Skill in Questions: How the Buddha Taught

Cross-questioning: I

The Buddha cited cross-questioning

(pa˛ipucch›) as a distinctive feature of his general teaching method [§73], noting that it’s an effective means for clarifying obscure points and resolving doubts. In this way it helps realize one of the rewards of listening to the Dhamma [§8]: clarifying what is not yet clear. By observing the Buddha’s use of this particular strategy in action, we can see why this is so.

To begin with, an interpersonal dynamic in which the teacher is open to cross-questioning from the student, and the student from the teacher, provides an atmosphere conducive for establishing that the topics under discussion are reasonable and responsive to the listeners’ needs. Even though the Buddha, in opening himself to

questions, was also

opening

himself to

arguments and

debates, he saw that if the student was intent on learning, even a contentious exchange could lead to a positive result. At times he would be willing to debate an insincere opponent if those listening to the debate were intent on learning the truth [§126], for he saw that the cross-questioning within the debate would clarify the truth in their minds.

In fact, it’s possible to regard cross-questioning as the most inter-subjective mode

of

teaching. A

teacher

not

open

to

cross-questioning

is

guilty

of

objectifying himself and his audience. On the one hand, the way he presents his teaching

as

a finished product

stands

on

the

foundation

of

objectificationclassifications, “I am the thinker,” unwilling to open his thought to the probing of others. On the other hand, he is treating his listeners as objects, for he shows no concern for whether they will understand or benefit from the beauty or logic of

his

thought. However, a teacher

who

welcomes

cross-questioning

is

concerned less with his status as a teacher and more with communicating something clear and useful. In honoring his listeners’ freedom to question, he opens the discussion to their subjective experience of doubt and their desire for knowledge. Thus

a sincere

exchange

of

questions—particularly

around the

primary common-ground problem of subjective experience, how to gain release from suffering and stress—is the pedagogical equivalent of thought prior to objectification. The Buddha rejected objectification not only as a style of thinking but also as a style of teaching: another way in which his teaching style was an expression of his compassion.

Furthermore, as a compassionate and responsible teacher, the Buddha was not content simply to give the right answer to a question. He also wanted to ensure that his listeners understood the answer and had the right mental context for putting it to use. Thus his most distinctive form of cross-questioning was to cite activities familiar to them and—from his own experience—similar to the context in which the teaching was to be used. Then he would cross-question them about those activities to ensure that they too saw the parallel in a way that would help them understand and apply the teaching effectively.

At the same time, by showing his listeners how cross-questioning was done, he was giving them an example of how to pursue the process of clarification within their own minds. Having seen the value of self cross-examination—an internal form of cross-questioning—in his own search for awakening, he wanted to expose his listeners to the same process, showing them how it could be done skillfully, in hopes that they would subject themselves to the same process and receive similar results.

An important part of this lesson included knowing which types of crossquestioning to focus on, and which ones to put aside. Even though the Buddha was generally open to cross-questioning from his listeners, the fact that he was offering his teaching as a gift meant that he held the right to maintain firm control over what he would and wouldn’t give. This meant exercising control over

two

things: the

questions

he

would

and

wouldn’t

answer, and

the

questioners he would and wouldn’t respond to. As we will see in Chapters Seven and Eight, he would put aside any questions whose answer would harm himself or others, or would distract attention from the issue at hand: how to understand and put an end to suffering and stress. As we will see later in this chapter, he refused to submit to cross-questioning from listeners whose motives in crossquestioning were less than sincere. Thus, even though the Buddha taught by example that it was, in general, a good principle to be open to cross-questioning, he also taught by example that cross-questioning, in order to stay beneficial, had to stay focused within appropriate limits.

In Chapter One we noted the nine different situations to which the Canon applies

the

term

“cross-questioning.” Although

only

four

of

the

situations

involve cross-questioning as a response to a question, all nine are united by two common threads: A person should take responsibility for his or her actions or statements; and truth is to be found and clarified by a mutual willingness to cross-question and be cross-questioned. Thus, to understand what the Buddha intended when applying this strategy to questions addressed to him, it is useful to recapitulate all nine. They are:

1) A monk is accused of an offense that he denies committing. His fellow monks cross-question him to see if he can give a coherent and believable account of his behavior.

2) A monk, even after being reproved by his fellow monks, maintains a position in the Buddha’s presence that is clearly pernicious. After the Buddha ascertains that the monk will not abandon the pernicious view, he rebukes the monk and then turns to the other monks to cross-question them as to the relevant right view. This is to ensure that none of them pick up the first monk’s errant position.

3) The Buddha or one of his disciples makes a statement that a listener finds unclear. The listener asks him to explain what the statement means and how it fits in with his other statements.

4) A person asks a question unclear in its wording or underlying motive.

The Buddha cross-questions him to clarify the original question.

5) A person asks for a definition of a term without realizing that he has enough knowledge to provide at least part of the definition himself. The Buddha responds by cross-questioning the person in such a way that the person ends up contributing to the answer of his own question.

6)

Aperson

asks

a question

in

a way

indicating

that

he

may

not

understand the response the Buddha will give—either the content of the response or the strategy with which it is given. The Buddha then draws an example, usually an activity, familiar to the person and questions him on it.

From the person’s replies, the Buddha shows how the proper response to the original question can be understood in the same frame as the person’s understanding of the familiar activity.

7) A person presents an argument against the Buddha’s teaching. The Buddha cites a hypothetical example that disproves the person’s position and then questions him on it. From the person’s answers, the Buddha shows how the person has contradicted himself and so disproven his own argument.

8) The

Buddha encourages his listeners to

cross-question themselves

about their actions or traits present in their minds.

9) The Buddha cross-questions his listeners as to phenomena they are experiencing in the present moment.

The first of these situations is not, strictly speaking, a teaching situation, but the Buddha’s method for handling it throws light on the responsibilities assumed in cross-questioning in all contexts. Thus we will examine below how accusations are handled in the monastic Saºgha, to see what those responsibilities are. The remaining situations can be roughly divided into three categories: the student questions the teacher’s statement (situation three); the teacher questions the student’s statement or question (situations two, four, five, six, and seven); and the teacher encourages the student to question him/herself (situations eight and nine).

These last two situations are particularly effective in leading to awakening, and, as

we

will see, they

act

as

the

culmination

of

the

process

of

crossquestioning applied in other situations. Thus, to focus special attention on them, we will devote a separate chapter to them, following this one. Although in this chapter we will have occasion to mention these two situations, our primary focus here is on how the Buddha employs cross-questioning in the first seven.

1) Accusations.

When Monk A suspects Monk B of misbehavior and wants to bring up the issue with him, he first has to ask B’s permission to discuss the issue.

If B thinks that A is simply trying to create trouble with abusive or unprincipled cross-questioning, he is free to deny permission. However, he himself should be sure of his own motives in denying permission, for if A feels that B is hiding something, he can gain support from his fellow monks to have the issue brought up in the midst of the Saºgha. If they are convinced of A’s sincerity, they will pressure B to give leave for A to make his accusation. Then they will crossexamine B—the word for cross-examination, pa˛ipucch›, is the same as for crossquestioning—until they can reach a unanimous decision as to whether B is guilty as charged.

The monk bringing the accusation is directed to establish five qualities in himself while he speaks: compassion, seeking the other’s benefit, sympathy, removal of offenses, and esteem for the Vinaya (Cv.IX.5.5-6). The first four of these qualities mean that he is not to speak out of malice or the simple desire to shame the accused; the fourth and fifth mean that if he feels an offense has been committed, he is not to back off his accusation simply out of pity for the accused over the hardships the latter may have to undergo in the course of the crossexamination or the penalty for the offense. The fact that these two principles overlap at the fourth quality—seeking the removal of offenses—shows that compassion and strict adherence to rules are not incompatible principles. In fact, they are mutually reinforcing. If a monk is to succeed in his practice, he must be scrupulous in his behavior and take responsibility for his errors. Thus any skillful effort to get him to behave in a responsible manner is for his long-term benefit.

It’s important to note that these procedures and standards for handling a cross-examination contain a strong ethical element in being fair to the accused.

The fact that the latter may have acted unethically in committing an offense does not give his accusers the right to handle the cross-examination in an unfair or unethical way, for that would undercut their ability to arrive at the truth. The accused could later complain of their behavior, and that would call into question the truth of their verdict.

As for the accused monk, he is directed to establish two qualities in himself while being cross-examined: truth and unprovokability (Cv.IX.5.7). In other words, he is responsible for giving a true account of his actions and for not getting angered when asked probing questions or told that his word is in doubt.

Although the monk making the accusation is advised to be compassionate, examples

of

cross-examination

given

in

Cv.IV.14.29) show that

the

accused is to

aggressively until the Saºgha is convinced of his guilt or innocence, so that if there is an offense, it can be removed and the standards of the Vinaya upheld.

Thus the monk being cross-examined must remain patient and calm regardless of how his words are questioned.

These principles parallel those that can be observed in other forms of crossquestioning. Some of these parallels apply across the board, whereas others apply particularly in the context of an argument about the Dhamma. In all cases of cross-questioning, the person being questioned is not to take the questions as an insult, and so should remain unprovokable. He also has the responsibility of being truthful, even if the truthful answer undercuts his earlier position.

In the case of an argument about the Dhamma, the person to be questioned can opt out at the beginning of the argument if he feels that his opponent’s motives are suspect. As we will see in the section on arguments, the Buddha had high standards for the type of person he was willing to argue with, and would often refuse to speak with those who did not meet his standards. Although some of these standards were intellectual, others were ethical, focused on the person’s willingness to follow fair and truthful methods of argument. Like the process of cross-examining an accused monk, an argument could arrive convincingly at the truth only if both sides conducted it in a fair and ethical way. For this reason, the the

Vinaya (see, for

example,

be

pressed and questioned quite

Buddha would argue with a person only if he trusted two qualities in that person: the desire for truth and the ability to adhere to truthful, ethical modes of discussion. Thus when he did engage a person in an argument, it was a sign of respect.

And of compassion: Just as kindness and strict adherence to the Vinaya were seen as necessary and mutually reinforcing motivations for cross-examining an accused monk, kindness and strict adherence to the truth were seen as necessary and mutually reinforcing motivations for engaging in an argument about the Dhamma. The Buddha did not argue simply to score points or to disgrace his opponent, and he discouraged his disciples from engaging in debates simply for the

sake

of

coming

out

ahead. Instead, his

purpose

in

arguing

with

his

opponents was to establish them in right view so that they could embark on the path to the end of suffering. If at times—as in cross-examinations—this required being aggressive in demolishing his opponents’ arguments, that was a sign not of ill will but of the seriousness with which he regarded their error.

Thus the way the Buddha formulated the principles to be observed in a crossexamination following an accusation provides insight into the principles that underlie the practice of cross-questioning in general.

2) Establishing orthodoxy.

MN 22 [§71] and MN 38 [§72] contain the two cases in the Canon where the Buddha felt the need to cross-question an assembly of monks

about

his

teaching

pernicious form

of wrong

treatment of the errant monk might seem harsh, but he was acting out of compassion for the monks in the assembly, in case any of them might be swayed by the errant monk’s position. In other words, the Buddha apparently saw the errant monk as a lost cause—for having behaved unethically in continuing to misrepresent the Buddha’s teaching to the Buddha’s face—but he didn’t want this lost cause to cause further losses among the other monks. We have to remember that during the Buddha’s lifetime there were no written accounts of his teachings; the monks and nuns all had to rely on their memory of what they had heard directly

from him or through word-of-mouth from fellow members of the Saºgha. Thus the Buddha saw the need to establish orthodoxy whenever a member of the Saºgha was found espousing false interpretations of his teaching.

Here again, there is a parallel with the way the Buddha taught the monks to handle accusations. When a monk wants to bring up an accusation in a meeting of the Saºgha, he is first to ask permission to question a knowledgeable monk in detail about the rules touching on the suspected offense. This questioning serves a dual purpose. It alerts all the monks present to reflect on their own behavior, to see if they have committed any offenses against the rules being explained; if the monk about to be accused is actually guilty of such an offense, he has the opportunity to confess it before the accusation is made, thus saving the Saºgha from the burden of having to open an investigation. At the same time, the process of questioning the knowledgeable monk provides an opportunity for all the monks to refresh their knowledge of the rules in question, so that if an after

they

had heard an

errant

monk

assert

a

view in his presence. Here

again, the

Buddha’s

investigation is opened they are all in a position to make an informed decision on the case.

In the same way, the Buddha’s cross-questioning of the assembly of monks allows all the monks to refresh their knowledge of the point in question, and to examine their own views to see if they have misinterpreted what they have previously heard.

SN

22:85 [§193]

contains

a conversation

in

which

Ven. S›riputta crossquestions a monk, Ven. Yamaka, in whom another pernicious view has arisen:

that the Tath›gata does not exist after death. However, in that discourse, the cross-questioning is one-on-one, and it is successful. Ven. Yamaka not only abandons his pernicious view but is also able to gain the Dhamma-eye, the first stage of awakening, as a result of the conversation. Because the view deals with a question that should be put aside, this passage is discussed in Chapter Eight. It’s worth noting here, though, that Ven. S›riputta’s approach to the issue follows the standard pattern for accusations: He first brings up the issue with Yamaka in private. Only if Yamaka had proven recalcitrant would the issue have gone to the Buddha in the presence of the Saºgha.

3) Questioning the speaker.

Although the Buddha was a skilled rhetorician, he did not engage in rhetoric for rhetoric’s sake. In teaching a path of practice, he meant for his words to be put into practice. And in most cases, this required that their

meaning

be

clear, and

their

interrelationships

precisely

delineated.

Although the Buddha occasionally spoke in cryptic terms [§47; §123; see also SN 1:1; SN 1:20], his purpose in these instances was frequently to subdue the pride of his listener. If the technique worked, the listener would be ready to listen carefully to his teachings; if not, teaching the person would have been a waste of time in any event. At other times, he might make a cryptic statement to the monks and then enter his dwelling without explaining his words. In cases of this sort, his

intention

was

apparently

to

give

one

of

his

senior

disciples

the

opportunity to show the monks how they should analyze statements of this sort for themselves [§ 50; see also MN 138].

In general, though, the Buddha took pains to explain his terms clearly and to teach in a step-by-step manner so that his listeners could follow what he was saying and see how one step in the practice built on the previous ones. To make doubly sure that his listeners understood, and to show them that he sincerely wanted them to understand, he would invite them to ask questions then and there about what they found unclear [§75]. AN 2:46 [§73] and AN 6:51 [§74] state that this was a general practice not only when the Buddha spoke, but also when the monks discussed the Dhamma among themselves. In MN 94 [§76] and MN 146 [§77], two monks who are giving talks explicitly invite their listeners to question them about anything they, the listeners, don’t understand; in MN 94 the listener

actually

does

ask

a question. One

of

the

most

famous

instances,

however, in which a listener freely asks questions of a speaker is MN 84 [§100], when King Koravya asks Ven. Ra˛˛hap›la about the meaning of the Dhamma summaries that Ra˛˛hap›la had learned from the Buddha and that had inspired his ordination.

Although there were occasions—as in MN 140, Ud 1:10, and Ud 5:3—where the Buddha praised specific listeners for not “pestering” him with issues related to the Dhamma, these listeners were so wise that they had no need to ask questions and could attain noble attainments while listening to him speak. The fact that he later praised these listeners to the monks in these terms suggests that he may have wanted the monks to question him only about genuine problems.

But—as

we

noted

in

the

Introduction—the

Buddha nevertheless

took

the

principle of being

open to

cross-questioning so seriously that his next-to-last instruction to the monks before his passing away was to invite them to crossquestion him about any doubts they might have about the Buddha, Dhamma, Saºgha, the

path, or

the

practice

[§82]. To

underline

the

sincerity

of

the

invitation, he stated it three times, and then even gave the opportunity for any monks too shy to speak in front of the whole group to inform their friends of any questions they might have. In other words, even though he was on the verge of death, he did not consider the monks to be “pestering” him if their questions were based on serious doubts. Only after the monks remained silent did he address them with his final words.

