Skill in Questions: How the Buddha Taught

Eternalism & Annihilationism

There are two passages in the discourses where the Buddha puts aside a question because answering it would involve “circling around” or “being in company with” proponents of either eternalism or annihilationism [§162, §166].

Although he obviously regards these two

viewpoints as extreme forms of

wrong view, nowhere does he give a formal definition of what they are. Instead, he cites various examples of these views at scattered places in the discourses.

Thus the best way to get a sense of what these viewpoints entail is to start by gathering the examples that the Canon explicitly identifies as eternalism and annihilationism into one place.

Examples of eternalism:

“‘The self & the cosmos are barren, stable as a mountain-peak, standing firm like a pillar. And even though beings roam, wander, fall [die], & reappear, there is just that which will be like that as long as eternity.’” — DN 1

“’This self is the same as the cosmos. This I will be after death, constant, lasting, eternal, not subject to change.’” — SN 22:81 Examples of partial eternalism:

“‘We were created by Brahm›, the Great Brahm›, the Conqueror, the Unconquered, the All-Seeing, All-Powerful, the Sovereign Lord, the Maker, Creator, Chief, Appointer and Ruler, Father of All That Have Been and Shall Be. He is constant, permanent, eternal, not subject to change, and will stay just like that as long as eternity. But we who have been created by him—inconstant, impermanent, short-lived, subject to falling— have come to this world.’” — DN 1

“Those honorable devas who are not corrupted by play don’t spend an excessive amount of time indulging in the delights of laughter & play.

Because they don’t spend an excessive amount of time indulging in the delights of laughter & play, their mindfulness doesn’t become muddled.

Because of unmuddled mindfulness, they don’t fall from that company.

They are constant, permanent, eternal, not subject to change, and will stay just like that as long as eternity. But those of us who were corrupted by play spent an excessive amount of time indulging in the delights of laughter & play. Because we spent an excessive amount of time indulging in the delights of laughter & play, our mindfulness became muddled.

Because of muddled mindfulness, we fell from that company and— inconstant, impermanent, short-lived, subject to falling—have come to this world.’” — DN 1

“Those honorable devas who are not corrupted in mind don’t spend an excessive amount of time staring at one another with lust. Because they don’t spend an excessive amount of time staring at one another with lust, their minds don’t become corrupted toward one another. Because they are uncorrupted in mind toward one another, they don’t grow exhausted in body or exhausted in mind. They don’t fall from that company. They are constant, permanent, eternal, not subject to change, and will stay just like that as long as eternity. But those of us who were corrupted in mind spent an excessive amount of time staring at one another with lust.

Because we spent an excessive amount of time staring at one another with lust, our minds became corrupted toward one another. Because we were corrupted in mind toward one another, we grew exhausted in body & exhausted in mind. We fell from that company and—inconstant, impermanent, short-lived, subject to falling—have come to this world.’”

— DN 1

“‘That which is called “eye” & “ear” & “nose” & “tongue” & “body”:

That self is inconstant, impermanent, non-eternal, subject to change. But that which is called “mind” or “intellect” or “consciousness”: That self is constant, permanent, eternal, not subject to change, and will stay just like that as long as eternity.’” — DN 1

Examples of annihilationism:

“There are, monks, some contemplatives & brahmans who are annihilationists, and who on [one of] seven grounds declare the annihilation, destruction, & non-becoming of an existing being [sant satta:

see Appendix Four]….

“’When the self that is possessed of form, made of the four great elements, engendered by mother & father, is—with the breakup of the body—annihilated, destroyed, & does not exist after death, it’s to this extent that the self is completely exterminated.’ …

“’There is another self—divine, possessed of form, on the sensual level, feeding on material food…. When this self—with the breakup of the body—is annihilated, destroyed, & does not exist after death, it’s to this extent that the self is completely exterminated.’…

“’There is another self—divine, possessed of form, mind-made, complete in all its limbs, not destitute of any faculties…. When this self— with the breakup of the body—is annihilated, destroyed, & does not exist after death, it’s to this extent that the self is completely exterminated.’…

