1.1 Of the Existence of a Personal Entity (KV1.1)

Supernormal Power

Examination into “Soul” continued by reference to Superintellectual Power

Puggalavādin: Is it wrong to say “the person or soul is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact”?

Theravādin: Yes.

Puggalavādin: Have there not been those who could transform themselves by magic potency?

Theravādin: Yes.

Puggalavādin: If that be so, then indeed, good sir, it is right to say “the person or soul is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact”. Again, have there not been those who could hear sounds by the element of celestial hearing,… or know the mind of another, or remember previous lives, or see visible objects by the celestial eye, or realize the destruction of the “intoxicants”?

Theravādin: Yes.

Puggalavādin: If these things be so, then indeed, good sir, it is right to say “the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact”.

Theravādin: Granting that there have been those who could transform themselves by magic potency, is it for that reason that the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: When one has through magic potency transformed himself, was he then the personal entity, and not when not so transforming himself?

Puggalavādin: Nay, that cannot truly be said … .

This question is asked, and so answered, in the case of the other five modes of Superintellectual faculty named above.

Appeal to the Suttas

Puggalavādin: Is it wrong to say “the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact”?

Theravādin: Yes.

Puggalavādin: Is there not one whom we call mother?

Theravādin: Yes.

Puggalavādin: If there be, then indeed, good sir, it is right to say “the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact”. Again, is there not one whom we call father, are there not brothers, sisters, nobles, brahmins, merchants, serfs, householders, religious, devas, humans?

Theravādin: Yes.

Puggalavādin: If there be, then indeed, good sir, it is right to say “the person is known”, etc.

Theravādin: Granting there are mothers, fathers, etc., is it for this reason that you insist thus respecting the personal entity?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Is there anyone who, not having been a mother, becomes a mother?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Is there anyone who, not having been a personal entity, becomes one?

Puggalavādin: Nay, that cannot truly be said … .

This pair of questions is then put concerning “father”, “brother”…“deva”, “human”, and answered as above.

Theravādin: Granting the existence of a mother, is it for this reason that the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Is there anyone who, having been a mother, is no longer a mother?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Is there anyone who, having been a personal entity, is no longer one?

Puggalavādin: Nay, that cannot truly be said … .

This last pair of questions is then put with respect to “father” and the rest, and answered as above.

Puggalavādin: Is it wrong to say “the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact”?

Theravādin: Yes.

Puggalavādin: Is there no such thing as a “stream-winner” (or one who has entered the first stage of the way to salvation)?

Theravādin: Yes.

Puggalavādin: If there be such a thing, then indeed, good sir, it is right to assent to the original proposition. Again, is there no such thing as a “once-returner”, a “no-returner”, an arahant, one who is freed in both ways, one who is emancipated by understanding, one who has the testimony within himself, one who has arrived at right views, one who is emancipated by faith, one who marches along with wisdom, one who marches along with faith?

Theravādin: Yes.

Puggalavādin: Then surely, good sir, it is right to affirm the first proposition.

Theravādin: Granted that there is such a thing as a “stream-winner”, is it for that reason that the “person” is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Is there anyone who, not having been a stream-winner, is one now?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Is there anyone who, not having been a “person”, is one now?

Puggalavādin: Nay, that cannot truly be said … .

Theravādin: Again, granted that there is such an one as a stream-winner, and that this is the reason for your affirmation as to the personal entity, is there anyone who having been a stream-winner, is so no longer?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Is there anyone who, not having been a person, is one now?

Puggalavādin: Nay, that cannot truly be said … .

These questions are now put regarding the other designations, and are answered similarly.

Puggalavādin: If as you say it be wrong to assert “the person is known, etc., …” are there not the accepted terms of “the Four Pairs of men”, “the Eight Individuals”?

Theravādin: Yes.

Puggalavādin: But if that be so, surely it is right to speak of the “person” as known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact.

Theravādin: Granting that there are the Four, the Eight, is it for this reason you assert the first proposition?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Do the Four, the Eight, appear because of the Buddha's appearing?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Does the “person” appear because of the Buddha's appearing?