In establishing the practice of being open to cross-questioning as a general principle, the Buddha was showing that people speaking the Dhamma should be held responsible

for

their

words. They

are

not to

engage

irresponsibly

in

attractive but vague generalities—“the works of poets, artful in sound, artful in rhetoric, the work of outsiders” [§73]. For, after all, even if such words may be pleasing, they serve no truly compassionate intent. Thus people speaking the Dhamma should be able to explain the meaning of everything they say [§197].

In MN 58 [§93] the Buddha makes the point that he did not spend his time formulating answers for anticipated questions. He knew the Dhamma so well that when asked a question, he could come up with an answer on the spot.

However, he also knew that his students might not have such familiarity with the

Dhamma and yet might be

asked difficult questions. So, as a way

of

preparing them for this eventuality, he—and Ven. S›riputta—would warn his students of potential questions they might be asked and of the answers they should give.

The Canon cites two examples in which the Buddha does this, and in both he is preparing his students for faultfinders. In MN 59 [§78], he prepares them for questioners who might spot what they think is an inconsistency in his teaching:

How can he describe unbinding as pleasant or happy (sukha) when it is devoid of feeling? His answer is that the word pleasure is not limited to feelings. In DN 29 [§79] he prepares them for a question directed at one of his claimed skills that, in the

eyes

of

some,

might

not

measure

up

to

the

skills

claimed

by

other

contemporary teachers. PÒra˚a Kassapa and Niga˚˛ha N›˛aputta, who taught two different forms of determinism, both claimed to have infinite knowledge of the cosmos, including knowledge of the past and future, which in their view was already predetermined [§156]. The Buddha, however, did not claim that the future was predetermined, and so his knowledge of the future was of a more specific sort. Followers of PÒra˚a Kassapa and Niga˚˛ha N›˛aputta might cast aspersions on what they could regard as the limited nature of this sort of knowledge, so here the Buddha clarifies what his knowledge of past and future actually are: His knowledge of the past is the ability to recollect any past event that he wants; his knowledge of the future is that this is his last birth; there is no further becoming. Regardless of how unlimited PÒra˚a Kassapa and Niga˚˛ha N›˛aputta might claim their knowledge of the future to be, they do not have this sort of knowledge of their own future at all.

In a similar passage, Ven. S›riputta prepares a group of monks for questions they might face concerning the Buddha’s teachings when they go to foreign lands [§80]. In this case, the questions he anticipates are not from faultfinders but from intelligent people with a sincere interest to know: “What does your teacher teach? Why does he teach that?” Ven. S›riputta’s answers to these questions are of special interest, for they demonstrate what he saw as the best way to frame an introduction to the Buddha’s teachings. In keeping with the fact that the Buddha taught a path, Ven. S›riputta begins his explanation not with a metaphysical proposition but with a recommended course of action: the subduing of passion and desire. After stating the benefits that come from this course of action, he then reverts to a more basic pragmatic principle about action as a whole: the desirability of abandoning unskillful qualities and developing skillful ones. The way Ven. S›riputta handles this question not only prepares the monks for questions they might face, but also shows them the best way to present the Dhamma to intelligent newcomers.

In this way, the Buddha and Ven. S›riputta prepare the monks for their responsibility of being open to questions as they spread the teaching.

However, it’s important to note that in establishing his openness to be questioned, the Buddha is also alerting his listeners that he expects them to be open to questioning as well. This principle applies in two contexts. The first context is contained in the handful of passages where the Buddha approaches sectarians of other schools and questions them about their teachings [§§83-84], or when a follower of those sectarians approaches the Buddha, and the Buddha asks him about what his teachers teach [§85]. In each of these cases, the sectarians espouse doctrines denying the efficacy of action, among them determinism. In response, the Buddha points out that their doctrines, when followed to their logical conclusion, make the idea of a holy life, a path of practice for true happiness, totally

meaningless. The

follower

is

swayed

by

the

Buddha’s

arguments, but there is no indication of whether the sectarians are.

Still, the passages in which the Buddha relates these encounters to his monk followers do serve other purposes. To begin with, the Buddha is showing the monks that they have the right to cross-question members of other sects quite aggressively. He also provides the monks with the tools needed specifically to refute

any

doctrine

denying

the

efficacy

of

action. This

underscores

the

importance of action as the focus of the Buddha’s categorical teachings. And it’s particularly important to note that these encounters establish the point that he did not teach a deterministic view of the workings of kamma, and that his teachings should not be confused with the various forms of determinism current in his day. The effort with which the Buddha emphasized this point—even to the extent of seeking out the determinists to dispute their teachings—calls attention to a fact that has long been misunderstood within the Buddhist tradition over the centuries and is still widely misunderstood to this day: The Buddha was not a determinist, and

his

teachings

on

kamma and

causality—to

be

correctly

understood—have to be interpreted in a non-deterministic way.

The other context in which the Buddha alerts his listeners that they have to be open to questioning is when they are asking him questions and he announces that he will cross-question them in turn. If they want answers from him, they first have to be willing to give him the answers he wants from them. This establishes the principle that the teaching and the learning of the Dhamma are a cooperative process. The more both sides are open to questioning, the more easily the Dhamma can be learned in a way that is conducive to practice.

With these observations in mind, we can now look at the four situations in which the Buddha cross-questions his questioners.

4) Clarifying the question.

In cases where a question or the motivation behind it is unclear, the Buddha would cross-question the person asking the question about the meaning of its terms or about his/her motivation for asking it. There are a number of ironies surrounding this type of cross-questioning. To begin with, the Commentary identifies it as the primary use of cross-questioning, whereas in the Canon it’s one of the rarest. Among the few examples of this type, two—in DN 9 [§88] and MN 90 [§86]—contain their own ironies.

In DN 9, Po˛˛hap›da the wanderer asks if self is the same as perception, and the Buddha responds first by asking Po˛˛hap›da to define what sort of self he is referring to. Po˛˛hap›da ends up offering three definitions, and in each case the Buddha shows that self is one thing and perception another. In other words, regardless of how the terms are defined, the answer is the same. Perhaps the Buddha wanted to emphasize this point by offering Po˛˛hap›da the chance to come up with as many different definitions as possible, only to see them all treated in the same way.

In MN 90, King Pasenadi asks the Buddha if there are devas. MN 100 [§87] suggests that this was a trick question in the Buddha’s time: If the person answering said Yes, he would be asked to prove his answer and yet be unable to do

so. If he said No, he would be denying

whereby

kings

were

called devas, and thus

disrespect for kings. In MN 100, the Buddha gives something of a trick answer to the trick question—recognizing the existence of the convention on the human plane, but not getting into the issue of whether there is a separate plane of earthly or heavenly devas—and the person asking the question is so impressed that he goes for refuge.

Given this background, it’s only natural that in MN 90, when King Pasenadi asks if there are devas, the Buddha first questions his motives for doing so. It turns out, however, that Pasenadi—whom the Canon frequently depicts as somewhat scatterbrained—has a totally

different question in mind and has

simply been sloppy about putting it into words.

Even from just these two examples, though, it’s possible to draw four lessons for when this sort of cross-questioning is useful: a) when forcing the questioner the contemporary

convention

could be

accused of

showing

to be more precise in defining his terms allows for a more precise answer to the question; b) when it allows for the rhetorical point of showing that, however a particular term is defined, the answer will be the same; c) when one senses a trick question and wants to avoid falling into a trap; and d) when one is dealing with questioners who have trouble articulating their thoughts.

5) Extracting definitions.

There are three cases where the Buddha, when asked the definition of a term, responds by cross-questioning the questioner in a way that allows the questioner to arrive at the definition based on knowledge he has already acquired: either through personal experience or from having heard the Buddha’s

teachings

[§89-90]. This, however, is

not

the

Buddha’s

preferred

strategy when asked for definitions—in the vast majority of cases he simply gives the definition as requested—and even in cases where he does use it, the process of cross-questioning yields only part of the definition requested. But it’s easy to see how this strategy can be effective when the questioner has enough background, for it not only yields the meaning of the term but also shows how the term relates to what the questioner already knows. This strategy is especially effective in §89, for the question relates to how the Dhamma is visible here & now, and so the Buddha’s way of responding drives home the point that the questioner has already seen an aspect of the Dhamma here & now.

However, the most interesting variation on this strategy is in AN 3:73 [§91], where Ven. finanda is asked a series of questions that are not requests for definitions, and yet his strategy of cross-questioning turns them into a search for definitions that the questioner ends up providing himself.

To understand why Ven. finanda does this, we first have to recall one of the essential features of the etiquette of a Dhamma teacher: the Buddha’s insistence that Dhamma speakers not harm themselves or others by their speech [§8], which means that they not exalt themselves or disparage others by name. There are examples in the Canon where the Buddha is quite critical of teachers of other schools of thought, but he mentions these teachers by name only when speaking to the monks (AN 3:138, Chapter Seven). When asked point-blank by lay people or wanderers of other sects whether teachers or members of other sects are awakened, he usually puts the question aside and simply teaches the Dhamma.

In one famous instance, however—the discourse to the K›l›mas [§149]—he puts the question aside and then follows it with a series of cross-questions, extracting responses from his listeners based on their experience of what is skillful and not, establishing the principle that teachers are to be evaluated by testing their teachings. We will examine this example again in Chapter Seven.

Here

in AN 3:73, however, Ven. finanda establishes a similar principle

without putting the question aside, but simply by cross-questioning his listener, a student

of

the

fatalist

school

who

was

apparently

testing

Ven. finanda’s

manners. When asked who is teaching rightly, who is practicing rightly, and who is well-gone, Ven. finanda avoids the trap of naming names and instead asks the questioner about what, in general terms, right teaching, right practice, and right attainment would be. He gets the questioner to state that those who teach the abandoning of passion, aversion, and delusion teach rightly; those who practice for the abandoning of passion, aversion, and delusion are practicing rightly; and those who have abandoned passion, aversion, and delusion are well-gone. In this way, Ven. finanda then notes, the questioner has answered his own question.

The result is that the questioner, impressed with Ven. finanda’s tact, goes for refuge in the Triple Gem.

One of the noteworthy features of this passage is that Ven. finanda adopts a strategy used by the Buddha and takes it further than any extant examples we have of the Buddha’s own use of it: both in the way in which the crossquestioning yields complete definitions, and in the deft way it avoids a potential trap. We cannot know if the Buddha ever used this strategy with quite this finesse, but the record as we have it in the Canon suggests that this is one instance in which a disciple of the Buddha developed one of the Buddha’s response-strategies further than the Teacher did himself.

6) Exploring hypotheticals.

This is one of the two most frequent ways in which the Buddha cross-questions his questioners. In situations where he senses that they might not understand his answer to their questions, or they have shown confusion about statements he has already made, he prefaces or follows his answers by citing hypothetical cases: either examples of the point he is trying to make or analogies that illuminate it. He then questions his questioners about the details of the hypothetical cases, after which he shows how their knowledge of those cases applies to the points they have trouble understanding. In this way, the questioners become participants in explaining the points in question and resolving their own confusion. At the same time, the Buddha is demonstrating an important pedagogical point: that a convenient way to clarify an issue in the minds of one’s listeners is to remind them of a relevant pattern they have already learned and mastered in the past. In the terms of the Buddha’s own vocabulary, this is an exercise in strengthening mindfulness—the ability to keep something in mind—combining it with discernment to treat the question at hand.

A short example of this strategy is this:

[Prince Abhaya:] “Venerable sir, when wise nobles or brahmans, householders or contemplatives, having formulated questions, come to the Tath›gata and ask him, does this line of reasoning appear to his awareness beforehand—’If those who approach me ask this, I—thus asked—will answer in this way’—or does the Tath›gata come up with the answer on the spot?”

[The Buddha:] “Very well then, prince, I will cross-question you on this matter. Answer as you see fit. What do you think? Are you skilled in the parts of a chariot?”

“Yes, venerable sir. I am skilled in the parts of a chariot.”

“And what do you think? When people come & ask you, ‘What is the name of this part of the chariot?’ does this line of reasoning appear to your awareness beforehand—’If those who approach me ask this, I—thus asked—will answer in this way’—or do you come up with the answer on the spot?”

“Venerable sir, I am renowned for being skilled in the parts of a chariot. All the parts of a chariot are well known to me. I come up with the answer on the spot.”

“In the same way, prince, when wise nobles or brahmans, householders or contemplatives, having formulated questions, come to the Tath›gata and ask him, he comes up with the answer on the spot.

Why is that? Because the property of the Dhamma is thoroughly penetrated by the Tath›gata. From his thorough penetration of the property of the Dhamma, he comes up with the answer on the spot.” —

MN 58

AN 4:111 [§98] contains a variation on the strategy of cross-questioning hypotheticals, in which the Buddha doesn’t wait to be asked a question. He quizzes a horse-trainer about the latter’s approach to training horses, and then— when the trainer in turn asks him how he trains his monks—draws on the analogy provided by the trainer’s answers to his original questions.

It’s easy to see that this strategy would have a doubly positive effect on the questioners. First, they see that they already have a fund of knowledge they can apply to understanding the Dhamma; this gives them confidence that they can learn even more abstruse points. Second, they sense that the Buddha respects their knowledge; this makes them more inclined to view him and his teachings with respect as well. In establishing

an atmosphere of mutual respect, the

Buddha makes it easier for his listeners to learn with an open, trusting, and receptive state of mind.

MN 97 [§111] constitutes a special case in the use of this particular strategy. In this discourse Ven. S›riputta is addressing a layperson he has taught in the past.

The layperson—Dhanañj›nin—having come under the influence of a wife with no faith in the Buddha’s teachings, has been gaining his livelihood in a dishonest manner. Ven. S›riputta asks him about his behavior and then cross-questions him on a series of hypothetical situations as to what will happen at death to people who try to excuse their dishonest behavior, as Dhanañj›nin has done, by citing the need to help their family and relatives. Dhanañj›nin ends up admitting that

his

excuses

are

worthless. What’s

special

about

this

case

is

that

the

hypotheticals

draw, not

on

Dhanañj›nin’s

personal experience, but on the

implications of the doctrine of kamma, which Ven. S›riputta has apparently taught Dhanañj›nin in the past. In this case, instead of clarifying new points of the Dhamma, the cross-questioning simply serves to remind Dhanañj›nin of points he already knows. Still, this case has two important points in common with other uses of this strategy. The first is that it clarifies an important point by reminding the listener of something the listener already knows. This shows the importance of the act of reminding in the process of clarification. The second point is that the discussion is conducted in an atmosphere of mutual trust, respect, and compassion. This is what inclines Dhanañj›nin to accept the fairly harsh points that Ven. S›riputta wants to convey.

In addition to

explaining

categorical answers, the

Buddha also

uses the

strategy of exploring hypotheticals to

explain why he is using a particular

strategy in responding to a question. We have already seen three instances in which he uses this form of cross-questioning to show why he is giving an analytical answer to a question [§§68-69, §103]. The most famous instance in which he uses this strategy to explain why he is putting a question aside is MN 72 [§190], a passage we will discuss in Chapter Eight.

Two points in particular stand out in the Buddha’s strategy of exploring hypotheticals through cross-questioning. One is that the analogies he draws deal primarily with skills and activities that the listeners have mastered. This point resonates with the fact that his own teaching deals primarily with the mastery of skills, and adds clarity and nuance to

his primary categorical teaching, the

distinction between what is skillful and not. Because skills require strategies— sometimes paradoxical, and always sensitive to context—the Buddha’s frequent reference to skills in this context emphasizes the need to think strategically, alert to paradox and context, when trying to comprehend and follow the path.