“’There is another self where—with the complete transcending of perceptions of form, with the disappearance of perceptions of resistance, and not heeding perceptions of diversity, (perceiving,) ‘Infinite space’— one enters & remains in the dimension of the infinitude of space…. When this self—with the breakup of the body—is annihilated, destroyed, & does not exist after death, it’s to this extent that the self is completely exterminated.’…

“’There is another self where—with the complete transcending of the dimension of the infinitude of space, (perceiving,) ‘Infinite consciousness’—one enters & remains in the dimension of the infinitude of consciousness…. When this self—with the breakup of the body—is annihilated, destroyed, & does not exist after death, it’s to this extent that the self is completely exterminated.’…

“’There is another self where—with the complete transcending of the dimension of the infinitude of consciousness, (perceiving,) ‘There is nothing’—one enters & remains in the dimension of nothingness…. When this self—with the breakup of the body—is annihilated, destroyed, & does not exist after death, it’s to this extent that the self is completely exterminated.’…

“’There is another self where—with the complete transcending of the dimension of nothingness—one enters & remains in the dimension of neither perception nor non-perception…. When this self—with the breakup of the body—is annihilated, destroyed, & does not exist after death, it’s to this extent that the self is completely exterminated.’ — DN 1 [King Aj›tasattu:] “Ajita Kesakambalin said to me, ‘Great king, there is nothing given, nothing offered, nothing sacrificed. There is no fruit or result of good or bad actions. There is no this world, no next world, no mother, no father, no spontaneously reborn beings; no contemplatives or brahmans who, faring rightly & practicing rightly, proclaim this world and the next after having directly known and realized it for themselves. A person is a composite of four primary elements. At death, the earth [in the body] returns to and merges with the [external] earth-substance. The fire returns to and merges with the fire-substance. The liquid returns to and merges with the liquid-substance. The wind returns to and merges with the wind-substance. The sense-faculties scatter into space. Four men, with the bier as the fifth, carry the corpse. Its eulogies are sounded only as far as the charnel ground. The bones turn pigeon-colored. The offerings end in ashes. Generosity is taught by idiots. The words of those who speak of existence [after death] are false, vain, empty chatter. With the breakup of the body, the wise & the foolish alike are annihilated, destroyed, & do not exist after death.’” — DN 2

“‘I would not be, neither would there be what is mine. I will not be, neither will there be what is mine.’” — SN 22:81 To generalize from these examples, eternalism is a view that both the self and the

cosmos

are

eternal

and

unchanging, existing

throughout

time. Partial

eternalism is a view that some beings are eternal and unchanging whereas others are not, or that some parts of the self are eternal and unchanging whereas others are not. Annihilationism is a view that a person—regardless of whether it is defined as a “self”—will be annihilated at death.

However, the views that the Buddha rejects because they encircle either eternalism or annihilationism do not constitute the full-blown forms of these views. Instead, they

are

forms

of

objectification

that

simply

tend in

their

direction.

“Kassapa, the statement, ‘With the one who acts being the same as the one who experiences, existing from the beginning, pleasure & pain are self-made’: This circles around eternalism. And the statement, ‘With the one who acts being one thing, and the one who experiences being another, existing as the one struck by the feeling’: This circles around annihilationism.” — SN 12:17

“finanda, if I—being asked by Vacchagotta the wanderer if there is a self—were to answer that there is a self, that would be in company with those contemplatives & brahmans who are exponents of eternalism. If I— being asked by Vacchagotta the wanderer if there is no self—were to answer that there is no self, that would be in company with those contemplatives & brahmans who are exponents of annihilationism.” —

SN 44:10

In the first case, the assumption that the self exists long enough to experience the results of the acts of which it is the agent is enough to circle around eternalism. The

assumption

that

the

agent

doesn’t

exist

long

enough

to

experience the results of its actions is enough to circle around annihilationism.

In the second case, the assumption that there is any kind of self at all is enough to put oneself in the same company as eternalists. The assumption that there is no self—this would come close to the annihilationist view given in DN 2—is enough to put oneself in the same company as annihilationists.

Even though these assumptions do not constitute full-blown eternalism or annihilationism, they are similar to eternalism and annihilationism in that they place importance on questions of what does or does not underlie the phenomena of experience, lasting from one moment to the next. Thus they encourage the perceptions of objectification that get in the way of seeing the phenomena of experience directly as they occur in terms of dependent co-arising. At the same time—as Iti 49 shows—the ways of thinking exemplified by assumptions tending either

toward

eternalism

or

annihilationism

provide

food

for

craving

for

becoming and craving for non-becoming, both of which are causes for continued becoming and its inherent suffering and stress.