Puggalavādin: Nay, that cannot truly be said … .

Theravādin: I repeat the question.

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Then at the Buddha's final Nibbāna, is the “person” annihilated, so that no personal entity exists?

Puggalavādin: Nay, that cannot truly be said … .

Theravādin: The person you say is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact—is the person conditioned?

Puggalavādin: Nay, that cannot truly be said … .

Theravādin: Is the person unconditioned?

Puggalavādin: Nay, that cannot truly be said … .

Theravādin: Is he neither?

Puggalavādin: Nay, that cannot truly be said … .

Theravādin: I repeat my question.

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Apart from the conditioned or the unconditioned, is there another, a third alternative?

Puggalavādin: Nay, that cannot truly be said … .

Theravādin: I repeat my question.

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: But was it not said by the Exalted One:

“There are, bhikkhus, these two irreducible categories—what are the two? The irreducible category of the conditioned, the irreducible category of the unconditioned. These are the two”?

Is the Suttanta thus?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Hence it is surely wrong to say that apart from the conditioned and the unconditioned, there is another, a third alternative.

Theravādin (continues): You say that the person is neither conditioned nor unconditioned? Are then the conditioned, the unconditioned, the person, entirely different things?

Puggalavādin: Nay, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: Are the aggregates conditioned, Nibbāna unconditioned, the person neither conditioned nor unconditioned?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Then are the aggregates, Nibbāna, and the person, three entirely different things?

Puggalavādin: Nay, that cannot truly be said … .

The last two questions are then applied to each aggregate taken separately: material qualities, feeling, perception, mental coefficients, consciousness).

Theravādin: Is the genesis of the person apparent, and its passing away also, and is its duration distinctively apparent?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Then is the person conditioned?

Puggalavādin: Nay, that cannot truly be said … .

Theravādin: It was said by the Exalted One:

“Bhikkhus, there are these three characteristics of the conditioned: of conditioned things the genesis is apparent, the passing away is apparent, the duration amidst change is apparent”.

Hence if these three are characteristics of the person, this is also conditioned. Are these three characteristics not apparent in the person?

Puggalavādin: No, they are not apparent.

Theravādin: Then is the person unconditioned?

Puggalavādin: Nay, that cannot truly be said … .

Theravādin: It was said by the Exalted One:

“Bhikkhus, there are these three characteristics of the unconditioned: of unconditioned things, bhikkhus, the genesis is not apparent, the passing away is not apparent, the duration amidst change is not apparent”.

Now if all these as you say do not characterize the notion of “person”, the person is unconditioned.

Theravādin: The person who has attained final Nibbāna, does he exist in the Goal, or does he not exist therein?

Puggalavādin: He exists in the Goal.

Theravādin: Is then the person who has finally attained eternal?

Puggalavādin: Nay, that cannot truly be said … .

Theravādin: Is the person who has attained final Nibbāna and does not exist in the Goal annihilated?

Puggalavādin: Nay, that cannot truly be said … .

Theravādin: On what does the person depend in order to persist?

Puggalavādin: He persists through dependence on coming-to-be.

Theravādin: Is the state of coming-to-be impermanent, conditioned, arisen through a cause, liable to perish, to pass away, to become passionless, to cease, to change?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Is the person also impermanent, conditioned, arisen through a cause, liable to perish, to pass away, to become passionless, to cease, to change?

Puggalavādin: Nay, that cannot truly be said … .

Puggalavādin: Is it wrong to say “the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact”?

Theravādin: Yes.

Puggalavādin: Is there no one who, on feeling pleasurable feeling, knows that he is feeling it?

Theravādin: Yes.

Puggalavādin: Surely, if that be so, good sir, it is right to say “the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact”… and if he, on feeling painful feeling, knows that he is feeling it—you admit this?—it is right to say “the person is known”, etc. So also for neutral feeling.

Theravādin: I note what you affirm. Now is it for this reason that you maintain the person to be known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Then is one who, on feeling pleasurable feeling, knows he is feeling it, a personal entity, and is one who, on that occasion, does not know, not a personal entity?