The second point is that the Buddha often uses this strategy with people of rank: kings, princes, generals, brahmans, and village headmen. Sensitive to their position in society, they would be pleased that a person of the Buddha’s stature would recognize their knowledge and skills, and would trust them—with a little encouragement—to

answer

their

own

questions

and

resolve

their

own

confusion.

The fact that the Buddha would sometimes use this strategy specifically to appeal to the vanity of a high-ranking visitor is shown by comparing §104 with §105. In both cases, the same person, General Sıha—is asking the same question, concerning the rewards of generosity in the present life. In the first case, the Buddha simply gives a categorical answer to the question; in the second, he cross-questions Sıha about Sıha’s personal experience with the issue, giving Sıha the opportunity to describe the rewards he has seen from his own generosity.

The fact that the Buddha in the first instance doesn’t resort to cross-questioning shows

that

the

question

doesn’t

inherently

demand

response. The

fact

that

Sıha in

the

second

instance

opportunity to declare that he is a person of generosity shows that he is not averse to self-flattery—a fact that the Buddha probably sensed when choosing to respond to the question in the way he did.

The Buddha’s ability to appeal to his listeners’ vanity in this way is a mark of his rhetorical skill. He himself is not reduced to being a sycophant; the sincerity of the implied compliment is much more believable than direct flattery, for it demonstrates trust and respect in action; and—by illustrating his point with analogies—he is giving a valuable lesson in how to draw on one’s previous knowledge of skills in comprehending the skills needed for the path. In this way he

shows

his

proud listeners

that

their

knowledge

and skills

are

a more

appropriate reason for pride than is their rank.

7) Engaging in debate.

This, the other of the two most frequent ways in which the

Buddha cross-questions

his

preceding

strategy. The

primary

expressing confusion; instead, they are arguing with a statement the Buddha has a cross-questioning

explicitly

takes

the

questioners, is

virtually

identical

with

the

difference

is that

the

questioners are

not

made. As we will see, though, the Buddha treats those who argue with him primarily as if they are simply confused. In this case, as in the preceding one, the Buddha responds by citing hypothetical cases: examples that refute the point the questioners are trying to make, or analogies indicating why it is wrong. Then he questions them about the details of the hypothetical cases, after which he shows how their answers to his questions refute their position. In some cases—as in the following example—he doesn’t even have to make the connection explicit. The questioner realizes that the cross-question has already defeated him.

[Saccaka Aggivessana:] “Yes, Master Gotama, I’m saying that ‘Form is my self, feeling is my self, perception is my self, fabrications are my self, consciousness is my self.’”

“Very well then, Aggivessana, I will cross-question you on this matter.

Answer as you see fit. What do you think? Would a consecrated, noblewarrior king—such as King Pasenadi of Kosala or King Aj›tasattu Vedehiputta of Magadha—wield the power in his own domain to execute those who deserve execution, to fine those who deserve to be fined, and to banish those who deserve to be banished?”

“Yes, Master Gotama, he would… Even these oligarchic groups, such as the Vajjians & Mallans, wield the power in their own domains to execute those who deserve execution, to fine those who deserve to be fined, and to banish those who deserve to be banished, to say nothing of a consecrated, noble-warrior king such as King Pasenadi of Kosala, or King Aj›tasattu Vedehiputta of Magadha. He would wield it, and he would deserve to wield it.”

“What do you think, Aggivessana? When you say, ‘Form is my self,’ do you wield power over that form: ‘May my form be thus, may my form not be thus’?”

When this was said, Saccaka the Niga˚˛ha-son was silent. — MN 35 There are two further differences between the Buddha’s use of this strategy and of the preceding one. The first is that, whereas in the preceding strategy he uses analogies proportionately more than examples, here the proportions are reversed (the above passage being one of his rare uses of analogy in this context). The reason is not hard to see: A person set on debate might easily deny an analogy’s relevance to the point in question, whereas it’s harder to deny that an example doesn’t fall under the general point being made. Thus the Buddha, when engaged in an argument, would use analogies only when they were obviously relevant, and examples to make the majority of his points.

The second difference is the obvious one that, whereas the preceding strategy can feed the pride of the questioner, this strategy can severely wound it, for in responding to the Buddha’s cross-questioning the questioner has become a party to the refutation of his own argument. And he has done a thorough job of refutation. Having given, in response to the Buddha’s cross-questioning, answers that support the Buddha’s position, he cannot turn around and deny what he has just said. In effect, he has done the Buddha’s work so thoroughly that there is little left for the Buddha to say. Many are the cases where, on being defeated by the Buddha’s cross-questioning in front of an audience, the questioner is left “silent, abashed, his shoulders drooping, his head down, brooding, at a loss for words.”

This raises two

points. The

first

is that, for

this strategy

to

work, the

questioner must be truthful in his responses to the Buddha’s cross-questioning.

This means that the Buddha would have to be selective in choosing whom to debate. The second is that, given the Buddha’s avowed principles in teaching— that he would speak only what is true, beneficial, and timely—he must have seen some benefit in refuting his opponents so thoroughly. And with these two points we come to the heart of the Buddha’s approach to debate in general. For him it was a mark of his respect that he would be willing to debate a listener; and he saw the defeat of his opponent’s wrong views as an act of compassion.

Given the way debates are usually conducted, especially in modern society, it seems hard to reconcile these two principles. We see debaters showing extreme disrespect for their opponents, and so it seems inevitable that debate must involve disdain. To avoid the obvious dangers of this lack of civility, we see other groups maintaining that the compassionate way to live together is to leave each person to his or her own opinions, or to celebrate the fact that our views are diverse.

The Buddha’s approach, however, was very different. On the one hand, he was selective in taking on an opponent in debate. He would not engage in debates designed simply for the sport of trying to defeat an opponent. Sn 4:8 [§120] and MN 18 [§123] are examples in which he declines to get involved in debates of this sort. In the first case he states his reasons for not participating; in the second, he stymies a would-be debater with a statement that leaves no room for argument. For him, a debate was worthwhile only if aimed at establishing the truth.

To further this end, the Buddha would sometimes explicitly set the conditions for a debate when faced with argumentative followers of other beliefs:

“If, householder, you will confer taking a stand on the truth, we might have some discussion here.” — MN 56

“Vappa, if you will allow of me what should be allowed, protest what should be protested, and further cross-question me directly then & there on the meaning of any statement of mine that you don’t understand— ‘How is this, lord? What is the meaning of this?’—then we could have a discussion here.” — AN 4:195

In other words, debates should be conducted in a way that stands by the truth

and recognizes

established standards

for

what

is

and is

not

a valid

argument. At the same time, the participants—rather than attacking or ridiculing any statement they don’t understand—should make every effort to get at the meaning of what their opponents are saying.

One of the implications of “standing by the truth” is that arguments be internally consistent—a point reflected in the admonition the Buddha gives to any debater whose statements contradict one another:

“Householder, householder, pay attention, and answer (only) after having paid attention! What you said after isn’t consistent with what you said before, nor is what you said before consistent with what you said after. And yet you made this statement: ‘Lord, I will confer taking a stand on the truth; let us have some discussion here.’” — MN 56 Because

internal consistency

is

also

an

established standard for

a valid

argument, the Buddha apparently saw legitimate forms of debate not as mere conventions but as implicit expressions of the nature of the truth.

In addition to being selective in the format of the debate, the Buddha was also selective in the type of person he was willing to talk to. MN 80 [§117] states the basic qualities he was looking for in a student—being truthful and observant— and AN 3:68 [§118] fleshes out these qualities by describing in more detail the sort of person fit to talk to or not.

The first two sets of qualities pertains to the person’s intellectual capabilities:

“If a person, when asked a question, doesn’t give a categorical answer to a question deserving a categorical answer, doesn’t give an analytical answer to a question deserving an analytical answer, doesn’t crossquestion a question deserving cross-questioning, doesn’t put aside a question deserving to be put aside, then—that being the case—he is a person unfit to talk with. But if a person, when asked a question, gives a categorical answer to a question deserving a categorical answer, gives an analytical answer to a question deserving an analytical answer, crossquestions a question deserving cross-questioning, and puts aside a question deserving to be put aside, then—that being the case—he is a person fit to talk with….

“If a person, when asked a question, doesn’t stand by what is possible and impossible, doesn’t stand by agreed-upon assumptions, doesn’t stand by teachings known to be true, doesn’t stand by standard procedure, then—that being the case—he is a person unfit to talk with. But if a person, when asked a question, stands by what is possible and impossible, stands by agreed-upon assumptions, stands by teachings known to be true, stands by standard procedure, then—that being the case—he is a person fit to talk with….

The next two sets of qualities, however, deal with the extent to which the person conducts an argument in an ethical manner:

“If a person, when asked a question, wanders from one thing to another, pulls the discussion off the topic, shows anger & aversion and sulks, then—that being the case—he is a person unfit to talk with. But if a person, when asked a question, doesn’t wander from one thing to another, doesn’t pull the discussion off the topic, doesn’t show anger or aversion or sulk, then—that being the case—he is a person fit to talk with….

“If a person, when asked a question, puts down [the questioner], crushes him, ridicules him, grasps at his little mistakes, then—that being the case—he is a person unfit to talk with. But if a person, when asked a question, doesn’t put down [the questioner], doesn’t crush him, doesn’t ridicule him, doesn’t grasp at his little mistakes, then—that being the case—he is a person fit to talk with.” — AN 3:68 In short, the Buddha would engage a person in conversation and debate only if he felt that the person was competent and truthful, and would behave in a fair and civil manner: the sort of person who would engage in debate not simply to win a point, but to find the truth. In this way, the type of person the Buddha would debate with was intimately connected to the form of debate in which he was willing to engage. On one level, this point is obvious enough—anyone would prefer to debate with a person whose way of debating is congenial—but the Buddha is not dealing simply with preferences here. He is dealing with principles. The ability to follow the proper form of the debate as he defines it is not simply a matter of the intellect. It reflects the character of the debater as well:

his fairness, his honesty, his ethical standards. This means that the pursuit of truth requires not only a sharp intellect but also personal integrity. This may be one of the reasons why, as we noted above, the Buddha saw that standard procedure in the conduct of a debate is intimately related to the nature of truth:

Because truth is both a matter of factual accuracy and moral rectitude, only a person who is true in his or her way of seeking the truth will be able to find it.

From these considerations we can conclude that when the Buddha engages a person in a debate, it’s a sign that he respects that person’s motives and morals.

Even in the case of Saccaka [§126], who tries to snare the Buddha with a variety of cheap debater’s tricks—such as appealing to the prejudices of the audience he has brought along—we find that by the end of their encounters, recorded in MN 35, Saccaka displays enough truthfulness to show that he has benefited from their debates.

And that is the Buddha’s intention in every debate: to benefit his opponent.

For him, it is not an act of compassion simply to leave a person to his or her views, for those views can easily be wrong, leading that person to act in ways that produce many lifetimes of suffering. On the surface, the Buddha’s sharp insistence on right and wrong view here might seem surprising. After all, viewclinging is one of the forms of clinging he abandoned at awakening. However, this does not mean that he lost his sense of right and wrong. As he points out in Sn 4:9 [§47], the awakened state is not defined in terms of view, but it cannot be attained without right view. The Buddha may no longer need right view for his own sake, but he sees that other people need to develop it if they are to reach full awakening. Having been to the top of the mountain, he is in a position to see that only one path leads there.

This is why the factors of the noble eightfold path are all termed right, and

anything deviating from them wrong. As he states in Sn 4:12 [§48], “the truth is one; there is no second.” Even a stream-winner—who has had only a first glimpse of the deathless—is in a position to see that no path aside from the noble eightfold path leads to the deathless [§144]. Any view that deviates from right view is a wrong view that strays from the path. As §67 shows, acting on wrong view is like trying to get milk from a cow by twisting her horn: In addition to not getting any milk, you wear yourself out and torment the cow.

Thus the Buddha, when necessary, sees it as an act of respect and compassion to argue aggressively with anyone who is desirous of the truth but holds to wrong view. The fact that he uses cross-questioning—a means of clarification— as his primary mode of debate shows that he regards debate as a means of instruction: Once he can get the opponent to see the facts clearly in the right perspective, he has accomplished his immediate aim. And in keeping with the fact that instruction is a collaborative effort, involving the kamma of both sides, the collaboration of cross-questioning is an ideal strategy to drive his points home.

Given this understanding, it is easy to see that even when the Buddha is aggressive

in

his cross-questioning—and

he

can

at

times

be

extremely

aggressive, even to the point of going ad hominem [§125; see also MN 14]—it is a sign, not of ill will, but of the sincerity of his concern for the other person’s wellbeing.

Here again we can see the parallels between the way the Buddha handles arguments and the way he instructs his monks to handle the cross-examination of a monk accused of having committed an offense. In both cases, the process must be conducted with mutual respect, compassion, and a clear sense of right and wrong. Just as the accused has the right not to give leave to accusers whose motives he suspects, the Buddha holds the right not to engage in an argument with a person who is not aiming at the truth and who will not conduct the argument in a fair way. Just as the accusers must keep the well-being of the accused foremost in mind so as to release him from his offense, the Buddha cross-questions his opponents for the compassionate purpose of clearing up their misunderstanding and establishing them in right view. And just as the accusers, motivated by their esteem for the Vinaya, can cross-question the accused in an aggressive manner, the Buddha can be aggressive in rooting out wrong view because, knowing the true value of the Dhamma (SN 5:2), he knows that any truthful questioner would benefit from developing the same appreciation.

These, then, are the first seven situations in which the Buddha would apply the approach of cross-questioning. As we will see in the next chapter, these seven types of cross-questioning reach their culmination in the remaining two, but before we explore how that happens, it would be useful to stop and take stock of the situations we have already covered. One way to do this is to compare the Buddha’s use of cross-questioning in these situations with the way Socrates is portrayed as using cross-questioning in Plato’s dialogues. It has often been said that the Buddha makes frequent use of the Socratic method, so it’s instructive to see exactly how far this is true.

The parallels between the two teachers are obvious. Comparing the Buddha’s teachings with what we find, for example, in the Protagoras, we can see that both teachers express a dislike of empty bombast [§73], and both feel that learning is best fostered in an atmosphere where people are free to question one another.

Both state that the back-and-forth of a dialogue is most effective when conducted in an atmosphere of mutual good will. Just as the Buddha would regard crossquestioning as a compassionate activity, leading to the true happiness of the questioner, Socrates in the Symposium states that philosophical dialectic—the process of talking things through together—is an expression of the highest form of love in that it leads eventually to the vision of absolute truths.

However, the

two

teachers

have

very

different

ideas

of

how

crossquestioning works. In the Theaetetus, Socrates compares himself to a midwife, helping his interlocutors give birth to definitions that he then tests to see how viable they are. But in line with his belief in the transmigration of souls, he holds that the birth of a true idea is actually its rebirth. In the Meno, he asks a slave a series of leading questions about how to find a square with double the area of a given square. After a number of false starts, the slave—who has no background whatsoever in geometry—arrives at the correct answer. Socrates then argues that this knowledge must have come from his knowledge of true principles gained before birth.

The Buddha, however, even though he teaches rebirth, does not see the process of cross-questioning as operating in this way at all. He questions his listeners as to knowledge they have gained from practical experience in this life.

Even

when

extracting

definitions

from

his

listeners, he

draws

solely

on

information or experiences in the immediate present.

Asecond

major

difference

between

the

two

teachers

is

in

how

they

characterize the good will that provides the ideal atmosphere for discovering the truth. In Socrates’ eyes, this good will starts with carnal love and attraction, whereas for the Buddha good will starts with the realization that all beings desire happiness and freedom from suffering, and he allows no role for carnal love in the mutual pursuit of truth at all.