“Overcome by two viewpoints, some human & divine beings adhere, other human & divine beings slip right past, while those with vision see.

“And how do some adhere? Human & divine beings delight in becoming, enjoy becoming, are satisfied with becoming. When the Dhamma is being taught for the sake of the cessation of becoming, their minds do not take to it, are not calmed by it, do not settle on it, or become resolved on it. This is how some adhere.

“And how do some slip right past? Some, feeling horrified, humiliated, & disgusted with that very becoming, delight in non-becoming: ‘When this self, with the breakup of the body, after death, is annihilated, destroyed, and does not exist after death, that is peaceful, that is exquisite, that is sufficiency!’ This is how some slip right past.

“And how do those with vision see? There is the case where a monk sees what’s come to be as what’s come to be. Seeing this, he practices for disenchantment with what’s come to be, dispassion for what’s come to be, and the cessation of what’s come to be. This is how those with vision see.

— Iti 49

As the Buddha states in the refrain to DN 1 [§184], he rejects eternalism and annihilationism because “he discerns that these standpoints, thus seized, thus grasped at, lead to such & such a destination, to such & such a state in the world beyond. And he discerns what is higher than this. And yet discerning that, he does not grasp at that act of discerning. And as he is not grasping at it, unbinding (nibbuti) is experienced right within.” A similar statement could be made about assumptions that circle around these two extreme forms of wrong view: When they are abandoned, when the mind no longer thinks in terms of the questions on which they are based—Am I? Am I not? What am I?—one is in a better position to develop the vision that allows one to see simply in terms of what has come to be, as dependently co-arisen events, and to practice in a way that leads through dispassion and cessation to release.

AP P E N DI X FOUR

On the meaning of tath›gata in the tetralemma The primary use of the word

tath›gata in the discourses is as an epithet of the Buddha. Iti 112 gives an extended discussion of why this epithet is appropriate to him:

This was said by the Blessed One, said by the Arahant, so I have heard:

“The

cosmos [§159] has been fully awakened to by the Tath›gata. From the cosmos, the Tath›gata is disjoined. The origination of the cosmos has been fully awakened to by the Tath›gata. The origination of the cosmos has, by the Tath›gata, been abandoned. The cessation of the cosmos has been fully awakened to by the Tath›gata. The cessation of the cosmos has, by the Tath›gata, been realized. The path leading to the cessation of the cosmos has been fully awakened to by the Tath›gata. The path leading to the cessation of the cosmos has, by the Tath›gata, been developed.

“Whatever in this cosmos—with its devas, M›ras, & Brahm›s, its generations with their contemplatives & brahmans, their royalty & common people—is seen, heard, sensed, cognized, attained, sought after, pondered by the intellect, that has been fully awakened to by the Tath›gata [§46]. Thus he is called the Tath›gata.

“From the night the Tath›gata fully awakens to the unsurpassed Right Self-awakening until the night he is totally unbound in the unbinding property with no fuel remaining, whatever the Tath›gata has said, spoken, explained is just so (tatha) and not otherwise. Thus he is called the Tath›gata.

“The Tath›gata is one who does in line with

(tath›) what he teaches,

one who teaches in line with what he does. Thus he is called the Tath›gata.

“In this cosmos with its devas, M›ras, & Brahm›s, its generations with their contemplatives & brahmans, their royalty & common people, the Tath›gata is the unconquered conqueror, all-seeing, the wielder of power [these are epithets usually associated with the Great Brahm›]. Thus he is called the Tath›gata.” This is the meaning of what the Blessed One said. — Iti 112

Many of the attributes listed in this discourse apply solely to the Buddha, but a few passages in the discourses—at MN 22 (see below), MN 72 [§190], and SN 22:85 [§183]—use the term tath›gata to denote any person fully released, whether a Buddha or

an arahant disciple. In either

case, the

word, as used in the

discourses, has a high and exalted meaning.