Puggalavādin: Nay, that cannot truly be said … .

Theravādin: You deny this also in the case of painful and neutral feeling?

Puggalavādin: Yes, that cannot truly be said … .

Theravādin: But you maintain, because of this self-awareness, that the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Is then pleasurable feeling one thing and the self-conscious enjoyer another?

Puggalavādin: Nay, that cannot truly be said … .

Same query and answer in the case of painful and neutral feelings.

Puggalavādin: You deny that the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact: Is there then no one who may be occupied in contemplating the concept of body with respect to his physical frame?

Theravādin: Yes.

Puggalavādin: … or in contemplating the concept of feeling, or consciousness, or certain mental properties with respect to these in himself, respectively?

Theravādin: Yes.

Puggalavādin: Then surely, good sir, it is right to say as I do with respect to the person.

Theravādin: Granting the carrying out by anyone of the four applications in mindfulness, is it for this reason that you say as you do with respect to the personal entity?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Then is anyone when so engaged a person, and not, when he is not so engaged?

Puggalavādin: Nay, that cannot truly be said … .

Theravādin: Or again, granting as above… is “body” one thing, the contemplator another? and so for “feeling”, etc.?

Puggalavādin: Nay, that cannot truly be said … .

Theravādin: Is the person known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Was it not said by the Exalted One:

“O Mogharājan! look upon the world
As void of soul, and ever heedful bide.

Cut out the world's opinions as to soul.
So shalt thou get past death; so an thou look,
The king of death shall no more look on thee”?

Is it thus in the Suttanta?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Hence it is surely wrong to say that the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact.

Theravādin: Is it the person or soul here who “looks upon”?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Does he contemplate with or without material qualities?

Puggalavādin: With them.

Theravādin: Is that soul the same as that body?

Puggalavādin: Nay, that cannot truly be said … .

Theravādin: But if he contemplates without material qualities, is that soul quite different from that body?

Puggalavādin: Nay, that cannot truly be said … .

Theravādin: I ask again is it the soul or person who contemplates?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Does he contemplate when he has gone within, or does he contemplate from without the organism?

Puggalavādin: He contemplates when he has gone within.

Theravādin: Is that soul that body?

Puggalavādin: Nay, that cannot truly be said … .

Theravādin: Supposing he contemplates from without, is the soul one thing, the body another?

Puggalavādin: Nay, that cannot truly be said … .

Puggalavādin: Is it wrong to say “the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact”?

Theravādin: Yes.

Puggalavādin: Was not the Exalted One a speaker of truth, a speaker in season, a speaker of facts, a speaker of words that are right, that are not wrong, that are not ambiguous?

Theravādin: Yes.

Puggalavādin: Now it was said by the Exalted One:

“There is the person who works for his own good …”

Is the Suttanta thus?

Theravādin: Yes.

Puggalavādin: Hence surely the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact.

Puggalavādin: … again, it was said by the Exalted One:

“There is one person, bhikkhus, who, being reborn in this world, is born for the good, for the happiness of many, to show compassion on the world, for the advantage, the good, the happiness of devas and of men”.

Is the Suttanta thus?

Theravādin: Yes.

Puggalavādin: Hence surely the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact.

Theravādin: Granting this, and also the veracity, etc., of the Exalted One, it was said by the Exalted One:

“All things are without soul”.

Is the Suttanta thus?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Hence surely it is wrong to say the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact.

… again, it was said by the Exalted One:

“He does not doubt that misery arises, comes to pass, that misery ceases, passes away, nor is he perplexed thereat. And thereupon independent insight comes herein to him. Now this, Kaccāna, thus far is right views”.

Is the Suttanta thus?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Hence surely it is wrong to say “the person is known”, etc.

Theravādin: … again, was it not said by Bhikkhunī Vajirā to Māra the evil One:

“`Being'? What dost thou fancy by that word?
'Mong false opinions, Māra, art thou strayed.
This a mere bundle of formations is.
Therefrom no `being' mayest thou obtain.
For e'en as, when the factors are arranged,
The product by the name `chariot' is known,
So doth our usage covenant to say:
`A being', when the aggregates are there.