These differences in how the process of cross-questioning is understood to work are reflected in how the two teachers actually use the strategy. Throughout the Platonic dialogues, Socrates makes most frequent use of the strategy of extracting definitions from his listeners, whereas the Buddha in the Pali Canon rarely employs that strategy, and—even when he does employ it—doesn’t make it carry the full burden of extracting extended definitions from his listeners in the way that Socrates does. Instead, the Buddha makes frequent use of the strategy of exploring hypotheticals—analogies and examples, usually based on actions and skills—to aid in understanding his points. This difference reflects the deeper difference we noted between these two in Chapter Three: that Socrates sees dialectic as a way of constructing, through clear definitions connected through reason, an intellectual grasp of reality as a whole; whereas the Buddha sees the strategy of cross-questioning hypotheticals as a way of clarifying the path of skills needed to achieve the goal of unbinding.

A second difference in practice is that, at crucial junctures in dialogues such as the Symposium and the Republic, Socrates abandons the dialectical strategy of cross-questioning to make assertions concerning issues that the Buddha would have classified under the categories of objectification, such as the existence or non-existence of the soul and whether it can be identified with the body. In these passages, Socrates bases his remarks on myth and visionary experiences, a mode of presentation that precludes cross-questioning. As we noted above, this sort of presentation is the pedagogical equivalent of objectification. In contrast, the Buddha almost always avoids the categories of objectification; even when he does use them he remains open to cross-questioning, keeping the discussion in the pedagogical mode appropriate to pre-objectified thought.

A third difference in practice is that Socrates’ strategy of cross-questioning often ends up with an inconclusive result: Many ideas are tested and found wanting—to use the midwife analogy, the children produced are not viable and so are allowed to die—and yet they are not replaced with any useful conclusions.

The Meno, for instance, starts with Meno asking Socrates if goodness can be taught. Socrates then gets Meno to provide a definition of goodness, only to reject

every

definition

he

can

induce

Meno

to

supply. The

dialogue

ends

somewhat uselessly, with their agreeing that goodness, whatever it might be, is a gift of the gods.

Thus the process of the Socratic dialogue is often less about reaching a goal than about the process itself, the happiness to be found in clarifying one’s ideas and approaching—if never quite reaching in this lifetime—an intellectual grasp of pure

abstractions. In

the

questioning

has

a clear

discourses show that in many cases the arguments and analogies explored through cross-questioning either lead the listeners there immediately, inspire them to practice with ardency and resolution until they soon achieve awakening, or encourage them to take refuge as a first step in that direction.

The Buddha’s pragmatic emphasis is further illustrated by the cluster of topics he

treats

through

cross-questioning: how

to

understand

the

workings

of

kamma, how to

understand pleasure

and pain, how important

caste

is in

comparison to action, whether the life gone forth can benefit as many people as the practice of sacrifice, what his qualifications for teaching are, and why he teaches the way he does. And actually, all six of these topics are permutations of one: kamma. Pleasure and pain are best understood in terms of the actions that lead to them; people are to be judged by their actions rather than their caste; the life gone forth enables one to find and teach to numerous beings the path of action leading to the end of suffering, something no sacrifice can do; the Buddha is qualified to teach because of the skillful way he has mastered the principles of cause and effect in training his mind; and the way he teaches—and in particular, his use of cross-questioning itself—is a primary example of how the kamma of collaborative effort works.

In this way we can see again that

how the Buddha teaches is intimately

connected to what he teaches. Sensitive to the role that kamma plays on the path to awakening, he uses the kamma of cross-questioning in a way that sensitizes his listeners to that role as well. Rather than aiming his students at abstractions— as Socrates does—he aims them in the other direction, at the particulars of their actions and their results. That’s where they will find release.

This point will become even clearer in the next chapter, where we see how the Buddha cross-questions his students—and encourages them to crossquestion themselves—on their present actions and the results of those actions.

Buddha’s

hands, however, the

goal—awakening—attainable

in

process

of

cross

this

life, and

the

There we will see that cross-questioning oneself on one’s actions from the grossest levels to the subtlest is one of the most effective ways to achieve awakening.

READINGS

ESTABLISHING ORTHODOXY

§ 71. Then the monk Ari˛˛ha Formerly-of-the-Vulture-Killers went to the Blessed One and, on arrival, having bowed down to him, sat to one side. As he was sitting there, the Blessed One said to him, “Is it true, Ari˛˛ha, that this pernicious viewpoint has arisen in you—‘As I understand the Dhamma taught by the Blessed One, those acts the Blessed One says are obstructive, when indulged in, are not genuine obstructions’?”1

“Exactly so, lord. As I understand the Dhamma taught by the Blessed One, those acts the Blessed One says are obstructive, when indulged in, are not genuine obstructions.”

“Worthless man, from whom have you understood that Dhamma taught by me in such a way? Worthless man, haven’t I in many ways described obstructive acts? And when indulged in, they are genuine obstructions. I have said that sensual pleasures are of little satisfaction, much stress, much despair, & greater drawbacks.

I have compared sensual pleasures to a chain of bones: of much stress, much despair, & greater drawbacks. I have compared sensual pleasures to a lump of flesh… a grass torch… a pit of glowing embers… a dream… borrowed goods…

the fruits of a tree… a butcher’s ax and chopping block… swords and spears… a snake’s head: of much stress, much despair, & greater drawbacks. But you, worthless man, through your own poor grasp [of the Dhamma], not only misrepresent us but also dig yourself up [by the root] and produce much demerit for yourself. That will lead to your long-term harm & suffering.”

Then the Blessed One said to the monks, “What do you think, monks? Is this monk Ari˛˛ha Formerly-of-the-Vulture-Killers even warm in this Dhamma & Vinaya?”

“How could he be, lord? No, lord.”

When this was said, the monk Ari˛˛ha Formerly-of-the-Vulture-Killers sat silent, abashed, his shoulders drooping, his head down, brooding, at a loss for words.

Then the Blessed One, seeing that the monk Ari˛˛ha Formerly-of-the-VultureKillers was sitting silent, abashed, his shoulders drooping, his head down, brooding, at a loss for words, said to him, “Worthless man, you will be recognized for your own pernicious viewpoint. I will cross-question the monks on this matter.”

Then the Blessed One addressed the monks, “Monks, do you too understand the Dhamma as taught by me in the same way that the monk Ari˛˛ha Formerlyof-the-Vulture-Killers does when, through his own poor grasp, he not only misrepresents us but also digs himself up [by the root] and produces much demerit for himself?”

“No, lord, for in many ways the Blessed One has described obstructive acts to us, and when indulged in they are genuine obstructions. The Blessed One has said that sensual pleasures are of little satisfaction, much stress, much despair, & greater drawbacks. The Blessed One has compared sensual pleasures to a chain of bones: of much stress, much despair, & greater drawbacks. The Blessed One has compared sensual pleasures to a lump of flesh… a grass torch… a pit of glowing embers… a dream… borrowed goods… the fruits of a tree… a butcher’s ax and chopping block… swords and spears… a snake’s head: of much stress, much despair, & greater drawbacks.”

“It’s good, monks, that you understand the Dhamma taught by me in this way, for in many ways I have described obstructive acts to you, and when indulged in they are genuine obstructions. I have said that sensual pleasures are of little satisfaction, much stress, much despair, & greater drawbacks. I have compared sensual pleasures to a chain of bones: of much stress, much despair, & greater drawbacks. I have compared sensual pleasures to a lump of flesh… a grass torch… a pit of glowing embers… a dream… borrowed goods… the fruits of a tree… a butcher’s ax and chopping block… swords and spears… a snake’s head: of much stress, much despair, & greater drawbacks. But this monk Ari˛˛ha Formerly-of-the-Vulture-Killers, through his own poor grasp [of the Dhamma], has both misrepresented us as well as injuring himself and accumulating much demerit for himself, and that will lead to this worthless man’s long-term harm & suffering. For a person to indulge in sensual pleasures without sensual passion, without sensual perception, without sensual thinking: That isn’t possible.” — MN 22

NOTE: 1. The Commentary notes that Ari˛˛ha here is referring to sexual intercourse and other related acts.

§ 72. Then the monk S›ti, the Fisherman’s Son, went to the Blessed One and, on arrival, having bowed down to him, sat to one side. As he was sitting there, the Blessed One said to him, “Is it true, S›ti, that this pernicious view has arisen in you—‘As I understand the Dhamma taught by the Blessed One, it is just this consciousness that runs and wanders on [from birth to birth], not another’?”

“Exactly so, lord. As I understand the Dhamma taught by the Blessed One, it is just this consciousness that runs and wanders on, not another.”

“Which consciousness, S›ti, is that?”1

“This speaker, this knower, lord, that is sensitive here & there to the ripening of good & evil actions.”

“And to whom, worthless man, do you understand me to have taught the Dhamma like that? Haven’t I, in many ways, said of dependently co-arisen consciousness, ‘Apart from a requisite condition, there is no coming-into-play of consciousness’?2 But you, through your own poor grasp, not only misrepresent us but also dig yourself up [by the root] and produce much demerit for yourself.

That will lead to your long-term harm & suffering.”

Then the Blessed One said to the monks, “What do you think, monks? Is this monk S›ti, the Fisherman’s Son, even warm in this Dhamma & Vinaya?”

“How could he be, lord? No, lord.”

When this was said, the monk S›ti, the Fisherman’s Son, sat silent, abashed, his shoulders drooping, his head down, brooding, at a loss for words.

Then the Blessed One, seeing that the monk S›ti, the Fisherman’s Son, was sitting silent, abashed, his shoulders drooping, his head down, brooding, at a loss for words, said to him, “Worthless man, you will be recognized for your own pernicious viewpoint. I will cross-question the monks on this matter.”

Then the Blessed One addressed the monks, “Monks, do you too understand the Dhamma as taught by me in the same way that the monk S›ti, the Fisherman’s Son, does when, through his own poor grasp [of the Dhamma], he not only misrepresents us but also digs himself up [by the root] and produces much demerit for himself?”

“No, lord, for in many ways the Blessed One has said of dependently co-arisen consciousness, ‘Apart from a requisite condition, there is no coming-into-play of consciousness.’”

“It’s good, monks, that you understand the Dhamma taught by me in this way, for in many ways I have said of dependently co-arisen consciousness, ‘Apart from a requisite condition, there is no coming-into-play of consciousness.’ But this monk S›ti, the Fisherman’s Son, through his own poor grasp [of the Dhamma], has not only misrepresented us but has also dug himself up [by the root], producing much demerit for himself. That will lead to this worthless man’s long-term harm & suffering.” — MN 38 [See also §193]

NOTES

1. The Buddha, knowing that there are two types of consciousness—the consciousness aggregate (viññ›˚akkhandha) and consciousness without surface (viññ›˚aª anidassanaª— see §205, note 4)—is here giving S›ti the chance to identify which of the two types he has interpreted as running and wandering on. S›ti’s answer shows that he is talking about the first type. It would have been interesting to see how the Buddha would have attacked S›ti’s misunderstanding if S›ti had identified the second.

2. The Pali here is,

Nanu may› moghapurisa anekapariy›yena pa˛iccasamuppannaª viññ›˚aª vuttaª, ‘Aññatra paccay› n’atthi viññ›˚assa sambhavoti?’ Literally: “Worthless man, hasn’t dependently-coarisen consciousness been described by me in many ways that, ‘Apart from a requisite condition, there is no coming-into-play of consciousness’?”

Some translators, thinking that all consciousness must be dependently co-arisen, have translated this sentence as, “Misguided man, have I not stated in many ways consciousness to be dependently arisen since without a condition there is no origination of consciousness?” They then use this translation to assert that the two passages in the Canon referring to consciousness without surface [§161, §205] are not in keeping with the principle, expressed here, that all consciousness is dependently co-arisen. Thus, they say, those two passages cannot be accepted as coming genuinely from the Buddha, whereas this passage in MN 38 definitely can. Their translation, however, is grammatically incorrect, as it inserts a “since” where there is none in the Pali, and ignores the quotation marks (ti) around the sentence in which dependently co-arisen consciousness is described. Thus it is a case of an interpretation forced on a passage that is then supposed to act as evidence confirming the interpretation—a form of circular reasoning.

When this passage is correctly translated, however, there is no conflict between this passage and those. The Buddha here is discussing dependently-coarisen consciousness in a way that does not conflict with the possibility that there is also a consciousness without surface that lies beyond the six sense-spheres and is not dependently-coarisen. In fact, because he modifies the consciousness discussed here with the adjective “dependently-coarisen,” that suggests that he is keeping in mind the fact that there is another type of consciousness to which that modification does not apply.

CROSS -QUESTIONING IN THE PROCESS OF LEARNING

§ 73. “Monks, there are these two assemblies. Which two? The assembly trained in bombast and not in cross-questioning, and the assembly trained in cross-questioning and not in bombast.

“And which is the assembly trained in bombast and not in cross-questioning?

There is the case where in any assembly when the discourses of the Tath›gata—deep, deep in their meaning, transcendent, connected with emptiness—are recited, the monks don’t listen, don’t lend ear, don’t set their hearts on knowing them; don’t regard them as worth grasping or mastering. But when discourses that are literary works—the works of poets, artful in sound, artful in expression, the work of outsiders, words of disciples—are recited, they listen, they lend ear, they set their hearts on knowing them; they regard them as worth grasping & mastering. Yet when they have mastered that Dhamma, they don’t cross-question one another about it, don’t dissect: ‘How is this? What is the meaning of this?’ They don’t make open what isn’t open, don’t make plain what isn’t plain, don’t dispel doubt on its various doubtful points. This is called an assembly trained in bombast, not in cross-questioning.

“And which is the assembly trained in cross-questioning and not in bombast?

There is the case where in any assembly when discourses that are literary works—the works of poets, artful in sound, artful in rhetoric, the work of outsiders, words of disciples—are recited, the monks don’t listen, don’t lend ear, don’t set their hearts on knowing them; don’t regard them as worth grasping or mastering. But when the discourses of the Tath›gata—deep, deep in their meaning, transcendent, connected with emptiness—are recited, they listen, they lend ear, they set their hearts on knowing them; they regard them as worth grasping & mastering. And when they have mastered that Dhamma, they crossquestion one another about it and dissect it: ‘How is this? What is the meaning of this?’ They make open what isn’t open, make plain what isn’t plain, dispel doubt on its various doubtful points. This is called an assembly trained in crossquestioning and not in bombast.” — AN 2:46 § 74. Ven. finanda said, “There is the case, friend S›riputta, where a monk masters the Dhamma: dialogues, narratives of mixed prose & verse, explanations, verses, spontaneous exclamations, quotations, birth stories, amazing events, question & answer sessions. He teaches the Dhamma in detail— as he has heard it, as he has remembered it—to others. He gets others to recite the Dhamma in detail—as they have heard it, as they have remembered it. He holds a group chanting of the Dhamma in detail—as he has heard it, as he has remembered it. He thinks about & evaluates the Dhamma as he has heard it, as he has remembered it; he contemplates it with his intellect. He enters the Rains in monasteries in which there are senior monks who are learned, who know the tradition, who are holders of the Dhamma, the Vinaya, & the M›tika [the lists of topics that later formed the basis for the Abhidhamma]. Having approached them periodically, he questions them & quizzes them: ‘How it this, venerable sirs? What is the meaning of this?’ They make open for him what wasn’t open, make plain what wasn’t plain, dispel doubt on various doubtful points.