In general, the Commentary follows this understanding of the term tath›gata

in its explanations of the discourses. In fact, whenever the term first appears in each of the major nik›yas, the Commentary to that nik›ya expands on the list given in Iti 112 to provide even more reasons for why the Buddha is termed the Tath›gata, and why this is a term of exalted status. However, when treating the tetralemma—the

four

unacceptable

ways

of

describing

the

Tath›gata after

death—the Commentary gives two different definitions for the term tath›gata.

When discussing the tetralemma in SN 44:1 [§191], it defines tath›gata in the standard way, as meaning the Buddha (“the all-knowing Tath›gata”); but in five places—when discussing the tetralemma as it appears in DN 29 [§185], MN 63 [§176], SN 16:12, SN 22:85 [§193], and AN 7:51 [§178]—it defines tath›gata as satta, or being. According to this latter explanation, the question of the existence, nonexistence, etc., of any being after death is one that the Buddha would put aside.

The Commentary does not define the term

tath›gata in this way in any other

context, provides no reason for why it does so in these locations, and makes no note of the fact that it defines the term differently even though the context—the tetralemma—is the same. And as the Commentary to SN 44:1 points out, it is precisely because the Tath›gata cannot be classified as a being that the four alternatives in the tetralemma do not apply to him:

“Deep”: Deep through the depth of his disposition & through the depth of his qualities. Given that the all-knowing Tath›gata is so deep in his qualities, and through the non-existence of that in dependence on which there is the description, “The Tath›gata is classed as a being,” for one who sees the non-existence of that description, the statement, “The Tath›gata, classed as a being, exists after death,” isn’t fitting, doesn’t apply. The statement, “The Tath›gata doesn’t exist after death,” etc., isn’t fitting, doesn’t apply. — Commentary to SN 44:1 For

these

reasons,

many

scholars

have

called

into

question

the

Commentary’s definition of tath›gata as satta in its other explanations of the tetralemma. Recently, however, a justification for the Commentary’s usage has been proposed: The tetralemma actually functions in two contexts, with the term tath›gata carrying different meanings in each. When the tetralemma appears as part of the ten undeclared questions, it concerns the post-mortem fate of any being; when it appears on its own, it concerns the post-mortem fate of a fully awakened person.

To evaluate this proposal, we have to address three questions:

1) Does the Commentary itself observe this distinction between the two contexts?

2) Is there any evidence that the Canon recognizes a distinction between the meaning of the tetralemmas in the two contexts?

3) Is there any reason to accept the Commentary’s proposal that the Buddha would have put aside the question of whether an ordinary being exists, doesn’t exist, both, or neither after death?

1) The answer to the first question is a simple No. The Commentary to DN 29 [§185] and to SN 16:12 both equate tath›gata with satta, and yet the tetralemma discussed in those discourses appears on its own, and not in the context of the ten undeclared questions.

2) As for whether the Canon itself recognizes a distinction between the meaning of the tetralemmas in the two contexts, the major arguments for saying Yes are these:

a) In MN 72 [§183], Vacchagotta the wanderer asks why the Buddha doesn’t take a stand on any of the ten undeclared questions, and the Buddha responds by saying that each of these ten positions is “a thicket of views, a wilderness of views, a contortion of views, a writhing

of views, a fetter

of views. It is

accompanied by suffering, distress, despair, & fever, and it does not lead to disenchantment,

dispassion,

cessation;

to

calm,

direct

knowledge,

selfawakening, unbinding.” In other words, he gives the basic list of pragmatic reasons for not taking a stand on these views. This answer apparently satisfies Vacchagotta. Later in the same discourse [§190], however, Vacchagotta questions the Buddha about the post-mortem fate of a monk whose mind is released. This, according to the argument, shows that when Vacchagotta had asked the Buddha about the tetralemma earlier in the discourse, he intended the term tath›gata to mean any being in general, for if he had intended it to mean an awakened being in that context, he wouldn’t have repeated his question about the fate of the monk whose mind was released.