'Tis simply Ill that riseth, simply Ill
That doth persist, and then fadeth away.
Nought beside Ill there is that comes to be;
Nought else but Ill there is that fades away”?

Is the Suttanta thus?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: … again, did not the venerable Ānanda say to the Exalted One:

“It is said, lord, `the world is void, the world is void'. Now in what way, lord, is it meant that the world is void”?

and did not the Exalted One reply:

“Inasmuch, Ānanda, as it is void of soul and of what belongs to soul, therefore is the world called void. And wherein, Ānanda, is it void of soul and of what belongs to soul? The eye, Ānanda, is verily void of soul and of what belongs to soul, so is visible object and the sense and contact of sight. So are the other organs, and objects of the senses, and the other senses. So is the co-ordinating organ, cognizable objects, mental consciousness and contact. All are void of soul and of what belongs to soul. And whatever pleasurable, painful, or neutral feeling arises, in relation to the senses, and the sense-co-ordinating mind that too is void of soul and of what belongs to soul. It is for this, Ānanda, that the world is said to be void”?

Is the Suttanta thus?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: … again, whereas you affirm that the person is known, etc … and we know the veracity, etc., of the Exalted One, it was said by the Exalted One:

“Bhikkhus, if there were soul, should I have that which belongs to a soul? Or if there were that which belongs to soul, should I have a soul? In both cases ye would reply: `Yea, lord'. But both soul and that which belongs to soul being in very truth and for ever impossible to be known, then this that is a stage of opinion, namely: `that is the world, that is the soul, this I shall hereafter become, permanent, constant, eternal, unchangeable—so shall I abide even like unto the Eternal'—is not this, bhikkhus, absolutely and entirely a doctrine of fools?” “Whatever it be not, lord, it surely is, absolutely and entirely a doctrine of fools”.

Is the Suttanta thus?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: … again, it was said by the Exalted One:

“There are these three teachers, Seniya, to be found in the world—who are the three? There is first, Seniya, that kind of teacher who declares that there is a real, persistent soul in the life that now is, and in that which is to come; then there is the kind of teacher, Seniya, who declares that there is a real, persistent soul in the life that now is, but not a soul in a future life; lastly, there is a certain teacher who does not declare that there is a soul either in the life that now is, nor in that which is to come. The first, Seniya, of these three is called an Eternalist, the second is called an Annihilationist; the third of these, he, Seniya, is called the teacher, who is Buddha supreme. These are the three teachers to be found in the world”.

Is the Suttanta thus?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: … again, did the Exalted One speak of “a butter-jar”?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Is there anyone who can make a jar out of butter?

Puggalavādin: Nay, that cannot truly be said … .

Theravādin: … finally, did the Exalted One speak of an oil-jar, a honey-jar, a molasses-jar, a milk-pail, a water-pot, a cup, flask, bowl of water, a “meal provided in perpetuity”, a “constant supply of congey”?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Is there any supply of congey that is permanent, stable, eternal, not liable to change?

Puggalavādin: Nay, that cannot truly be said … .

Theravādin: Hence it is surely wrong to say “the soul is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact”.

The Points of Controversy, an English translation of the Pali Abhidhamma Kathāvatthu. Translated by Shwe Zan Aung and C.A.F. Rhys Davids. First published by Pali Text Society, 1915.

This SuttaCentral edition was prepared by Manfred Wierich and Ven. Vimala and proofread by Josephine Tobin. Some changes were introduced:

Abbreviations, i.e., those of cited works and the participants in the controversies, were expanded.

Cross-references were linked.

Some typographic changes were introduced, among others, i.e.: the phonetic symbol “ŋ” was changed to the Pāli diacritical letter “ṃ”, “ô” to “o”, single quotes to double quotes, and “:—” to “:”.

Letter-spacing with fixed spaces was replaced with bold font.

The corrigenda were merged into the text. Some could not be resolved, though.

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