“It’s to this extent, friend S›riputta, that a monk hears Dhamma he has not heard, that the Dhammas he has heard do not get confused, that the Dhammas he has touched with his awareness stay current, and that he understands what (previously) was not understood.” — AN 6:51

Invitations to cross-questioning:

§ 75. “Therefore, monks, when you understand the meaning of any statement of mine, that is how you should remember it. But when you don’t understand the meaning of any statement of mine, then right then & there you should crossquestion me or the experienced monks.” — MN 22 § 76. Then Gho˛amukha the brahman, taking a low seat, sat to one side. As he was sitting there, he said to Ven. Udena, “My good contemplative, there is no righteous wanderer’s life: That is [the opinion] that occurs to me here, but that may be from not seeing either someone like your venerable self or the Dhamma here.”

“Brahman, if you will allow of me what should be allowed, protest what should be protested, and further cross-question me right then & there on the meaning of any statement of mine that you don’t understand—‘How is this, Master Udena? What is the meaning of this?’—then we could have a discussion here.” — MN 94 [See also §109]

§ 77. As the nuns were sitting there, Ven. Nandaka said to them, “This will be a cross-questioning talk, sisters. Where you understand, you should say, ‘We understand.’ Where you don’t, you should say, ‘We don’t understand.’ Where you feel doubt or indecision, you should cross-question me right then & there:

‘How is this, venerable sir? What is the meaning of this?’”

“Venerable sir, we are gratified & delighted that you invite us [in this way].”

“So then, sisters, what do you think? Is the eye constant or inconstant?”

“Inconstant, venerable sir.” “And is that which is inconstant easeful or stressful?”

“Stressful, venerable sir.” “And is it fitting to regard what is inconstant, stressful, subject to change as: ‘This is mine. This is my self. This is what I am’?”

“No, venerable sir.”

“… Is the ear constant or inconstant?”

“Inconstant, venerable sir.”…

“… Is the nose constant or inconstant?”

“Inconstant, venerable sir.”…

“… Is the tongue constant or inconstant?”

“Inconstant, venerable sir.”…

“… Is the body constant or inconstant?”

“Inconstant, venerable sir.”…

“What do you think, sisters? Is the intellect constant or inconstant?”

“Inconstant, venerable sir.”

“And is that which is inconstant easeful or stressful?”

“Stressful, venerable sir.”

“And is it fitting to regard what is inconstant, stressful, subject to change as:

‘This is mine. This is my self. This is what I am’?”

“No, venerable sir. Why is that? Because we have already seen it well as it has come to be, with right discernment, that these six internal media are inconstant.”

“Good, good, sisters. That’s how it is for a disciple of the noble ones who has seen it as it has come to be with right discernment.

“Now, what do you think, sisters? Are forms constant or inconstant?”

“Inconstant, venerable sir.” “And is that which is inconstant easeful or stressful?”

“Stressful, venerable sir.” “And is it fitting to regard what is inconstant, stressful, subject to change as: ‘This is mine. This is my self. This is what I am’?”

“No, venerable sir.”

“… Are sounds constant or inconstant?”

“Inconstant, venerable sir.”…

“… Are aromas constant or inconstant?”

“Inconstant, venerable sir.”…

“… Are flavors constant or inconstant?”

“Inconstant, venerable sir.”…

“… Are tactile sensations constant or inconstant?”

“Inconstant, venerable sir.”…

“What do you think, sisters? Are ideas constant or inconstant?”

“Inconstant, venerable sir.”

“And is that which is inconstant easeful or stressful?”

“Stressful, venerable sir.”

“And is it fitting to regard what is inconstant, stressful, subject to change as:

‘This is mine. This is my self. This is what I am’?”

“No, venerable sir. Why is that? Because we have already seen it well as it has come to be, with right discernment, that these six external media too are inconstant.”

“Good, good, sisters. That’s how it is for a disciple of the noble ones who has seen it as it has come to be with right discernment.

“Now, what do you think, sisters? Is eye-consciousness constant or inconstant?”

“Inconstant, venerable sir.”

“And is that which is inconstant easeful or stressful?”

“Stressful, venerable sir.”

“And is it fitting to regard what is inconstant, stressful, subject to change as:

‘This is mine. This is my self. This is what I am’?”

“No, venerable sir.”

“… Is ear-consciousness constant or inconstant?”

“Inconstant, venerable sir.”…

“… Is nose-consciousness constant or inconstant?”

“Inconstant, venerable sir.”…

“… Is tongue-consciousness constant or inconstant?”

“Inconstant, venerable sir.”…

“… Is body-consciousness constant or inconstant?”

“Inconstant, venerable sir.”…

“What do you think, sisters? Is intellect-consciousness constant or inconstant?”

“Inconstant, venerable sir.”

“And is that which is inconstant easeful or stressful?”

“Stressful, venerable sir.”

“And is it fitting to regard what is inconstant, stressful, subject to change as:

‘This is mine. This is my self. This is what I am’?”

“No, venerable sir. Why is that? Because we have already seen it well as it has come to be, with right discernment, that these six consciousness-groups too are inconstant.”

“Good, good, sisters. That’s how it is for a disciple of the noble ones who has seen it as it has come to be with right discernment.

“Just as when the oil in a burning oil lamp is inconstant & subject to change, its wick is inconstant & subject to change, its flame is inconstant & subject to change, its light is inconstant & subject to change. If someone were to say, ‘The oil in that burning oil lamp is inconstant & subject to change, its wick is inconstant & subject to change, its flame is inconstant & subject to change, but as for its light, that is constant, everlasting, eternal, & not subject to change,’ would he be speaking rightly?”

“No, venerable sir. Why is that? Because the oil in that burning oil lamp is inconstant & subject to change, its wick is inconstant & subject to change, its flame is inconstant & subject to change, so how much more should its light be inconstant & subject to change.”

“In the same way, sisters, if someone were to say, ‘My six internal media are inconstant, but what I experience based on the six internal media—pleasure, pain, or neither-pleasure-nor-pain—that is constant, everlasting, eternal, & not subject to change,’ would he be speaking rightly?”

“No, venerable sir. Why is that? Because each feeling arises dependent on its corresponding condition. With the cessation of its corresponding condition, it ceases.”

“Good, good, sisters. That’s how it is for a disciple of the noble ones who has seen it as it has come to be with right discernment.

“Just as when the root of a great, standing tree—possessed of heartwood—is inconstant & subject to change, its trunk is inconstant & subject to change, its branches & foliage are inconstant & subject to change, its shadow is inconstant & subject to change. If someone were to say, ‘The root of that great, standing tree—possessed of heartwood—is inconstant & subject to change, its trunk is inconstant & subject to change, its branches & foliage are inconstant & subject to change, but as for its shadow, that is constant, everlasting, eternal, & not subject to change,’ would he be speaking rightly?”

“No, venerable sir. Why is that? Because the root of that great, standing tree—possessed of heartwood—is inconstant & subject to change, its trunk is inconstant & subject to change, its branches & foliage are inconstant & subject to change, so how much more should its shadow be inconstant & subject to change.”

“In the same way, sisters, if someone were to say, ‘My six external media are inconstant, but what I experience based on the six internal media—pleasure, pain, or neither-pleasure-nor-pain—that is constant, everlasting, eternal, & not subject to change,’ would he be speaking rightly?”

“No, venerable sir. Why is that? Because each feeling arises dependent on its corresponding condition. With the cessation of its corresponding condition, it ceases.”

“Good, good, sisters. That’s how it is for a disciple of the noble ones who has seen it as it has come to be with right discernment.

“Just as if a skilled butcher or butcher’s apprentice, having killed a cow, were to carve it up with a sharp carving knife so that—without damaging the substance of the inner flesh, without damaging the substance of the outer hide— he would cut, sever, & detach only the skin muscles, connective tissues, & attachments in between. Having cut, severed, & detached the outer skin, and then covering the cow again with that very skin, if he were to say that the cow was joined to the skin just as it had been, would he be speaking rightly?”1 “No, venerable sir. Why is that? Because if the skilled butcher or butcher’s apprentice, having killed a cow, were to… cut, sever, & detach only the skin muscles, connective tissues, & attachments in between; and… having covered the cow again with that very skin, then no matter how much he might say that the cow was joined to the skin just as it had been, the cow would still be disjoined from the skin.”

“This simile, sisters, I have given to convey a message. The message is this:

The substance of the inner flesh stands for the six internal media; the substance of the outer hide, for the six external media. The skin muscles, connective tissues, & attachments in between stand for passion & delight. And the sharp knife stands for noble discernment—the noble discernment that cuts, severs, & detaches the defilements, fetters, & bonds in between.

“Sisters, there are these seven factors for awakening through whose development & pursuit a monk enters & remains in the fermentation-free awareness-release & discernment-release, having directly known & realized them for himself right in the here & now. Which seven? There is the case where a monk develops mindfulness as a factor for awakening dependent on seclusion, dependent on dispassion, dependent on cessation, resulting in relinquishment.

He develops analysis of qualities as a factor for awakening… persistence as a factor for awakening… rapture as a factor for awakening… serenity as a factor for awakening… concentration as a factor for awakening… equanimity as a factor for awakening dependent on seclusion, dependent on dispassion, dependent on cessation, resulting in relinquishment. These are the seven factors for awakening through whose development & pursuit a monk enters & remains in the fermentation-free release of awareness & release of discernment, having directly known & realized them for himself right in the here & now.”

Then, having exhorted the nuns with this exhortation, Ven. Nandaka dismissed them, saying, “Go, sisters. The time has come.” The nuns, delighting in and approving of Ven. Nandaka’s exhortation, got up from their seats, bowed down to him, circumambulated him—keeping him to the right—and went to the Blessed One. On arrival, having bowed down to the Blessed One, they stood to one side. As they were standing there, the Blessed One said to them, “Go, nuns.

The time has come.” So the nuns, having bowed down to the Blessed One, circumambulated him—keeping him to the right—and departed.

Then, not long after the nuns’ departure, the Blessed One addressed the monks: “Monks, just as on the uposatha day of the fifteenth, people at large feel no doubt or indecision as to whether the moon is lacking or full, for it is clearly full; in the same way, the nuns are gratified with Nandaka’s Dhamma-teaching, and their resolves have been fulfilled. Of these 500 nuns, the most backward is a stream-winner, not destined for the planes of deprivation, headed to selfawakening for sure.” — MN 146 NOTE: 1. The act of covering the cow with skin refers to the arahant’s return to the world of the six senses after emerging from the experience of awakening.

The Buddha anticipates cross-questioning of his teaching by faultfinders:

§ 78. “Now it’s possible, finanda, that some wanderers of other sects might say, ‘Gotama the contemplative speaks of the cessation of perception & feeling, and yet describes it as pleasure. What is this? How is this?’ When they say that, they are to be told, ‘It’s not the case, friends, that the Blessed One describes only pleasant feeling as included under pleasure. Wherever pleasure is found, in whatever terms,1 the Blessed One describes it as pleasure.’” — MN 59 [See also §116]

NOTE: 1. This passage indicates that the aggregates do not cover all possible experience. See also §205, note 4.

§ 79. “Now it’s possible, Cunda, that some wanderers of other sects might say, ‘Gotama the contemplative describes unlimited knowledge & vision with regard to the past, but doesn’t describe unlimited knowledge & vision with regard to the future. What is this? How is this?’ Those wanderers of other sects construe the sort of knowing that is not knowledge & vision to be the sort of knowing that is knowledge & vision, just like those who are foolish & inexperienced. The Tath›gata’s memory-&-recollection knowledge with regard to the past is such that he recollects whatever he wants. The Tath›gata’s knowledge with regard to the future arises born from his awakening: ‘This is the last birth. There is now no further becoming.’ “With regard to what is past: If it is unfactual, untrue, & unbeneficial, the Tath›gata does not declare it. If it is factual, true, but unbeneficial, the Tath›gata does not declare it. If it is factual, true, & beneficial, the Tath›gata has a sense of the proper time for giving the answer to that question.

“With regard to what is future…

“With regard to what is present: If it is unfactual, untrue, & unbeneficial, the Tath›gata does not declare it. If it is factual, true, but unbeneficial, the Tath›gata does not declare it. If it is factual, true, & beneficial, the Tath›gata has a sense of the proper time for giving the answer to that question.” — DN 29 [§69, §156] Ven. S›riputta anticipates cross-questioning of the teaching by sincere, intelligent people:

§ 80. Ven. S›riputta said, “Friends, in foreign lands there are wise nobles & brahmans, householders & contemplatives—for the people there are wise & discriminating—who will question a monk: ‘What is your teacher’s doctrine?

What does he teach?’

“Thus asked, you should answer, ‘Our teacher teaches the subduing of passion & desire.’

“Having thus been answered, there may be wise nobles & brahmans, householders & contemplatives… who will question you further, ‘And your teacher teaches the subduing of passion & desire for what?’ “Thus asked, you should answer, ‘Our teacher teaches the subduing of passion & desire for form… for feeling… for perception… for fabrications. Our teacher teaches the subduing of passion & desire for consciousness.’ [§38] “Having thus been answered, there may be wise nobles & brahmans, householders & contemplatives… who will question you further, ‘And seeing what danger does your teacher teach the subduing of passion & desire for form… for feeling… for perception… for fabrications? Seeing what danger does your teacher teach the subduing of passion & desire for consciousness?’ “Thus asked, you should answer, ‘When one is not free from passion, desire, love, thirst, fever, & craving for form, then from any change & alteration in that form, there arises sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief, & despair. When one is not free from passion… for feeling… for perception… for fabrications… When one is not free from passion, desire, love, thirst, fever, & craving for consciousness, then from any change & alteration in that consciousness, there arise sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief, & despair. Seeing this danger, our teacher teaches the subduing of passion & desire for form… for feeling… for perception… for fabrications. Seeing this danger our teacher teaches the subduing of passion & desire for consciousness.’

“Having thus been answered, there may be wise nobles & brahmans, householders & contemplatives… who will question you further, ‘And seeing what benefit does your teacher teach the subduing of passion & desire for form… for feeling… for perception… for fabrications? Seeing what benefit does your teacher teach the subduing of passion & desire for consciousness?’ “Thus asked, you should answer, ‘When one is free from passion, desire, love, thirst, fever, & craving for form, then with any change & alteration in that form, there does not arise any sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief, or despair. When one is free from passion… for feeling… for perception… for fabrications… When one is free from passion, desire, love, thirst, fever, & craving for consciousness, then with any change & alteration in that consciousness, there does not arise any sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief, or despair. Seeing this benefit, our teacher teaches the subduing of passion & desire for form… for feeling… for perception… for fabrications. Seeing this benefit our teacher teaches the subduing of passion & desire for consciousness.’ “Friends, if one who entered & remained in unskillful qualities were to have a pleasant abiding in the here & now—unthreatened, undespairing, unfeverish— and on the breakup of the body, after death, could expect a good destination, then the Blessed One would not advocate the abandoning of unskillful qualities.

But because one who enters & remains in unskillful qualities has a stressful abiding in the here & now—threatened, despairing, & feverish—and on the breakup of the body, after death, can expect a bad destination, that is why the Blessed One advocates the abandoning of unskillful qualities.

“If one who entered & remained in skillful qualities were to have a stressful abiding in the here & now—threatened, despairing, & feverish—and on the breakup of the body, after death, could expect a bad destination, then the Blessed One would not advocate entering into skillful qualities. But because one who enters & remains in skillful qualities has a pleasant abiding in the here & now— unthreatened, undespairing, unfeverish—and on the breakup of the body, after death, can expect a good destination, that is why the Blessed One advocates entering into skillful qualities.” — SN 22:2 [See also §20; §26] Awakening through cross-questioning the speaker:

§ 81. On one occasion many elder monks were staying at Kosambı in Ghosita’s park. And at that time Ven. Khemaka was staying at the Jujube Tree park, diseased, in pain, severely ill. Then in the late afternoon the elder monks left their seclusion and addressed Ven. D›saka, (saying,) “Come, friend D›saka.