b) The Canon, when explaining the reasons for rejecting the tetralemma in the context of the ten undeclared questions, uses what we have identified as the basic list of pragmatic reasons, but when explaining the reasons for rejecting the tetralemma on its own, it never uses this list, but instead uses other sets of reasons: that the questions derive from unskillful mind states (what we have identified as part of the strong list pragmatic reasons), or that the terms of the questions simply do not apply (the argument based on the meaninglessness of the questions). At the same time, the fact that the questions of the tetralemma derive from unskillful mind states shows that, from the Buddhist point of view, they are meaningless. Thus the reasons for putting aside the questions of the tetralemma on

their

own

are

of

a different

order: The

argument

from

meaninglessness is always used, and the argument from pragmatic reasons, never.

c) The tetralemma in the context of the ten undeclared questions is part of a general

questionnaire

of

issues

discussed

among

the

many

competing

philosophical groups of the time. Because some of those groups denied the existence of awakened beings, this would not have been a topic they would have addressed. Also, there is no evidence that any other schools used the term tath›gata to mean an awakened being in their teachings, and so that meaning would not have been part of the general questionnaire.

When the tetralemma is addressed on its own, however, it is always in the context where a person has just heard the Buddha’s teachings, and so it deals with the post-mortem fate of the tath›gata as understood in those teachings: i.e., as a fully awakened being.

In response to these arguments, we can cite the following points:

a) As we noted in Chapter Eight, the pragmatic reasons for rejecting the ten undeclared questions leave open the issue of whether or not they could be answered. Thus, in MN 72, when Vacchagotta hears these reasons, he could easily

assume

that

the

Buddha might

have

had

private

answers

to

these

questions, but for pragmatic reasons refused to divulge them publicly. After the Buddha again brings up the topic of the released mind, Vacchagotta might have seen his chance to gain access to those private answers. What confuses him is the new set of reasons that the Buddha gives for not answering the tetralemma: that the various alternatives are meaningless and so do not apply. Thus the argument in point (a), above, is inconclusive.

b) Without going into the issue of whether the reasons in the strong list should be classed as pragmatic or dealing with meaninglessness, we can simply note that DN 29 [§185] and SN 16:12, when discussing the tetralemma on its own, do use the basic list of pragmatic reasons for explaining why the Buddha puts these questions aside. In fact, these are the only reasons these discourses list. This in itself is enough to disprove the argument in point (b), that the Canon never uses the basic list of pragmatic reasons when discussing the tetralemma on its own.

c) The lack of evidence for how other philosophical groups addressed the questionnaire of ten questions to one another, and the lack of evidence for how they used the word tath›gata among themselves, cuts both ways. When reading the discourses, we must remember that we are reading how other sectarians addressed the questionnaire to the Buddha or to his followers, and it might be that those sectarians phrased their questions in terms that the Buddhists would have

found

familiar. Either

that, or

the

Buddhists—when

recording

their

conversations with other sectarians—did so using their own Buddhist terms.

Whichever is the case, SN 44:2 [§192] portrays other sectarians addressing a Buddhist monk and using the term tath›gata in the sense of a person who has reached the highest goal:

On that occasion, Ven. Anur›dha was staying not far from the Blessed One in a wilderness hut. Then a large number of wandering sectarians went to him and… said, “Friend Anur›dha, the Tath›gata—the supreme person, the superlative person, attainer of the superlative attainment— being described, is described with [one of] these four positions: After death the Tath›gata exists; after death he does not exist; after death he both exists & does not exist; after death he neither exists nor does not exist.”

Although it is true that we have no evidence that other philosophical schools used the

word tath›gata to mean an awakened being when talking among themselves, we also have no evidence of their using it to mean satta when talking among themselves. In fact, there is good reason to think that they would not have used it to mean satta, for if it had such an ordinary meaning among the sects of the time, why would the Buddha have adopted it as his primary epithet to express his exalted status and that of his fully awakened students?

And as for groups that did not believe in awakening—and these tended to believe

that

death

was

annihilation—they

could

have

easily

answered

the

questionnaire sarcastically by saying that regardless of how “awakened” you were, you were no different from anyone else: Death would be the end of you.

Thus there is no conclusive evidence that the Canon recognized a distinction between the meaning of the tetralemma in the context of the ten undeclared issues and that of the tetralemma when discussed on its own. In fact, the evidence strongly suggests that this was not the case.

