. Based on this kind of framework we can 156

X. The Mutual Dependence of the Two Truths

discuss the dharma characteristics and we can know the dharma-nature. If we cannot discuss dharma characteristics, there is no basis for knowing the dharma-nature.

These four levels of the two truths can be seen as presenting four kinds of contrasts.

The first is the contrast between existence and nonexistence. Since the first conventional truth is that of the fabricated, its essential nature is utterly nonexistent. Since the remainder of the four levels are not the fabricated, their essential nature is not nonexistent.

The second is the contrast between phenomena and principle. The dharmas existing as the previously mentioned "existence" are those of superficial characteristics such as the five aggregates, and therefore they are called phenomena. Dharmas such as the three kinds of natures are deep and underlying, therefore they are called principle.

The third is the contrast between shallow and deep. Among the dharmas such as the three kinds of natures that are part of the above-mentioned principle, there are distinctive aspects, and these are called "shallow." The thusness of the two kinds of emptiness and so forth are the principle of a single flavor, and these are called "deep."111

The fourth is the contrast between the discursive and the nondiscursive. Even though the thusness of the two kinds of emptiness that are part of the prior "deep" are hypothesized based on the approach of emptiness, they are called "discursive." The single realm of reality completely transcends the discursive approach, therefore it is called "nondiscursive." These four levels include numberless myriads of different doctrinal approaches.112 The four conventional truths and the single ultimate truth are explained in the Foundational Treatise.113 The four levels of ultimate truth are only elucidated in the Cheng weishi lun.114 The complete discussion is contained in the chapter on the "Forest of the Meanings of the Two Truths."115

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