Go to the monk Khemaka and on arrival say to him, ‘The elders, friend Khemaka, say to you, “We hope you are getting better, friend. We hope you are comfortable. We hope that your pains are lessening and not increasing. We hope that there are signs of their lessening, and not of their increasing.”’”

Replying, “As you say, friends,” to the elder monks, Ven. D›saka went to Ven. Khemaka and on arrival said to him, “The elders, friend Khemaka, say to you, ‘We hope you are getting better, friend. We hope you are comfortable. We hope that your pains are lessening and not increasing. We hope that there are signs of their lessening, and not of their increasing.’”

“I am not getting better, my friend. I am not comfortable. My extreme pains are increasing, not lessening. There are signs of their increasing, and not of their lessening.”

Then Ven. D›saka went to the elder monks and, on arrival, said to them, “The monk Khemaka has said to me, ‘I am not getting better, my friend. I am not comfortable. My extreme pains are increasing, not lessening. There are signs of their increasing, and not of their lessening.’”

“Come, friend D›saka. Go to the monk Khemaka and on arrival say to him, ‘The elders, friend Khemaka, say to you, “Concerning these five clingingaggregates described by the Blessed One—i.e., the form clinging-aggregate, the feeling clinging-aggregate, the perception clinging-aggregate, the fabrications clinging-aggregate, the consciousness clinging-aggregate: Do you assume anything with regard to these five clinging-aggregates to be self or belonging to self?”’”

Replying, “As you say, friends,” to the elder monks, Ven. D›saka went to Ven. Khemaka and on arrival said to him, “The elders, friend Khemaka, say to you, ‘Concerning these five clinging-aggregates described by the Blessed One— i.e., the form clinging-aggregate, the feeling clinging-aggregate, the perception clinging-aggregate, the fabrications clinging-aggregate, the consciousness clinging-aggregate: Do you assume anything with regard to these five clingingaggregates to be self or belonging to self?’”

“Friend, concerning these five clinging-aggregates described by the Blessed One—i.e., the form clinging-aggregate… the feeling… perception…

fabrications… consciousness clinging-aggregate: With regard to these five clinging-aggregates, there is nothing I assume to be self or belonging to self.”

Then Ven. D›saka went to the elder monks and on arrival said to them, “The monk Khemaka has said to me, ‘Friend, concerning these five clingingaggregates described by the Blessed One—i.e., the form clinging-aggregate… the feeling… perception… fabrications… consciousness clinging-aggregate: With regard to these five clinging-aggregates, there is nothing I assume to be self or belonging to self.’”

“Come, friend D›saka. Go to the monk Khemaka and on arrival say to him, ‘The elders, friend Khemaka, say to you, “Concerning these five clingingaggregates described by the Blessed One—i.e., the form clinging-aggregate… the feeling… perception… fabrications… consciousness clinging-aggregate: If, with regard to these five clinging-aggregates, Ven. Khemaka assumes nothing to be self or belonging to self, then Ven. Khemaka is an arahant, devoid of fermentations.”’”

Replying, “As you say, friends,” to the elder monks, Ven. D›saka went to Ven. Khemaka and on arrival said to him, “The elders, friend Khemaka, say to you, ‘Concerning these five clinging-aggregates described by the Blessed One— i.e., the form clinging-aggregate… the feeling… perception… fabrications…

consciousness clinging-aggregate: If, with regard to these five clingingaggregates, Ven. Khemaka assumes nothing to be self or belonging to self, then Ven. Khemaka is an arahant, devoid of fermentations.’”

“Friend, concerning these five clinging-aggregates described by the Blessed One—i.e., the form clinging-aggregate… the feeling… perception…

fabrications… consciousness clinging-aggregate: With regard to these five clinging-aggregates, there is nothing I assume to be self or belonging to self, and yet I am not an arahant. With regard to these five clinging-aggregates, ‘I am’ has not been overcome, although I don’t assume that ‘I am this.’”

Then Ven. D›saka went to the elder monks and on arrival said to them, “The monk Khemaka has said to me, ‘Friend, concerning these five clingingaggregates described by the Blessed One—i.e., the form clinging-aggregate… the feeling… perception… fabrications… consciousness clinging-aggregate: With regard to these five clinging-aggregates, there is nothing I assume to be self or belonging to self, and yet I am not an arahant. With regard to these five clingingaggregates, “I am” has not been overcome, although I don’t assume that “I am this.”’”

“Come, friend D›saka. Go to the monk Khemaka and on arrival say to him, ‘The elders, friend Khemaka, say to you, “Friend Khemaka, this ‘I am’ of which you speak: What do you say ‘I am’? Do you say, ‘I am form,’ or do you say, ‘I am something other than form’? Do you say, ‘I am feeling… perception…

fabrications… consciousness,’ or do you say, ‘I am something other than consciousness’? This ‘I am’ of which you speak: What do you say ‘I am’?”’”

Replying, “As you say, friends,” to the elder monks, Ven. D›saka went to Ven. Khemaka and on arrival said to him, “The elders, friend Khemaka, say to you, ‘Friend Khemaka, this “I am” of which you speak: What do you say “I am”?

Do you say, “I am form,” or do you say, “I am something other than form”? Do you say, “I am feeling… perception… fabrications… consciousness,” or do you say, “I am something other than consciousness”? This “I am” of which you speak: What do you say “I am”?’”

“Enough, friend D›saka. What is accomplished by this running back & forth?

Fetch me my staff. I will go to the elder monks myself.”

Then Ven. Khemaka, leaning on his staff, went to the elder monks and, on arrival, exchanged courteous greetings with them. After an exchange of friendly greetings & courtesies, he sat to one side. As he was sitting there, the elder monks said to him, “Friend Khemaka, this ‘I am’ of which you speak: What do you say ‘I am’? Do you say, ‘I am form,’ or do you say, ‘I am something other than form’? Do you say, ‘I am feeling… perception… fabrications…

consciousness,’ or do you say, ‘I am something other than consciousness’? This ‘I am’ of which you speak: What do you say ‘I am’?”

“Friends, it’s not that I say ‘I am form,’ nor do I say ‘I am something other than form.’ It’s not that I say, ‘I am feeling… perception… fabrications…

consciousness,’ nor do I say, ‘I am something other than consciousness.’ With regard to these five clinging-aggregates, ‘I am’ has not been overcome, although I don’t assume that ‘I am this.’

“It’s just like the scent of a blue, red, or white lotus: If someone were to call it the scent of a petal or the scent of the color or the scent of a filament, would he be speaking correctly?”

“No, friend.”

“Then how would he describe it if he were describing it correctly?”

“As the scent of the flower: That’s how he would describe it if he were describing it correctly.”

“In the same way, friends, it’s not that I say ‘I am form,’ nor do I say ‘I am other than form.’ It’s not that I say, ‘I am feeling… perception… fabrications…

consciousness,’ nor do I say, ‘I am something other than consciousness.’ With regard to these five clinging-aggregates, ‘I am’ has not been overcome, although I don’t assume that ‘I am this.’

“Friends, even though a noble disciple has abandoned the five lower fetters, he still has with regard to the five clinging-aggregates a lingering residual ‘I am’ conceit, an ‘I am’ desire, an ‘I am’ obsession. But at a later time he keeps focusing on the phenomena of arising & passing away with regard to the five clingingaggregates: ‘Such is form, such its origination, such its disappearance. Such is feeling…. Such is perception…. Such are fabrications…. Such is consciousness, such its origination, such its disappearance.’ As he keeps focusing on the arising & passing away of these five clinging-aggregates, the lingering residual ‘I am’ conceit, ‘I am’ desire, ‘I am’ obsession is fully obliterated.

“Just like a cloth, dirty & stained: Its owners give it over to a washerman, who scrubs it with salt earth or lye or cow-dung and then rinses it in clear water.

Now even though the cloth is clean & spotless, it still has a lingering residual scent of salt earth or lye or cow-dung. The washerman gives it to the owners, the owners put it away in a scent-infused wicker hamper, and its lingering residual scent of salt earth, lye, or cow-dung is fully obliterated.

“In the same way, friends, even though a noble disciple has abandoned the five lower fetters, he still has with regard to the five clinging-aggregates a lingering residual ‘I am’ conceit, an ‘I am’ desire, an ‘I am’ obsession. But at a later time he keeps focusing on the phenomena of arising & passing away with regard to the five clinging-aggregates: ‘Such is form, such its origination, such its disappearance. Such is feeling…. Such is perception…. Such are fabrications….

Such is consciousness, such its origination, such its disappearance.’ As he keeps focusing on the arising & passing away of these five clinging-aggregates, the lingering residual ‘I am’ conceit, ‘I am’ desire, ‘I am’ obsession is fully obliterated.”

When this was said, the elder monks said to Ven. Khemaka, “We didn’t crossexamine Ven. Khemaka with the purpose of troubling him, just that [we thought] Ven. Khemaka is capable of declaring the Blessed One’s message, teaching it, describing it, setting it forth, revealing it, explaining it, making it plain—just as he has in fact declared it, taught it, described it, set it forth, revealed it, explained it, made it plain.”

That is what Ven. Khemaka said. Gratified, the elder monks delighted in his words. And while this explanation was being given, the minds of sixty-some monks, through no clinging, were released from fermentations—as was Ven.

Khemaka’s. — SN 22:89

The Buddha’s final invitation to cross-question him:

§ 82. Then the Blessed One addressed the monks, “If even a single monk has any doubt or indecision concerning the Buddha, Dhamma, or Saºgha, the path or the practice, ask. Don’t later regret that ‘The Teacher was face-to-face with us, but we didn’t bring ourselves to cross-question him in his presence.’”

When this was said, the monks were silent.

A second time, the Blessed One said, “If even a single monk has any doubt or indecision concerning the Buddha, Dhamma, or Saºgha, the path or the practice, ask. Don’t later regret that ‘The Teacher was face-to-face with us, but we didn’t bring ourselves to cross-question him in his presence.’”

A second time, the monks were silent.

A third time, the Blessed One said, “If even a single monk has any doubt or indecision concerning the Buddha, Dhamma, or Saºgha, the path or the practice, ask. Don’t later regret that ‘The Teacher was face-to-face with us, but we didn’t bring ourselves to cross-question him in his presence.’”

A third time, the monks were silent.

Then the Blessed One addressed the monks, “Now, if it’s out of respect for the Teacher that you don’t ask, let a friend inform a friend.”

When this was said, the monks were silent.

Then Ven. finanda said to the Blessed One, “It’s amazing, lord. It’s astounding.

I’m confident that in this community of monks there isn’t even a single monk who has any doubt or indecision concerning the Buddha, Dhamma, or Saºgha, the path or the practice.”

“You, finanda, speak out of confidence, while there is knowledge in the Tath›gata that in this community of monks there isn’t even a single monk who has any doubt or indecision concerning the Buddha, Dhamma, or Saºgha, the path or the practice. Of these 500 monks, the most backward is a stream-winner, not destined for the planes of deprivation, headed to self-awakening for sure.”

Then the Blessed One addressed the monks, “Now then, monks, I exhort you:

All fabrications are subject to decay. Bring about completion by being heedful.”

Those were the Tath›gata’s last words. — DN 16

THE BUDDHA QUESTIONS OTHER SECTARIANS

§ 83. “Monks, there are these three sectarian guilds that—when interrogated, pressed, & rebuked by wise people—even though they may explain otherwise, remain stuck in [a doctrine of] inaction. Which three?

“There are contemplatives & brahmans who hold this teaching, hold this view: ‘Whatever a person experiences—pleasant, painful, or neither pleasant nor painful—is all caused by what was done in the past.’ There are contemplatives & brahmans who hold this teaching, hold this view: ‘Whatever a person experiences—pleasant, painful, or neither pleasant nor painful—is all caused by a supreme being’s act of creation.’ There are contemplatives & brahmans who hold this teaching, hold this view: ‘Whatever a person experiences—pleasant, painful, or neither pleasant nor painful—is all without cause & without condition.’

“Having approached the contemplatives & brahmans who hold that…

‘Whatever a person experiences… is all caused by what was done in the past,’ I said to them: ‘Is it true that you hold that… whatever a person experiences… is all caused by what was done in the past?’ Thus asked by me, they admitted, ‘Yes.’ Then I said to them, ‘Then in that case, a person is a killer of living beings because of what was done in the past. A person is a thief… unchaste… a liar… a divisive speaker… a coarse speaker… an idle chatterer… covetous… one bearing thoughts of ill will… a holder of wrong views because of what was done in the past.’ When one falls back on what was done in the past as being essential, monks, there is no desire, no effort [at the thought], ‘This should be done. This shouldn’t be done.’ When one can’t pin down as a truth or reality what should & shouldn’t be done, one dwells bewildered & unprotected. One cannot righteously refer to oneself as a contemplative. This was my first righteous refutation of those contemplatives & brahmans who hold to such teachings, such views.

“Having approached the contemplatives & brahmans who hold that…

‘Whatever a person experiences… is all caused by a supreme being’s act of creation,’ I said to them: ‘Is it true that you hold that… whatever a person experiences… is all caused by a supreme being’s act of creation?’ Thus asked by me, they admitted, ‘Yes.’ Then I said to them, ‘Then in that case, a person is a killer of living beings because of a supreme being’s act of creation. A person is a thief… unchaste… a liar… a divisive speaker… a coarse speaker… an idle chatterer… covetous… one bearing thoughts of ill will… a holder of wrong views because of a supreme being’s act of creation.’ When one falls back on a supreme being’s act of creation as being essential, monks, there is no desire, no effort [at the thought], ‘This should be done. This shouldn’t be done.’ When one can’t pin down as a truth or reality what should & shouldn’t be done, one dwells bewildered & unprotected. One cannot righteously refer to oneself as a contemplative. This was my second righteous refutation of those contemplatives & brahmans who hold to such teachings, such views.

“Having approached the contemplatives & brahmans who hold that…

‘Whatever a person experiences… is all without cause, without condition,’ I said to them: ‘Is it true that you hold that… whatever a person experiences… is all without cause, without condition?’ Thus asked by me, they admitted, ‘Yes.’ Then I said to them, ‘Then in that case, a person is a killer of living beings without cause, without condition. A person is a thief… unchaste… a liar… a divisive speaker… a coarse speaker… an idle chatterer… covetous… one bearing thoughts of ill will… a holder of wrong views without cause, without condition.’ When one falls back on lack of cause and lack of condition as being essential, monks, there is no desire, no effort [at the thought], ‘This should be done. This shouldn’t be done.’ When one can’t pin down as a truth or reality what should & shouldn’t be done, one dwells bewildered & unprotected. One cannot righteously refer to oneself as a contemplative. This was my third righteous refutation of those contemplatives & brahmans who hold to such teachings, such views.

“These are the three sectarian guilds that—when interrogated, pressed, & rebuked by wise people—even though they may explain otherwise, remain stuck in inaction.” — AN 3:62

§ 84. The Blessed One said, “Monks, there are some contemplatives & brahmans who teach in this way, who have this view: ‘Whatever a person experiences—pleasure, pain, or neither-pleasure-nor-pain—all is caused by what was done in the past. Thus, with the destruction of old actions through asceticism, and with the non-doing of new actions, there will be no flow into the future. With no flow into the future, there is the ending of action. With the ending of action, the ending of stress. With the ending of stress, the ending of feeling. With the ending of feeling, all suffering & stress will be exhausted.’ Such is the teaching of the Niga˚˛has.

“Going to Niga˚˛has who teach in this way, I have asked them, ‘Is it true, friend Niga˚˛has, that you teach in this way, that you have this view: “Whatever a person experiences—pleasure, pain, or neither-pleasure-nor-pain—all is caused by what was done in the past. Thus, with the destruction of old actions through asceticism, and with the non-doing of new actions, there will be no flow into the future. With no flow into the future, there is the ending of action. With the ending of action, the ending of stress. With the ending of stress, the ending of feeling. With the ending of feeling, all suffering & stress will be exhausted”?’ “Having been asked this by me, the Niga˚˛has admitted it, ‘Yes.’ “So I said to them, ‘But, friends, do you know that you existed in the past, and that you did not not exist?’