3) As for the question of whether there is any basis in the Canon for assuming that the Buddha would have put aside the question of the existence, non-existence, etc., of

an

ordinary being

after

death: The

evidence

clearly

indicates that the Buddha would have treated this question as one deserving an analytical response. In other words, he would have given an answer after introducing an extra variable or two.

The variable he would have introduced here would have been his definition of “being” (satta) as passion, delight, obsession, or craving for any

of the

aggregates

[§§199-200]. In

this

sense, a “being” in

the

Buddha’s

terms

is

defined—measured—as an ongoing psychological process of attachment and obsession. Having given a definition in this way, he can then talk of the object of the definition as existing, not existing, both, or neither.

But before addressing the issue of that being’s existence after death, we have to add an important variable, noting that the Buddha’s definition of a being as a process differs from that of a being as a discrete metaphysical entity. This latter sort of definition is apparently what the Buddha meant by the phrase “existing being (sant satta)” in the following passage.

“And when the devas, together with their Indras, Brahm›s, & Paj›patıs, search for the monk whose mind is thus released, they cannot find that ‘The consciousness of the Tath›gata is dependent on this.’ Why is that? The Tath›gata is untraceable even in the here & now. [§§192-193] “Speaking in this way, teaching in this way, I have been erroneously, vainly, falsely, unfactually misrepresented by some contemplatives & brahmans (who say,) ‘Gotama the contemplative is one who misleads. He declares the annihilation, destruction, extermination of the existing being [sant satta].’ But as I am not that, as I do not say that, so I have been erroneously, vainly, falsely, unfactually misrepresented by those venerable contemplatives & brahmans (who say,) ‘Gotama the contemplative is one who misleads. He declares the annihilation, destruction, extermination of the existing being.’” — MN 22 Having

introduced

these

two

ways

of

talking

about

a being—as

a

metaphysical entity, which he does not adopt; and as a psychological process of self-definition through attachment and obsession, which he does—the Buddha would then be able to give an analytical answer to the question of whether such a being exists after death. From the perspective of mundane right view, the being as psychological process does exist after death as long as the process is supported by craving. And this, in fact, is how the Buddha often describes what beings do after death, most notably in the standard description of the “divine eye” given repeatedly throughout the discourses:

“When the mind was thus concentrated, purified, bright, unblemished, rid of defilement, pliant, malleable, steady, & attained to imperturbability, I directed it to the knowledge of the passing away & reappearance of beings. I saw—by means of the divine eye, purified & surpassing the human—beings passing away & re-appearing, and I discerned how they are inferior & superior, beautiful & ugly, fortunate & unfortunate in accordance with action: ‘These beings—who were endowed with bad conduct of body, speech, & mind, who reviled the noble ones, held wrong views and undertook actions under the influence of wrong views—with the breakup of the body, after death, have re-appeared in the plane of deprivation, the bad destination, the lower realms, in hell. But these beings—who were endowed with good conduct of body, speech, & mind, who did not revile the noble ones, who held right views and undertook actions under the influence of right views—with the breakup of the body, after death, have re-appeared in the good destinations, in the heavenly world.’” — MN 19

“But, Master Gotama, at the moment a flame is being swept on by the wind and goes a far distance, what do you designate as its clinging/sustenance then?”

“Vaccha, when a flame is being swept on by the wind and goes a far distance, I designate it as wind-sustained, for the wind is its clinging/sustenance at that time.”

“And at the moment when a being sets this body aside and is not yet reborn in another body, what do you designate as its clinging/sustenance then?”

“Vaccha, when a being sets this body aside and is not yet reborn in another body, I designate it as craving-sustained, for craving is its clinging/sustenance at that time.” — SN 44:9 However, when the mind has no more attachments and obsessions, then—as noted by the passage from MN 22—there is no longer any basis for locating or defining the person fully released.

“But if one doesn’t stay obsessed with form, monk, that’s not what one is measured by. Whatever one isn’t measured by, that’s not how one is classified.

“If one doesn’t stay obsessed with feeling… perception…

fabrications… consciousness, that’s not what one is measured by.

Whatever one isn’t measured by, that’s not how one is classified.” — SN 22:36

“Having

shed classifications,

gone beyond conceit,

he has here

cut

through craving

for name

& form:

This one—

his bonds cut through,

free

from trouble,

from longing—

though they search they can’t find him,

human & heavenly beings,

here & beyond,

in heaven

or any abode. — SN 1:20

When one cannot be defined or located, one cannot be described either in this life or after death.

Just as the destination of a glowing fire

struck with a [blacksmith’s] iron hammer,

gradually growing calm,

isn’t known:

Even so, there’s no destination to describe

for those who are rightly released

—having crossed over the flood

of sensuality’s bond—

for those who’ve attained

unwavering ease. — Ud 8:10

“I designate the rebirth of one who has clinging/sustenance, Vaccha, and not of one without clinging/sustenance. Just as a fire burns with clinging/sustenance and not without clinging/sustenance, even so I designate the rebirth of one who has clinging/sustenance and not of one without clinging/sustenance.” — SN 44:9

“And so, Anur›dha—when you can’t pin down the Tath›gata as a truth or reality even in the present life—is it proper for you to declare, ‘Friends, the Tath›gata—the supreme person, the superlative person, attainer of the superlative attainment—being described, is described otherwise than with these four positions: After death the Tath›gata exists; after death he does not exist; after death he both exists & does not exist; after death he neither exists nor does not exist’?”

“No, lord.”

“Very good, Anur›dha. Very good. Both formerly & now, it is only stress that I describe, and the cessation of stress.” — SN 44:2 Thus the Buddha would discuss the post-mortem fate of the being-as-process, because such a being could be defined; but he would not discuss the postmortem fate of the awakened person, because such a person cannot be defined.

In other words, questions about the Tath›gata’s post-mortem fate are in a category apart precisely because he/she cannot be defined as a satta. For these reasons, it appears that the word tath›gata—as used in the tetralemma wherever it is found in the discourses—has only one meaning: a person so fully released that he/she cannot be defined. And the Commentary’s equation of tath›gata with satta is clearly mistaken.

4) This, of course, leads to a further question: Why did the Commentary propose this equation to begin with? This is a matter of conjecture, but the following passage from the Commentary to SN 22:85 [§193] helps to throw some light on the matter. Here the Commentary is explaining what is wrong with Ven. Yamaka’s original position that “A monk with no more fermentations, with the breakup of the body, is annihilated, destroyed, & does not exist after death.”

If this thought had occurred to him, “Fabrications both arise & cease.

There is the non-occurrence of the mere occurrence of fabrications,” that would not be called a view-standpoint (di˛˛higata). It would be knowledge in accordance with the Teaching. But because the thought occurred to him, “A being is annihilated, is destroyed,” what is called a view-standpoint was born….

The Commentary then goes on to explain Ven. Yamaka’s answer after he has realized his mistake:

“That which is stressful has ceased”: What is stressful, only that has ceased. There is no being aside from that to cease. — Commentary to SN 22:85

In making this explanation, the Commentary is calling on the tradition that developed after the Abhidhamma (and is discussed above in the Chapter Nine) that there is no self (att›) or being (satta) in the ultimate sense of the term, that the terms self and being are simply

conventional designations for what, in

ultimate terms, is simply an occurrence of fabrications in the form of the five aggregates.

However, in taking this stand the Commentary is unwittingly providing an analytical answer to the tetralemma by adding the variables of conventional vs.

ultimate existence: Yes, a being with craving and clinging exists after death in the conventional sense, but No, it does not exist in the ultimate sense. In other words, the tath›gata (defined as satta) both exists and does not exist after death.

Thus, because

both

the

Canon

and

the

Commentary

give

(different)

analytical answers to the question of an ordinary being’s existence after death, we can safely stick with the conclusion given above, that tath›gata has only one meaning wherever it occurs in the tetralemma or in the Canon as a whole: a person so fully released that he/she cannot be defined either in this life or after death.

Glossary

Abhidhamma: The third division of the P›li Canon, composed of texts that elaborate on lists of terms and categories drawn from the discourses.

Arahant:

A “worthy one” or “pure one;” a person whose mind is free of defilement and thus not destined for further rebirth. A title for the Buddha and the highest level of his noble disciples.

Asura: A member of a race of heavenly beings that—much like the Titans in Greek mythology—fought with the devas for control of heaven and lost.

fisava:

Fermentation; effluent. Four qualities—sensuality, views, becoming, and ignorance—that “flow out” of the mind and create the flood (ogha) of the round of death & rebirth.