“‘No, friend.’

“‘And do you know that you did evil actions in the past, and that you did not not do them?’

“‘No, friend.’

“‘And do you know that you did such-and-such evil actions in the past?’ “‘No, friend.’

“‘And do you know that so-and-so much stress has been exhausted, or that so-and-so much stress remains to be exhausted, or that with the exhaustion of so-and-so much stress all stress will be exhausted?’ “‘No, friend.’

“‘But do you know what is the abandoning of unskillful qualities and the attainment of skillful qualities in the here-&-now?’ “‘No, friend.’

“‘So, friends, it seems that you don’t know that you existed in the past, and that you did not not exist… you don’t know what is the abandoning of unskillful qualities and the attainment of skillful qualities in the here-&-now. That being the case, it is not proper for you to assert that, “Whatever a person experiences— pleasure, pain, or neither-pleasure-nor-pain—all is caused by what was done in the past. Thus, with the destruction of old actions through asceticism, and with the non-doing of new actions, there will be no flow into the future. With no flow into the future, there is the ending of action. With the ending of action, the ending of stress. With the ending of stress, the ending of feeling. With the ending of feeling, all suffering & stress will be exhausted.”

“‘If, however, you knew that you existed in the past, and that you did not not exist; if you knew that you did evil actions in the past, and that you did not not do them; if you knew that you did such-and-such evil actions in the past; you don’t know that so-and-so much stress has been exhausted, or that so-and-so much stress remains to be exhausted, or that with the exhaustion of so-and-so much stress all stress will be exhausted; if you knew what is the abandoning of unskillful qualities and the attainment of skillful qualities in the here-&-now, then—that being the case—it would be proper for you to assert that, “Whatever a person experiences—pleasure, pain, or neither-pleasure-nor-pain—all is caused by what was done in the past. Thus, with the destruction of old actions through asceticism, and with the non-doing of new actions, there will be no flow into the future. With no flow into the future, there is the ending of action. With the ending of action, the ending of stress. With the ending of stress, the ending of feeling. With the ending of feeling, all suffering & stress will be exhausted.”

“‘Friend Niga˚˛has, it’s as if a man were shot with an arrow thickly smeared with poison. As a result of being shot with the arrow, he would feel fierce, sharp, racking pains. His friends & companions, kinsmen & relatives would provide him with a surgeon. The surgeon would cut around the opening of the wound with a knife. As a result of the surgeon’s cutting around the opening of the wound with a knife, the man would feel fierce, sharp, racking pains. The surgeon would probe for the arrow with a probe. As a result of the surgeon’s probing for the arrow with a probe, the man would feel fierce, sharp, racking pains. The surgeon would then pull out the arrow. As a result of the surgeon’s pulling out the arrow, the man would feel fierce, sharp, racking pains. The surgeon would then apply a burning medicine to the mouth of the wound. As a result of the surgeon’s applying a burning medicine to the mouth of the wound, the man would feel fierce, sharp, racking pains. But then at a later time, when the wound had healed and was covered with skin, he would be well & happy, free, master of himself, able to go wherever he liked. The thought would occur to him, “Before, I was shot with an arrow thickly smeared with poison. As a result of being shot with the arrow, I felt fierce, sharp, racking pains. My friends & companions, kinsmen & relatives provided me with a surgeon…. The surgeon cut around the opening of the wound with a knife… probed for the arrow with a probe… pulled out the arrow… applied a burning medicine to the mouth of the wound. As a result of his applying a burning medicine to the mouth of the wound, I felt fierce, sharp, racking pains. But now that the wound is healed and covered with skin, I am well & happy, free, master of myself, able to go wherever I like.”

“‘In the same way, friend Niga˚˛has, if you knew that you existed in the past, and that you did not not exist… if you knew what is the abandoning of unskillful qualities and the attainment of skillful qualities in the here-&-now, then—that being the case—it would be proper for you to assert that, “Whatever a person experiences—pleasure, pain, or neither-pleasure-nor-pain—all is caused by what was done in the past. Thus, with the destruction of old actions through asceticism, and with the non-doing of new actions, there will be no flow into the future. With no flow into the future, there is the ending of action. With the ending of action, the ending of stress. With the ending of stress, the ending of feeling. With the ending of feeling, all suffering & stress will be exhausted.” But because you do not know that you existed in the past… you do not know what is the abandoning of unskillful qualities and the attainment of skillful qualities in the here-&-now, then—that being the case—it is not proper for you to assert that, “Whatever a person experiences—pleasure, pain, or neither-pleasure-norpain—all is caused by what was done in the past. Thus, with the destruction of old actions through asceticism, and with the non-doing of new actions, there will be no flow into the future. With no flow into the future, there is the ending of action. With the ending of action, the ending of stress. With the ending of stress, the ending of feeling. With the ending of feeling, all suffering & stress will be exhausted.”

“When this was said, the Niga˚˛has said to me, ‘Friend, the Niga˚˛ha N›˛aputta [the leader of the Niga˚˛has] is all-knowing, all-seeing, and claims total knowledge & vision thus: “Whether I am walking or standing, sleeping or awake, knowledge & vision are continuously & continually established in me.”

He has told us, “Niga˚˛has, there are evil actions that you have done in the past.

Exhaust them with these painful austerities. When in the present you are restrained in body, restrained in speech, and restrained in mind, that is the nondoing of evil action for the future. Thus, with the destruction of old actions through asceticism, and with the non-doing of new actions, there will be no flow into the future. With no flow into the future, there is the ending of action. With the ending of action, the ending of stress. With the ending of stress, the ending of feeling. With the ending of feeling, all suffering & stress will be exhausted.” We approve of that [teaching], prefer it, and are gratified by it.’ “When this was said, I said to the Niga˚˛has, ‘Friend Niga˚˛has, there are five things that can turn out in two ways in the here-&-now. Which five? Conviction, liking, unbroken tradition, reasoning by analogy, & an agreement through pondering views. These are the five things that can turn out in two ways in the here-&-now. That being the case, what kind of conviction do you have for your teacher with regard to the past? What kind of liking? What kind of unbroken tradition? What kind of reasoning by analogy? What kind of agreement through pondering views?’ But when I said this, I did not see that the Niga˚˛has had any legitimate defense of their teaching.

“So I asked them further, ‘Friend Niga˚˛has, what do you think? When there is fierce striving, fierce exertion, do you feel fierce, sharp, racking pains from harsh treatment? And when there is no fierce striving, no fierce exertion, do you feel no fierce, sharp, racking pains from harsh treatment?’ “‘Yes, friend….’

“‘… Then it’s not proper for you to assert that, “Whatever a person experiences—pleasure, pain, or neither-pleasure-nor-pain—all is caused by what was done in the past. Thus, with the destruction of old actions through asceticism, and with the non-doing of new actions, there will be no flow into the future. With no flow into the future, there is the ending of action. With the ending of action, the ending of stress. With the ending of stress, the ending of feeling. With the ending of feeling, all suffering & stress will be exhausted.”

“‘If it were the case that when there was fierce striving, fierce exertion, you felt fierce, sharp, racking pains from harsh treatment; and when there was no fierce striving, no fierce exertion, you still felt fierce, sharp, racking pains from harsh treatment, then—that being the case—it would be proper for you to assert that, “Whatever a person experiences—pleasure, pain, or neither-pleasure-norpain—all is caused by what was done in the past. Thus, with the destruction of old actions through asceticism, and with the non-doing of new actions, there will be no flow into the future. With no flow into the future, there is the ending of action. With the ending of action, the ending of stress. With the ending of stress, the ending of feeling. With the ending of feeling, all suffering & stress will be exhausted.” But because when there is fierce striving, fierce exertion, you feel fierce, sharp, racking pains from harsh treatment; and when there was no fierce striving, no fierce exertion, you feel no fierce, sharp, racking pains from harsh treatment, then—that being the case—it is not proper for you to assert that, “Whatever a person experiences—pleasure, pain, or neither-pleasure-nor-pain— all is caused by what was done in the past. Thus, with the destruction of old actions through asceticism, and with the non-doing of new actions, there will be no flow into the future. With no flow into the future, there is the ending of action. With the ending of action, the ending of stress. With the ending of stress, the ending of feeling. With the ending of feeling, all suffering & stress will be exhausted.”’ But when I said this, I did not see that the Niga˚˛has had any legitimate defense of their teaching.

“So I asked them further, ‘Friend Niga˚˛has, what do you think? Can an action to be experienced in the here-&-now be turned, through striving & exertion, into an action to be experienced in the future life?’ “‘No, friend.’

“‘Can an action to be experienced in the future life be turned, through striving & exertion, into an action to be experienced in the here-&-now?’ “‘No, friend.’

“What do you think? Can an action to be experienced as pleasure be turned, through striving & exertion, into an action to be experienced as pain?’ “‘No, friend.’

“‘Can an action to be experienced as pain be turned, through striving & exertion, into an action to be experienced as pleasure?’ “‘No, friend.’

“What do you think? Can an action ripe to be experienced be turned, through striving & exertion, into an action not ripe to be experienced?’ “‘No, friend.’

“‘Can an action not ripe to be experienced be turned, through striving & exertion, into an action ripe to be experienced?’ “‘No, friend.’

“What do you think? Can an action greatly to be experienced be turned, through striving & exertion, into an action barely to be experienced?’ “‘No, friend.’

“‘Can an action barely to be experienced be turned, through striving & exertion, into an action greatly to be experienced?’ “‘No, friend.’

“What do you think? Can an action to be experienced be turned, through striving & exertion, into an action not to be experienced?’ “‘No, friend.’

“‘Can an action not to be experienced be turned, through striving & exertion, into an action to be experienced?’

“‘No, friend.’

“‘So, friends, it seems that an action to be experienced in the here-&-now cannot be turned, through striving & exertion, into an action to be experienced in the future life. An action to be experienced in the future life cannot be turned, through striving & exertion, into an action to be experienced in the here-&now…. An action to be experienced cannot be turned, through striving & exertion, into an action not to be experienced. An action not to be experienced cannot be turned, through striving & exertion, into an action to be experienced.

That being the case, the striving of the Niga˚˛has is fruitless, their exertion is fruitless.’

“Such is the teaching of the Niga˚˛has. And, such being the teaching of the Niga˚˛has, ten legitimate deductions can be drawn that give grounds for censuring them.

“[1] If beings experience pleasure & pain based on what was done in the past, then obviously the Niga˚˛has have done bad things in the past, which is why they now feel such fierce, sharp, racking pains.

“[2] If beings experience pleasure & pain based on the creative act of a supreme god, then obviously the Niga˚˛has have been created by an evil supreme god, which is why they now feel such fierce, sharp, racking pains.

“[3] If beings experience pleasure & pain based on sheer luck, then obviously the Niga˚˛has have evil luck, which is why they now feel such fierce, sharp, racking pains.

“[4] If beings experience pleasure & pain based on birth, then obviously the Niga˚˛has have had an evil birth, which is why they now feel such fierce, sharp, racking pains.

“[5] If beings experience pleasure & pain based on efforts in the here-&-now, then obviously the Niga˚˛has have evil efforts in the here-&-now, which is why they now feel such fierce, sharp, racking pains.

“[6] If beings experience pleasure & pain based on what was done in the past, the Niga˚˛has deserve censure. Even if not, they still deserve censure.

“[7] If beings experience pleasure & pain based on the creative act of a supreme god, the Niga˚˛has deserve censure. Even if not, they still deserve censure.

“[8] If beings experience pleasure & pain based on sheer luck, the Niga˚˛has deserve censure. Even if not, they still deserve censure.

“[9] If beings experience pleasure & pain based on birth, the Niga˚˛has deserve censure. Even if not, they still deserve censure.

“[10] If beings experience pleasure & pain based on efforts in the here-&-now, the Niga˚˛has deserve censure. Even if not, they still deserve censure.

“Such is the teaching of the Niga˚˛has, monks. And, such being the teaching of the Niga˚˛has, these ten legitimate deductions can be drawn that give grounds for censuring them.” — MN 101

§ 85. Then Asibandhakaputta the headman, a disciple of the Niga˚˛has, went to the Blessed One and on arrival, having bowed down to him, sat to one side.

As he was sitting there, the Blessed One said to him, “Headman, how does Niga˚˛ha N›˛aputta teach the Dhamma to his disciples?”

“Niga˚˛ha N›˛aputta teaches the Dhamma to his disciples in this way, lord:

‘All those who take life are destined for a state of deprivation, are destined for hell. All those who steal…. All those who indulge in sexual misconduct…. All those who tell lies are destined for a state of deprivation, are destined for hell.

Whatever one keeps doing frequently, by that is one led [to a state of rebirth].’ That’s how Niga˚˛ha N›˛aputta teaches the Dhamma to his disciples.”

“If it’s true that ‘Whatever one keeps doing frequently, by that is one led [to a state of rebirth],’ then no one is destined for a state of deprivation or destined to hell in line with Niga˚˛ha N›˛aputta’s words. What do you think, headman? If a man is one who takes life, then taking into consideration time spent doing & not doing, whether by day or by night, which time is more: the time he spends taking life or the time he spends not taking life?”

“If a man is one who takes life, lord, then taking into consideration time spent doing & not doing, whether by day or by night, the time he spends taking life is less, and the time he spends not taking life is certainly more. If it’s true that ‘Whatever one keeps doing frequently, by that is one led [to a state of rebirth],’ then no one is destined for a state of deprivation or destined to hell in line with Niga˚˛ha N›˛aputta’s words.”

“What do you think, headman? If a man is one who steals… engages in sexual misconduct… tells lies, then taking into consideration time spent doing & not doing, whether by day or by night, which time is more: the time he spends telling lies or the time he spends not telling lies?”

“If a man is one who tells lies, lord, then taking into consideration time spent doing & not doing, whether by day or by night, the time he spends telling lies is less, and the time he spends not telling lies is certainly more. If it’s true that ‘Whatever one keeps doing frequently, by that is one led [to a state of rebirth],’ then no one is destined for a state of deprivation or destined to hell in line with Niga˚˛ha N›˛aputta’s words.”

“There’s the case, headman, where a certain teacher holds this doctrine, holds this view: ‘All those who take life are destined for a state of deprivation, are destined for hell. All those who steal…. All those who engage in sexual misconduct…. All those who tell lies are destined for a state of deprivation, are destined for hell.’ A disciple has faith in that teacher, and the thought occurs to him, ‘Our teacher holds this doctrine, holds this view: “All those who take life are destined for a state of deprivation, are destined for hell.” There are living beings that I have killed. I too am destined for a state of deprivation, am destined for hell.’ He fastens onto that view. If he doesn’t abandon that doctrine, doesn’t abandon that state of mind, doesn’t relinquish that view, then as if he were to be carried off, he would thus be placed in hell.

“[The thought occurs to him,] ‘Our teacher holds this doctrine, holds this view:

‘All those who steal…. All those who engage in sexual misconduct…. All those who tell lies are destined for a state of deprivation, are destined for hell.’ There are lies that I have told. I too am destined for a state of deprivation, am destined for hell.’ He fastens onto that view. If he doesn’t abandon that doctrine, doesn’t abandon that state of mind, doesn’t relinquish that view, then as if he were to be carried off, he would thus be placed in hell.

“There is the case, headman, where a Tath›gata appears in the world, worthy and rightly self-awakened, consummate in clear knowing & conduct, well-gone, a knower of the cosmos, unexcelled trainer of those to be tamed, teacher of human & divine beings, awakened, blessed. He, in various ways, criticizes & censures the taking of life, and says, ‘Abstain from taking life.’ He criticizes & censures stealing, and says, ‘Abstain from stealing.’ He criticizes & censures engaging in sexual misconduct, and says, ‘Abstain from engaging in sexual misconduct.’ He criticizes & censures the telling of lies, and says, ‘Abstain from the telling of lies.’