Bhava:

Becoming. A sense of identity within a particular world of experience.

The three levels of becoming are on the level of sensuality, form, and formlessness.

Bodhisatta:

“A being (striving) for Awakening;” the term used to describe the Buddha before he actually became Buddha, from his first aspiration to Buddhahood until the time of his full Awakening. Sanskrit form: Bodhisattva.

Brahm›: An inhabitant of the higher heavenly realms of form or formlessness.

Brahman:

A member of the priestly caste, which claimed to be the highest caste in India, based on birth. In a specifically Buddhist usage, “brahman” can also mean an arahant, conveying the point that excellence is based not on birth or race, but on the qualities attained in the mind.

Deva (devat›): Literally, “shining one.” A being on the subtle level of form, living either in terrestrial or heavenly realms.

Dhamma:

(1) Event; action; (2) a phenomenon in and of itself; (3) mental quality; (4) doctrine, teaching; (5) nibb›na (although there are passages describing nibb›na as the abandoning of all dhammas). Sanskrit form: Dharma.

Gotama: The Buddha’s clan name.

Indra: King of a deva realm. Sakka is the indra of the heaven of the Thirtythree, one of the sensual heavenly realms.

Jh›na: Mental absorption. A state of strong concentration focused on a single sensation or mental notion.

Kamma: (1) Intentional action; (2) the results of intentional actions. Sanskrit form: Karma.

Khandha:

Aggregate; physical and mental phenomena as they are directly experienced; the raw material for a sense of self: rÒpa—physical form; vedan›— feelings of pleasure, pain, or neither pleasure nor pain; saññ›—perception, mental label; saºkh›ra—fabrication, thought construct; and viññ›˚a—sensory consciousness, the act of taking note of sense data and ideas as they occur.

Sanskrit form: Skandha.

M›ra: The personification of temptation and all forces, within and without, that create obstacles to release from the round of death and rebirth.

N›ga:

A term commonly used to refer to strong, stately, and heroic animals, such as elephants and magical serpents. In Buddhism, it is also used to refer to those who have attained the goal.

Nibb›na:

Literally, the “unbinding” of the mind from passion, aversion, and delusion, and from the entire round of death and rebirth. As this term also denotes the extinguishing of a fire, it carries connotations of stilling, cooling, and peace. Sanskrit form: Nirv›˚a.

Paj›pati: A high-ranking deva, second in command to the indra of his particular deva realm.

P›li: The language of the oldest extant Canon of the Buddha’s teachings.

Papañca: Objectification. Other possible translations for this term include complication, differentiaion, elaboration, and proliferation.

P›˛imokkha: The basic code of monastic discipline, composed of 227 rules for monks and 311 for nuns.

Sakyan: An inhabitant of the Sakyan republic, the Buddha’s home territory.

Saªyojana:

Fetter. The ten fetters that bind the mind to the round of death and rebirth are (1) identity views, (2) uncertainty, (3) grasping at habits and practices, (4) sensual passion, (5) irritation, (6) passion for form, (7) passion for formlessness, (8) conceit, (9) restlessness, and (10) ignorance.

Saºgha:

1) On the conventional (sammati) level, this term denotes the communities of Buddhist monks and nuns; 2) on the ideal (ariya) level, it denotes those followers of the Buddha, lay or ordained, who have attained at least stream-entry.

Tath›gata:

Literally, one who has “become authentic (tatha-›gata)” or who is “truly gone (tath›-gata)”: an epithet used in ancient India for a person who has attained the highest religious goal. In Buddhism, it usually denotes the Buddha, although occasionally it also denotes any of his arahant disciples.

Uposatha:

Observance day, coinciding with the full moon, new moon, and half moons. Lay Buddhists often observe the eight precepts on this day. Monks recite the P›˛imokkha, the monastic code, on the full moon and new moon uposathas.

Vinaya:

The monastic discipline, whose rules and traditions comprise six volumes in printed text. The Buddha’s own term for the religion he taught was, “This Dhamma-Vinaya.”

Yakkha: Spirit. A lower level of deva—sometimes friendly to human beings, sometimes not—often dwelling in trees or other wild places.