“A disciple has faith in that teacher and reflects: ‘The Blessed One in a variety of ways criticizes & censures the taking of life, and says, “Abstain from taking life.” There are living beings that I have killed, to a greater or lesser extent. That was not right. That was not good. But if I become remorseful for that reason, that evil deed of mine will not be undone.’ So, reflecting thus, he abandons right then the taking of life, and in the future refrains from taking life. This is how there comes to be the abandoning of that evil deed. This is how there comes to be the transcending of that evil deed.

“[He reflects:] ‘The Blessed One in a variety of ways criticizes & censures stealing… engaging in sexual misconduct… the telling of lies, and says, “Abstain from the telling of lies.” There are lies that I have told, to a greater or lesser extent. That was not right. That was not good. But if I become remorseful for that reason, that evil deed of mine will not be undone.’ So, reflecting thus, he abandons right then the telling of lies, and in the future refrains from telling lies.

This is how there comes to be the abandoning of that evil deed. This is how there comes to be the transcending of that evil deed.

“Having abandoned the taking of life, he refrains from taking life. Having abandoned stealing, he refrains from stealing. Having abandoned sexual misconduct, he refrains from sexual misconduct. Having abandoned lies, he refrains from lies. Having abandoned divisive speech, he refrains from divisive speech. Having abandoned coarse speech, he refrains from coarse speech.

Having abandoned idle chatter, he refrains from idle chatter. Having abandoned covetousness, he becomes uncovetous. Having abandoned ill will & anger, he becomes one with a mind of no ill will. Having abandoned wrong views, he becomes one who has right views.

“That disciple of the noble ones, headman—thus devoid of covetousness, devoid of ill will, unbewildered, alert, mindful—keeps pervading the first direction [the east] with an awareness imbued with good will, likewise the second, likewise the third, likewise the fourth. Thus above, below, & all around, everywhere, in its entirety, he keeps pervading the all-encompassing cosmos with an awareness imbued with good will—abundant, expansive, immeasurable, without hostility, without ill will. Just as a strong conch-trumpet blower can notify the four directions without any difficulty, in the same way, when the awareness-release through good will is thus developed, thus pursued, any deed done to a limited extent no longer remains there, no longer stays there.

“That disciple of the noble ones—thus devoid of covetousness, devoid of ill will, unbewildered, alert, mindful—keeps pervading the first direction with an awareness imbued with compassion… empathetic joy… equanimity, likewise the second, likewise the third, likewise the fourth. Thus above, below, & all around, everywhere, in its entirety, he keeps pervading the all-encompassing cosmos with an awareness imbued with equanimity—abundant, expansive, immeasurable, without hostility, without ill will. Just as a strong conch-trumpet blower can notify the four directions without any difficulty, in the same way, when the awareness-release through equanimity is thus developed, thus pursued, any deed done to a limited extent no longer remains there, no longer stays there.” — SN 42:8

CLARIFYING THE QUESTION

§ 86. [King Pasenadi:] “But, lord, are there devas?”

[The Buddha:] “But why do you ask, great king, ‘But, lord, are there devas’?”

“Whether the devas come back to this life, lord, or whether they don’t.”

“Those devas who are afflicted come back to this life, whereas those devas who are unafflicted don’t come back to this life.” — MN 90 § 87. [Saºg›rava Bh›radv›ja:] “Well, Master Gotama, are there devas?”

“It’s immediately known to me, Bh›radv›ja, that there are devas.”

“Why, when asked if there are devas, did Master Gotama say, ‘It’s immediately known to me, Bh›radv›ja, that there are devas.’ When that’s the case, isn’t that empty and false?”

“When, on being asked if there are devas, one would say, ‘There are devas’ or one would say, ‘They are immediately known, they are known to me,’ then a knowledgeable person would come to the categorical conclusion that there are devas.”

“But why didn’t Master Gotama answer me the first way?”

“It’s assumed as something high in the world that there are devas.” — MN 100

§ 88. “Now, lord, is perception a person’s self, or is perception one thing and self another?”

“What self do you posit, Po˛˛hap›da?”

“I posit a gross self, possessed of form, made up of the four great existents [earth, water, fire, and wind], feeding on physical food.”

“Then, Po˛˛hap›da, your self would be gross, possessed of form, made up of the four great existents, feeding on physical food. That being the case, then for you perception would be one thing and self another. And it’s through this line of reasoning that one can realize how perception will be one thing and self another:

even as there remains this gross self—possessed of form, made up of the four great existents, and feeding on food—one perception arises for that person as another perception passes away. It’s through this line of reasoning that one can realize how perception will be one thing and self another.”

“Then, lord, I posit a mind-made self complete in all its parts, not inferior in its faculties.”

“Then, Po˛˛hap›da, your self would be mind-made, complete in all its parts, not inferior in its faculties. That being the case, then for you perception would be one thing and self another. And it’s through this line of reasoning that one can realize how perception will be one thing and self another: even as there remains this mind-made self—complete in all its parts, not inferior in its faculties—one perception arises for that person as another perception passes away. It’s through this line of reasoning that one can realize how perception will be one thing and self another.”

“Then, lord, I posit a formless self made of perception.”

“Then, Po˛˛hap›da, your self would be formless and made of perception.

That being the case, then for you perception would be one thing and self another. And it’s through this line of reasoning that one can realize how perception will be one thing and self another: even as there remains this formless self made of perception, one perception arises for that person as another perception passes away. It’s through this line of reasoning that one can realize how perception will be one thing and self another.”

“Is it possible for me to know, lord, whether perception is a person’s self or if perception is one thing and self another?”

“Po˛˛hap›da—having other views, other practices, other satisfactions, other aims, other teachers—it’s hard for you to know whether perception is a person’s self or if perception is one thing and self another.” — DN 9

EXTRACTING DEFINITIONS

§ 89. Then Mo˘iya Sıvaka the wanderer went to the Blessed One and, on arrival, exchanged courteous greetings with the Blessed One. After an exchange of friendly greetings & courtesies, he sat to one side. As he was sitting there, he said to the Blessed One: “‘The Dhamma is visible here-&-now. The Dhamma is visible here-&-now.’ Thus it is said. To what extent, lord, is the Dhamma visible here-&-now, timeless, inviting all to come & see, pertinent, to be known by the observant for themselves?”

“Very well then, Sıvaka, I will cross-question you on this matter. Answer as you see fit. What do you think? There being greed present within you, do you discern, ‘There is greed present within me’? And there being no greed present within you, do you discern, ‘There is no greed present within me’?”

“Yes, lord.”

“Sıvaka, the fact that, there being greed present within you, you discern, ‘There is greed present within me’; and, there being no greed present within you, you discern, ‘There is no greed present within me’: It is in this way that the Dhamma is visible here-&-now, timeless, inviting all to come & see, pertinent, to be known by the observant for themselves.

“What do you think? There being aversion present within you, do you discern, ‘There is aversion present within me’? And there being no aversion present within you, do you discern, ‘There is no aversion present within me’?”

“Yes, lord.”

“Sıvaka, the fact that, there being aversion present within you, you discern, ‘There is aversion present within me’; and, there being no aversion present within you, you discern, ‘There is no aversion present within me’: It is in this way that the Dhamma is visible here-&-now, timeless, inviting all to come & see, pertinent, to be known by the observant for themselves.

“What do you think? There being delusion present within you, do you discern, ‘There is delusion present within me’? And there being no delusion present within you, do you discern, ‘There is no delusion present within me’?”

“Yes, lord.”

“Sıvaka, the fact that, there being delusion present within you, you discern, ‘There is delusion present within me’; and, there being no delusion present within you, you discern, ‘There is no delusion present within me’: It is in this way that the Dhamma is visible here-&-now, timeless, inviting all to come & see, pertinent, to be known by the observant for themselves.” — AN 6:47 [In AN 6:48, a certain brahman asks the Buddha the same question, and he responds in a similar manner, although instead of using the examples of greed, aversion, and delusion, he uses the examples of passion, aversion, delusion, bodily corrupt behavior, verbal corrupt behavior, and mental corrupt behavior.] § 90. [Ven. finanda:] “This word, ‘becoming, becoming’—to what extent is there becoming?”

[The Buddha:] “If there were no kamma ripening in the sensuality-property, would sensuality-becoming be discerned?”

[Ven. finanda:] “No, lord.”

The Buddha: “Thus kamma is the field, consciousness the seed, and craving the moisture. The consciousness of living beings hindered by ignorance & fettered by craving is established in/tuned to a lower property. Thus there is the production of renewed becoming in the future.

“If there were no kamma ripening in the form-property, would formbecoming be discerned?”

[Ven. finanda:] “No, lord.”

[The Buddha:] “Thus kamma is the field, consciousness the seed, and craving the moisture. The consciousness of living beings hindered by ignorance & fettered by craving is established in/tuned to a middling property. Thus there is the production of renewed becoming in the future.

“If there were no kamma ripening in the formless-property, would formlessbecoming be discerned?”

[Ven. finanda:] “No, lord.”

[The Buddha:] “Thus kamma is the field, consciousness the seed, and craving the moisture. The consciousness of living beings hindered by ignorance & fettered by craving is established in/tuned to a refined property. Thus there is the production of renewed becoming in the future. This is how there is becoming.” — AN 3:77

§ 91. I have heard that on one occasion Ven. finanda was staying in Kosambı at Ghosita’s park. Then a certain householder, a disciple of the Fatalists [fijıvakas], went to him and, on arrival, having bowed down to him, sat to one side. As he was sitting there he said to Ven. finanda, “Among us, sir, whose Dhamma is well-taught? Who has practiced well in this world? Who in the world is well-gone?”

“Very well then, householder, I will cross-question you on this matter.

Answer as you see fit. Now, what do you think? Those who teach a Dhamma for the abandoning of passion, for the abandoning of aversion, for the abandoning of delusion—is their Dhamma well-taught or not? Or how does this strike you?”

“Sir, those who teach a Dhamma for the abandoning of passion, for the abandoning of aversion, for the abandoning of delusion—their Dhamma is welltaught. That’s how it strikes me.”

“And what do you think, householder? Those who have practiced for the abandoning of passion, for the abandoning of aversion, for the abandoning of delusion—have they practiced well in this world or not? Or how does this strike you?”

“Sir, those who have practiced for the abandoning of passion, for the abandoning of aversion, for the abandoning of delusion—they have practiced well in this world. That’s how it strikes me.”

“And what do you think, householder? Those whose passion is abandoned, its root destroyed, made like a palmyra stump, deprived of the conditions of development, not destined for future arising; those whose aversion is abandoned… whose delusion is abandoned, its root destroyed, made like a palmyra stump, deprived of the conditions of development, not destined for future arising: are they, in this world, well-gone or not? Or how does this strike you?”

“Sir, those whose passion… aversion… delusion is abandoned, its root destroyed, made like a palmyra stump, deprived of the conditions of development, not destined for future arising: they, in this world, are well-gone.

That’s how it strikes me.”

“In this way, householder, you have answered yourself: ‘Those who teach a Dhamma for the abandoning of passion, for the abandoning of aversion, for the abandoning of delusion—their Dhamma is well-taught. Those who have practiced for the abandoning of passion, for the abandoning of aversion, for the abandoning of delusion—they have practiced well in this world. Those whose passion… aversion… delusion is abandoned, its root destroyed, made like a palmyra stump, deprived of the conditions of development, not destined for future arising: they, in this world, are well-gone.’”

“How amazing, sir! How astounding! There is neither extolling of one’s own Dhamma nor deprecation of another’s, but just the teaching of the Dhamma in its proper sphere, speaking to the point without mentioning oneself.” — AN 3:73

HYPOTHETICALS: ON THE BUD D HA AS TEACHER

§ 92. Then P›˛aliya the headman went to the Blessed One and, on arrival, having bowed down to him, sat to one side. As he was sitting there, he said to the Blessed One, “I have heard that, ‘Gotama the contemplative knows magic.’ I trust that those who say that, ‘Gotama the contemplative knows magic’ do not slander the Blessed One with what is unfactual, that they declare the Dhamma in accordance with the Dhamma, and that the legitimate implications of what they say give no grounds for criticism. For I would not want to slander the Blessed One.”

“Headman, those who say that, ‘Gotama the contemplative knows magic’ do not slander me with what is unfactual, they declare the Dhamma in accordance with the Dhamma, and the legitimate implications of what they say give no grounds for criticism.”

“Then, good sir, we did not believe the plain truth from those contemplatives & brahmans who said, ‘Gotama the contemplative knows magic.’ Then the Blessed One is actually a magician!”

“But, headman, is one who says that ‘I know magic’ also saying that ‘I am a magician’?”

“That’s just how it is, Blessed One! That’s just how it is, One Well-gone!”

“Very well then, headman, I will cross-question you on this matter. Answer as you see fit. What do you think? Do you know the Koliyan hirelings who wear their top-knots hanging down?”

“Yes, lord….”

“What do you think? What is the job of the Koliyan hirelings who wear their top-knots hanging down?”

“They arrest any thieves among the Koliyans, and they carry messages for the Koliyans. That is the job of the Koliyan hirelings who wear their top-knots hanging down.”

“What do you think? Do you know whether the Koliyan hirelings who wear their top-knots hanging down are virtuous or unvirtuous?”

“I know that the Koliyan hirelings who wear their top-knots hanging down are unvirtuous and of evil character. They are among those in the world who are unvirtuous and of evil character.”

“If someone were to say, ‘P›˛aliya the headman knows that the Koliyan hirelings who wear their top-knots hanging down are unvirtuous and of evil character; and P›˛aliya the headman too is unvirtuous and of evil character,’ would someone speaking thus be speaking rightly?”

“No, lord. The Koliyan hirelings who wear their top-knots hanging down are one thing, and I am something else. Their character is one thing, and mine is something else.”

“Then, headman, if you get (to say) that P›˛aliya the headman knows that the Koliyan hirelings who wear their top-knots hanging down are unvirtuous and of evil character, yet he is not unvirtuous and of evil character, then why can’t the Tath›gata get (to say) that the Tath›gata knows magic, yet the Tath›gata is not a magician?

“I know magic, headman. I know the (kammic) result of magic, and I know how a magician practices so that—with the breakup of the body, after death—he appears in a plane of deprivation, a bad destination, a lower realm, hell.” — SN 42:13

§ 93. “Venerable sir, when wise nobles or brahmans, householders or contemplatives, having formulated questions, come to the Tath›gata and ask him, does this line of reasoning appear to his awareness beforehand—‘If those who approach me ask this, I—thus asked—will answer in this way’—or does the Tath›gata come up with the answer on the spot?”

“Very well then, prince, I will cross-question you on this matter. Answer as you see fit. What do you think? Are you skilled in the parts of a chariot?”

“Yes, venerable sir. I am skilled in the parts of a chariot.”

“And what do you think? When people come & ask you, ‘What is the name of this part of the chariot?’ does this line of reasoning appear to your awareness beforehand—‘If those who approach me ask this, I—thus asked—will answer in this way’—or do you come up with the answer on the spot?”

“Venerable sir, I am renowned for being skilled in the parts of a chariot. All the parts of a chariot are well-known to me. I come up with the answer on the spot.”

“In the same way, prince, when wise nobles or brahmans, householders or contemplatives, having formulated questions, come to the Tath›gata and ask him, he comes up with the answer on the spot. Why is that? Because the property of the Dhamma is thoroughly penetrated by the Tath›gata. From his thorough penetration of the property of the Dhamma, he comes up with the answer on the spot.”1 — MN 58